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Abstract 
Domestic Extremism Violence Facing U.S. Law Enforcement: How Can These Threats 
Be Mitigated? Matthew R. Gilbert, 2018: Dissertation, Nova Southeastern University, 
College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Justice and Human 
Services. Descriptors: Domestic Extremism, Domestic Terrorist, Community Policing, 
Law Enforcement Shot in the Line of Duty, Far-right Extremist-Perpetrated Homicides 
 
The barbaric and targeted killings of police officers have become a growing epidemic 
facing the nation. An immediate consequence has created the monumental task in 
protecting the men and women who daily put their lives on the line on behalf of the 
public. Staggering national numbers over these last ten years has indicated a strong surge 
in the number of law enforcement officers being ambushed by domestic extremists. The 
purpose of the current research study was to present an overall awareness and threat 
picture to the law enforcement and academic communities to better educate men and 
women in law enforcement and to explain who exactly are these domestic extremist 
groups and/or individuals carrying out this violence and their ideologies and traits that 
make them crave such an outcome. The current research study utilized a strong 
exploratory qualitative focus by interviewing several law enforcement members and 
intelligence personnel in the Hampton Roads, Virginia, area to (a) gauge their 
jurisdictional domestic extremist threat picture; (b) to understand what policing tactics 
were being employed currently to produce effective “officer safety” protocols while 
embracing community relationships (if any); and (c) what recommendations they may 
have for other jurisdictions that will keep safe law enforcement men and women. If one 
law enforcement life can be saved from the current research study, then every second 
spent on the research was well worth it.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The barbaric and targeted killings of police officers has become a growing 
epidemic facing people in the United States. An immediate consequence has been that it 
has become a monumental task to protect the men and women who daily put their lives 
on the line on behalf of the public. Staggering national numbers over the last ten years 
have indicated a strong surge in the number of law enforcement officers being ambushed 
by domestic extremists. The 2017 ambushed shooting death of a New York City police 
officer in the borough of the Bronx signaled the latest in a growing number of officer 
deaths, up 20% in 2017 (“Police officer deaths,” 2017). In 2017, a total of 46 police 
officers died from gunfire, mostly from domestic extremists, emphasizing the surge in 
violent crime against the nation’s police officers (Officer Down Memorial Page, 2018a). 
The disturbing facts about the attacks are that there is no one region where they take 
place. The events are occurring nationwide, involving individuals from all walks of life 
(Bureau of Justice Assistance, Valor, 2016). Not only was 2017 a deadly year for 
officers, but during the first half of 2016, there was a large increase in police officer 
deaths, with 57 between January 1 and July 5, 2016 (“Police officer deaths,” 2017). 
The weapons of choice for the police officer killings have been primarily 
handguns. The handgun-related deaths have risen by 9%, from 22 to 24 for 2017 (“Police 
officer deaths,” 2017). The data indicates is that 2016 was one of the deadliest years for 
police officers in 5 years; a, total of 135 officers died in 2016 (“Police officer deaths,” 
2017). What does this mean for police officers and the potential for further increases in 
violence? Unfortunately, it means more violence toward law enforcement officers, 
especially from domestic extremist groups and individuals, and the overall disrespect for 
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the badge and uniform has greatly increased during the last ten years. Randy Sutton, a 
national spokesman for Blue Lives Matter, stated, “People are now more willing to 
engage the police in combat” (“Ambush murder of cops,” 2017).  
The year 2017 and parts of 2016, were particularly deadly for police officers; 
2016 was especially violent, with approximately 50,000 law enforcement officers having 
been severely assaulted or shot (“Police officer deaths,” 2017). Specifically, in 2016, 58 
officers were killed in the line of duty by gunfire; 20 were ambushed and killed, 
compared to 6 officers in 2015. The statistics are staggering, because they show more 
than a 300% increase in ambushes over the previous year. Furthermore, since the 
beginning of November 2016, ambush attacks involving multiple officers and 10 line-of-
duty deaths have resulted from gunfire. These are not just numbers; these are the lives of 
people who are dedicated to service.  
According to a preliminary report from the National Law Enforcement Officers 
Memorial Fund (NLEOMF; 2017b), the number of law enforcement officers shot and 
killed in the line of duty increased sharply in 2016, compared to 2015. The overall 
number of officer fatalities rose by 10%, remaining lower than average for the previous 
10 years. The NLEOMF officials found that 64 officers were killed in firearm-related 
incidents in 2016, which was a 56% increase from 2015, when 41 officers were killed. It 
was the highest number of firearms-related deaths recorded since 2011, when the tally 
was 73.  
As police violence against police officers significantly increased, officials at 
NLEOMF (2016) reported, “Those shooting deaths included 21 deaths in ambush-style 
shootings, the highest total in more than 2 decades." The increase was caused partly by a 
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few high-profile shootings that took the lives of multiple officers. Officials noted:  
Eight multiple-shooting death incidents claimed the lives of 20 officers in 2016, 
tied with 1971 for the highest total of any year since 1932. Those incidents 
included five officers killed in ambush attacks in Dallas (TX) and three in Baton 
Rouge (LA) spanning only 10 days in July. (National Law Enforcement Officer 
Memorial Fund, 2016)   
Finally, 1971 was a very deadly year for law enforcement, as struggles between 
the community members and the police officers, and racial overtones provided the 
incentive in many police shootings (in which Black Panthers were involved), the first 
year of the Nixon administration’s “war on drugs,” and the Attica Prison riot, which 
resulted in officer casualties. A strong comparison of reasons/factors can be made 
between the violence in 1971 and with modern violence.  
Relevant to current times is the emergence of the alt-right movement. According 
to officials at the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), “2017 was the most violent year 
of the alt-right movement, and the average age of these groups is 27 years old, with the 
youngest being 17” (Hankes & Amend, 2018), which showed that the domestic extremist 
movement is getting more and more violent and becoming younger, no matter who is 
their intended target. To properly define the alt-right movement, according to the SPLC: 
The alternative right, commonly known as the alt-right, is a set of far-right 
ideologies, groups and individuals whose core belief is that “white identity” is 
under attack by multicultural forces using “political correctness” and “social 
justice” to undermine white people and “their” civilization. Characterized by 
heavy use of social media and online memes, Alt-Righters eschew 
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“establishment” conservatism, skew young, and embrace white ethno-nationalism 
as a fundamental value (Hankes & Amend, 2018). 
President and chief executive of the NLEOMF, Craig Floyd, said in response to 
all this violence against the police, “We've never seen a year in my memory when we've 
had an increase of this magnitude in officer shooting deaths" (Pane, 2016). Floyd further 
stated, “These officers were killed simply because of the uniform they wear and the job 
they do” (Pane, 2016).  
Background and Significance 
The threat against U.S. law enforcement officials increased dramatically in 2017, 
to the point where U.S. law enforcement officers were unfortunate visible targets to 
domestic extremists and their hatred. Other vital secondary data used to underscore the 
severity of the threat was noted by NBC news officials: 
There were 135 U.S. law enforcement fatalities in 2016. That’s the most officers 
killed in five years (2012–2016) and a 10% increase over 2015. Firearms were the 
popular choice used by these “police killers” in 2016 (firearms 64; traffic 53, and 
other 18), 56% (firearms deaths) increase from 2016 and 21 out of 64 shooting 
deaths were ambush-style (33% of firearms deaths), the highest in our country in 
more than two decades (NBC Washington News, 2016). 
Chapter 1 of the current research study is used to discuss the unfortunate number 
of ambush-style deaths of U.S. law enforcement officers and the sinister backgrounds of 
the extremists who caused these unnecessary deaths. Chapters 3 and 4 of the research 
examine from a law enforcement community counter-extremism perspective, the 
recommended programs from the U.S. Department of Justice (Community Oriented 
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Policing Services–COPS) Community Awareness Program and other programs globally, 
including one from Lt. Col. (ret.) D. Scott Mann, U.S. Army, author of Game Changers: 
Going Local to Defeat Violent Extremism (Mann, 2015), regarding combating extremism 
and rebuilding and stabilizing villages from the bottom-up perspective. Mann’s 
perspectives are used to reinforce the community policing and/or community 
participation impetus on his bottom-up stabilization approach. As part of the current 
study, critical program elements/concepts from the programs/ideologies were examined 
and added to private research, particularly when analyzing existing law enforcement 
domestic extremists’ prevention/mitigation programs. 
The current study is critical for modern law enforcement officers’ overall well-
being and is important for the senior leadership of the agencies to examine, evaluate, and 
possibly use some of the themes that were garnered during the current research study, 
especially the themes uncovered from the various domestic extremists, as well as offering 
some possible solutions (success stories) from the law enforcement members who were 
interviewed. One of the major reasons for the current study was to examine the known 
gap regarding this pertinent topic and determine what additional research needs to be 
conducted to offer solutions and/or remedies to save lives of law enforcement officers, 
while producing rich community relationships. It was important to understand the ways 
that members of the law enforcement community are facing the domestic extremist 
threats and to know specifically what each agency has been doing to make officers safer.  
The methodology chapter (Chapter 3) of the current research study is used to 
describe the interviewing of 17 law enforcement officers and intelligence members from 
various government levels in the Hampton Roads, Virginia, area. The regional research 
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area and exploratory approach provided a large, diverse law enforcement sample, because 
the Hampton Roads area is rich in law enforcement, military services, and educational 
institutions, all within close proximity. Approximately 25 law enforcement agencies are 
within a 50-mile radius in the area, which provided the researcher with a rich law 
enforcement target area to interview for community policing/stabilization programs 
aimed at curtailing the domestic extremist threat and determine the overall threat. Finally, 
the Hampton Roads area offered a diverse population (see Figure 1), in addition to 
representing approximately 20% of Virginia’s overall population from the 2010 census. 
The researcher felt that the demographic statistics would be invaluable for the overall 
study, because many different ethnic/race backgrounds and many different levels of law 
enforcement (federal, state, county, local, university, and military) and intelligence 
personnel are represented in the Hampton Roads area. Once the researcher received 
approval from the school regarding his proposal being accepted on September 25, 2017 
and approval from the Institutional Review Board was received on October 29, 2017, 
various secondary data collection sources were established and the sampling of field 
interviews in the Hampton Roads, VA area commenced.   
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Figure 1. List and map of Hampton Roads communities.  Note: Hampton Roads area is 
categorized as PDC 23. Chart and map courtesy of Hampton Roads PDC-Virginia LMI 
(2018). virginialmi.com/report_center/community_profiles/5109000323.pdf 
 
Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of the current research was twofold. First, it was used to examine the 
available secondary data (for example the Officer Down Memorial Page, National Law 
Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, Bureau of Justice, and other similar collecting 
organizations and agencies) and to compare and contrast the increase and/or decrease of 
violence on law enforcement from the hands of domestic extremists. As part of this 
section, the researcher identified the domestic extremist individuals/groups responsible 
for the violence and provided an ideological background and case studies associated with 
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these perpetrators. The audience of the research study were members of the academic 
field in furthering the research, and senior law enforcement leaders, to give them the 
necessary information to make important remedies for their officers and communities 
about the propensity of violence associated with these groups. 
Second, the current study was used in an attempt to offer solutions to the critical 
issue facing U.S. law enforcement members by first researching a significant sample size 
of various government levels of law enforcement and intelligence agencies (federal, state, 
and local) and to determine if the agency officials have programs for combating the 
domestic extremism threats from a community-based policing model (for example, the 
Community Oriented Policing Services–COPS), then to offer a bottom-up perspective to 
connect community leaders. Themes or key words were collected through interviews with 
various law enforcement personnel, knowledgeable individuals who utilize vital concepts 
from such programs as Lt. Col. D. Scott Mann’s (2015) Game Changers: Going Local to 
Defeat Violent Extremist. 
By utilizing COPS and Mann’s perspectives, the next phase in the current study 
was to determine if the agency officials had a counter-extremist/community-based 
program (such as COPS and/or the Mann approach) and to see how the program was 
received within the community, and to gain feedback, particularly from the agency itself 
and within the community. How are such programs deployed within the department and 
community? What are the main goals of the program, and how long has it been 
implemented? What are some of the costs and risks associated with the program? 
Finally, if the selected agencies’ officials did not have some sort of a counter-
extremist/community-based program, the study was used in an attempt to ascertain why 
9 
 
 
not and to ask if they planned to have some sort of a program in the future. Additionally, 
if not an extremist prevention program, did the agency officials have a similar community 
interaction program already in place? If the agencies officials did not have a program in 
place, what were some of their reasons—monetary, lack of personnel, other needs within 
the agency/community (gangs, drugs, guns, and any other pressing agency need)? 
Research Questions 
With increasing violence being used against U.S. law enforcement, the main goals 
of the current research study were:  
1. Accurate profiling of the individuals or groups responsible for the documented 
increase in violence against the police (through secondary data sources). 
2. Detailed descriptions of the ideologies motivating such individuals or groups 
and associated case studies. 
3. Increased understanding of the “lone wolf terrorist”—as the term is used by 
law enforcement—and if this term factors in some way to any involvement in 
domestic extremism terrorism.  
4. To determine solutions for the law enforcement community to mitigate these 
threats and subsequent violence.  
Specifically, the project’s research questions were as follows:  
RQ1. What, if any, evidence/data is there to indicate the increase in violence 
targeting law enforcement from U.S. domestic terrorists’/extremists groups today? 
RQ2. Who exactly are these domestic extremist groups and what are their 
ideologies/motivations? 
RQ3. What are some practical solutions from a community policing/intelligence 
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perspective? From existing studies/research, what are some common themes in 
attempting to alleviate this targeted and barbaric violence on U.S. law enforcement 
members and what do law enforcement members perceive as the greatest threat today?  
Chapters 2 and 4 of the current study was used to focus on Research Question 3.  
Additionally, how much does mental illness have a part in a terrorist world/mind-
set? Is there a reason to be concerned with undiagnosed mental illness, especially with 
regards to a lone wolf actor? Corner and Gill (2017) documented mental illness diagnoses 
in terrorist activities/individuals/groups around the world, including the U.S., and found 
that “domestic terrorist (far-right)” were diagnosed as having “40.4% (lone wolves 
having a mental diagnoses) vs. 7.6% (far-right groups having a mental diagnoses)” (p. 1). 
Data were used to underscore the need for more research and corrective ways to address 
the violent issues in the nation currently, especially pertaining to the lone wolf type of 
domestic terrorism.    
The problem statement for the current research study was that based on the 
increased violence against law enforcement officers, especially in the last 10 years, 
mostly at the hands of domestic extremists, a heightened systematic law enforcement 
community awareness and coordinated community involvement effort must be in place to 
curtail the barbaric and targeted violence against our law enforcement officers. 
Additionally, the current research study was used to discuss, based on a law enforcement 
community awareness model with key community action recommendations, how to bring 
a unified perspective with the law enforcement community and with the communities 
they serve. Moreover, because the problem is of national concern and not a regional issue 
or a certain jurisdictional challenge in terms of growing violence against law 
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enforcement, the current study was used to offer some general remedies to mitigate the 
volatile social problem.  
To collect the valuable data on the Hampton Roads law enforcement research, 17 
law enforcement and intelligence-based personnel (both sworn and civilian personnel) 
were interviewed to gauge their knowledge of the topic. Furthermore, the current research 
was used to try to determine if the agencies’ participants believed they had any domestic 
extremists in their area of responsibility, what (if any) their agency was doing to curtail 
this threat (if any).  Finally, what were some possible solutions to make a healthier 
police/community relationship. The following questions were asked of each interviewee, 
and the answers were coded by the researcher to capture key words and/or concepts.  
1. What is your definition of a domestic extremist? 
2. Do you believe you have domestic extremists in your area of responsibility? If so, 
how many individuals/groups do you think you have? 
3. How has your agency perceived the domestic extremist threat in your area of 
responsibility? How about agencies around the country? 
4. Does your agency currently have a program aimed at combating this type of 
extremism or any type of law enforcement program similar to this? 
5. How about a community-based program aimed at preventing domestic extremism 
or any other criminality issues seen in your jurisdiction? 
6. If not, did your agency have a program combating this type of extremism? 
7. If your agency does not currently have a program combating this type of 
extremism, why not? 
8. If your agency does have some sort of a community awareness and/or extremist 
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prevention program, how would you describe its overall missions, goals, processes, and 
any other positives and/or negatives? 
9. If you could start a new program within your department, what would it be? 
10. What is your opinion on the best way to combat this type of extremism? 
11. Have you heard of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Community Awareness Brief 
or the department’s community awareness program aimed at preventing extremism? 
12. What would you say is your agency’s relationship with the public? 
13. How would you improve your relationship with the public: more community 
involvement with joint programs (i.e., ride-along programs, fundraisers, class instruction, 
and describing police actions)? 
Any other comments? 
Data Collection and Analysis 
  A qualitative data analysis approach was utilized for the current research study. 
Specifically, key secondary data collection and case study research methods were applied 
to pinpoint causations behind the national threat to law enforcement members. Crucial 
secondary data collection points were utilized from the following sources: (a) National 
Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), (b) Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
(c) Anti-Defamation League (ADL), (d) the International Security Program at the New 
America Foundation, (e) Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), and (f) the Triangle 
Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, and various other vital open source 
information networks. Leaders at these entities regularly collect timely information on 
domestic extremist activity/violence and any violence toward law enforcement, the 
researcher continuously checked the websites and communicated/requested any 
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additional data with/from the respective agencies. 
 Secondary data collection methods. Records approach is a data collection 
instrument that was vital in collecting necessary and timely data to complete this portion 
of the current research study. The researcher looked at statistics on the amount of law 
enforcement violence suffered at the hands of domestic extremists; therefore, acquiring 
records over this time period was crucial. Finally, these records were collected from 
sound law enforcement type associations reporting these ambushes and violent acts upon 
law enforcement officers.  The researcher looked at the secondary data sources to 
determine if an increase of violence against law enforcement from domestic extremists 
existed over the past 10 years compared to violence against law enforcement from 
international extremists (i.e., ISIS, Al-Qaeda). The focus with collecting the secondary 
data was to research any increase or decrease in the amount of violence against U.S. law 
enforcement at the hands of domestic extremists, within the last 10 years or so. The 
researcher also looked at a variety of secondary data sources and compared them to 
determine the overall threat of violence against U.S. law enforcement.  
Chapter 4 of the current research study incorporated a qualitative method by 
collecting data by interviewing 17 Hampton Roads law enforcement and intelligence 
personnel and coding their responses regarding domestic extremist threats against law 
enforcement members working the Hampton Roads area, including educational 
institutions. Once permission from members of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) was 
granted, the researcher sent out approximately 25 e-mails to Hampton Roads law 
enforcement agencies to determine the level of interest in participating in the current 
research and subsequently placed an additional 25 phone calls to these agencies, with 
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some of the phone calls to different agency representatives. After a few weeks, only one 
police agency responded with interest and an interview was set up. Over the next few 
months, the researcher was able to interview 16 more law enforcement personnel either in 
a secured office at their request and/or performed electronically to protect confidentiality. 
  This portion of the research was relevant in terms of understanding the domestic 
extremist groups and/or individuals who were currently in the participants’ jurisdiction, 
their agency’s overall threat level toward the groups, and how they were dealing with the 
threat (if any). Specifically, the researcher wanted to know if the police agency personnel 
being interviewed were employing some sort of a domestic extremism prevention 
program, and/or a community policing model or community awareness program aimed at 
curving domestic extremist violence in their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the researcher 
sought to determine the programs, and if were they considered successful in their 
respective jurisdictions in preventing violence against law enforcement officers. 
By conducting 17 interviews of various federal, state, and local law enforcement 
and intelligence members, the researcher collected valuable data and analyzed the 
findings as applicable to the open-ended questions (with some close-ended questions as 
well). The researcher looked for certain themes, such as a law enforcement agency 
having a community program in place that was very effective, by having law enforcement 
actively engaged with the public at public events, trainings, and fundraisers. Additionally, 
if an agency did not have a community program in place, the administrators were asked 
why. Possible answers included funding, lack of personnel, and not seeing the perceived 
threat as possible themes to this question, which would all be analyzed very carefully as 
part of the research project. 
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The researcher looked at the responses from the interviewees and compared the 
themes with community-oriented and/or stabilization concepts, such as the U.S. 
Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), Community 
Awareness Program, and other global programs, including the one from Mann (2015). 
The researcher compared and contrasted the responses from the interview questions with 
the known programs and analyzed them to see if any of the answers align with any of the 
key concepts. 
Limitations and Delimitations 
Anderson (2010) stated, 
Qualitative research is often criticized as biased, small scale, anecdotal, and/or 
lacking rigor; however, when it is carried out properly it is unbiased, in depth, 
valid, reliable, credible, and rigorous. In qualitative research, there needs to be a 
way of assessing the “extent to which claims are supported by convincing 
evidence.  (p. 141) 
The aim of the current study was to collect unbiased, in-depth, credible 
information secured from experienced law enforcement personnel and to ask thought-
provoking questions in an attempt to provide answers and guidance to help curtail the 
increase of violence toward law enforcement members at the hands of domestic 
extremists.  
Concerning limitations and delimitations, every attempt was made to conduct the 
interviews in person to ensure that communication was clear and understood pertaining 
the grave meaning and concepts of the topic. The researcher performed the following 
methods to ensure the topic was understood: 
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1. Each interviewee read the consent package, including definitions, and all advised 
that they understood the topic area. 
2. The researcher spoke about the topic and what the background was all about in 
regard to the domestic extremist threat.  
3. A brochure was given to each interviewee beforehand to give more information 
on the topic. 
4. An e-mail was sent to each agency leader to discuss the research and to solicit his 
or her participation in the overall research.  
To address the validity and reliability with the limitations and delimitations 
portion of the research study, the researcher went to 10 of the 15 police agencies without 
an appointment and spoke with a desk officer, requesting to speak with one of their law 
enforcement members knowledgeable in the field (usually just asking for a detective or 
investigator working this type of criminality). This type of questioning and/or validity 
asking for a law enforcement member knowledgeable in this field of research was 
paramount to the overall findings to eliminate any inaccuracies, for example, when a law 
enforcement member may not know anything about this type of criminality. Pogrebin 
stated, “The problem of validity in field research concerns [in qualitative research] the 
difficulty of gaining an accurate or true impression of the phenomenon under study” 
(Pogrebin, 2003, p. 8). Each law enforcement member interviewed stated that he or she 
understood the meaning of the current research.  
Another significant portion of the current qualitative research was: 
Qualitative research is usually described as allowing a detailed exploration of a 
topic of interest in which information is collected by a researcher through case 
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studies, ethnographic work, interviews, and so on. Inherent in this approach is the 
description of the interactions among participants and researchers in naturalistic 
settings with few boundaries, resulting in a flexible and open research process. 
(Harwell, 2011, p. 148). 
The main goal of the current study was to conduct research through case studies, 
while collecting secondary data to show the increase of the overall threat, in addition to 
having the interviews performed via open-ended questions with the interviewees able to 
express their true key opinions on this topic and how their respective agency was 
handling this threat (if any) in a confidential manner. The interviews were conducted in a 
positive environment where engaging conversations and opinions were expressed to the 
researcher, and the interviewees were able to express their opinions openly and without 
any interference and possible backlash from their agency.  
Limitations of the Study 
 One major limitation of the current research study was the unfortunate fact that 
this topic is very fluid in its outcomes and with staggering increases in incidents. When 
the researcher began collecting secondary data information and case studies about the 
domestic extremist groups and individuals, law enforcement deaths continued. Late in 
February 2018, the researcher decided to add an epilogue to the current study with a list 
of the 2018 law enforcement homicides at the hands of domestic extremists. Sadly, the 
list continued to grow.  
Another limitation of the research was the lack of involvement with all Hampton 
Roads law enforcement agencies. The researcher contacted approximately 25 law 
enforcement agencies, but members from only 14 were subsequently 
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interviewed/participated. One agency representative declined to participate after the 
research topic was discussed with an emphasis on officer safety opinions. Even though 14 
agencies, representing the federal government, state government, local government and a 
public university, were all interviewed, creating a diverse group, the researcher would 
have liked to work with at least 25 agencies to gather more opinions from a larger 
population.  
 The third limitation of this research was that since this topic nationally was so 
fluid concerning law enforcement members being killed by gunfire, in many situations, 
the background of the shooter was never known or not revealed until much later in time. 
The current study involved the increased violence of domestic extremists against law 
enforcement members, and many of the secondary data sources listed only the 
unfortunate shooting occurrence as an ambush, domestic situation, and/or a mentally 
unstable individual without mentioning any allegiance to any domestic groups, 
ideologies, and/or the real motive behind the officer shooting. Any officer’s death on 
duty is tragic, senseless, and unnecessary, so any solution to prevent any future deaths is 
worth the time and effort. 
 Another limitation discovered during the research was that of the lone wolf 
background as it pertained to possible mental health issues. Law enforcement officers are 
often unable to find out if a certain subject is legally allowed to carry a weapon, due to 
privacy laws and the need for more law enforcement training about subjects with mental 
illnesses. As one participant responded, “The lone wolf threat keeps me up at night, as 
you really don’t know where the violence is coming from and when.” A prime example 
of this was the Las Vegas massacre. However, a robust community initiative is the first 
19 
 
 
start in knowing your enemies and where the threats are. Impressively, all law 
enforcement agencies the researcher interviewed in the Hampton Roads area employed a 
healthy and vigorous community awareness and/or community policing model, a key 
successful perspective Mann (2015), and Schanzer et al. (2016) had in their research. 
 Finally, during the course of the interviews of the law enforcement officers, it was 
suggested that the researcher should study the whole state of Virginia instead of one area 
such as Hampton Roads. One participant suggested that since the Hampton Roads area 
was mostly urban, many of the domestic extremist groups didn’t have the space to set up 
a gun range, and the western portion of the state would have more groups based on the 
ability to create their own compounds.  Most likely, the researcher would’ve received 
different opinions on threat groups in the western part of the state, but the goal of the 
present study was to look at a particular area with a diverse population.   
Definition of Terms 
Alternative Right (alt-right):  
 “The alternative right, commonly known as the alt-right, is a set of far-right 
ideologies, groups, and individuals whose core belief is that “white identity” is under 
attack by multicultural forces using “political correctness” and “social justice” to 
undermine white people and “their” civilization.” (Hankes & Amend, 2018) 
Characterized by heavy use of social media and online memes, alt-righters eschew 
establishment conservatism, skew young, and embrace white ethno-nationalism as a 
fundamental value.” (Hankes & Amend, 2018) 
Anti-Defamation League (ADL):  
The ADL is a nongovernment organization that collects pertinent extremist (hate 
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groups and domestic extremists) data and includes several up-to-date data collections on 
domestic extremists’ violence toward law enforcement and the number of hate crimes 
across America. (Anti-Defamation League, 2018c)  
Bureau of Justice Assistance Valor Initiative: 
The Officer Robert Wilson III Preventing Violence Against Law Enforcement 
Officers and Ensuring Officer Resilience and Survivability (VALOR) Initiative is 
an effort to improve the immediate and long-term safety, wellness, and resilience 
of law enforcement officers. Through a multifaceted approach that includes 
delivering no-cost training (professional education), conducting research, 
developing and providing resources, and establishing partnerships that benefit law 
enforcement officers, VALOR seeks to provide our nation's law enforcement 
officers with innovative, useful, and valuable resources. (Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, Valor Initiative, 2018) 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS): 
 The BJS mission is  
to collect, analyze, publish, and disseminate information on crime, criminal 
offenders, victims of crime, and the operation of justice systems at all levels of 
government. These data are critical to federal, state, and local policymakers in 
combating crime and ensuring that justice is both efficient and evenhanded. (BJS, 
2018) 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS):  
The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the 
component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of 
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community policing by the nation's state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies through information and grant resources (Community Oriented Policing 
Services, U.S. Department of Justice, 2017b). 
Community policing:  
Community policing emphasizes proactive problem-solving in a systematic and 
routine fashion. Rather than responding to crime only after it occurs, community policing 
encourages agencies to proactively develop solutions to the immediate underlying 
conditions contributing to public safety problems (Community Oriented Policing 
Services, U.S. Department of Justice, 2017a). 
Domestic terrorist:  
People who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-
based extremist ideologies and movements, including individuals who commit crimes in 
the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, White 
supremacy, antigovernment ideals, Black separatism, and anti-abortion beliefs 
(Bjelopera, 2012).  
Far right:  
There are three major ideological movements within the American violent far 
right: a racist/white supremacy movement, an anti-federalist movement, and a 
fundamentalist movement (Perliger, 2012, p. 2).  
International Security Program at the New America Foundation: 
Leaders of the group database pertinent information on American citizens and 
permanent residents engaging in violent extremism activity within the United States from 
2001 to 2015. Every year, the foundation leaders produce informative statistics on the 
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valuable data collected for the year. 
Lone wolf terrorist:  
A lone wolf actor terrorist is defined in Corner and Gill (2017) as “an individual 
lacking any ties to a terrorist/violent extremist group. … The individuals typically engage 
in violence in support of a group and/or ideology within the sample, including those 
inspired by Islamist, right-wing, leftwing, nationalist, and single-issue ideologies” 
(Corner & Gill, 2017, p. 1). 
National Law Enforcement Memorial Fund (NLEOMF): 
“The Memorial Fund serves as a nationwide clearinghouse of information and 
statistics on law enforcement line-of-duty deaths” (NLEOMF, 2017a). Furthermore, the 
Memorial Fund officials maintain current statistics on law enforcement line-of-duty 
deaths, how the law enforcement member perished, and will give statistical analysis of 
any trends in death rates and individuals/groups responsible. 
Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP): 
The Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc. (ODMP) is a nonprofit organization 
dedicated to honoring America's fallen law enforcement heroes. More than 22,000 
officers have made the ultimate sacrifice in the United States since 1791, and it is with 
great honor that the ODMP officials preserve their memories within its pages. 
(ODMP.org, 2018a) 
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC):   
The SPLC group collects pertinent hate groups and domestic extremist data and 
produces several vital informational studies/documents outlining the propensity for 
violence of these domestic extremist groups against U.S. law enforcement. The SPLC 
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leaders continuously collect information on the violence stemming from the domestic 
extremist groups.  
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START):  
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 
Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence led by the University of 
Maryland, “committed to the scientific study of the causes and human consequences of 
terrorism in the United States and around the world.”  (START, 2018) 
Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security: 
Sponsored by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Duke University, 
and Research Triangle Institute (RTI) International, the center’s mission is to “enhance 
the understanding of terrorism and the means to combat it through education, research 
and the development of partnerships between universities, industry and government.” 
officials perform critical research on the dynamic terrorism (both internationally and 
domestically) discipline and subsequent challenges. (Triangle Center on Terrorism and 
Homeland Security at Duke University, 2018). 
Importance of the Research 
The targeted and ambush-style killings of police officers have become a growing 
epidemic facing America and protecting the men and women who serve the public daily 
has become a monumental task. Significant national numbers over the last 10 years has 
indicated a strong surge in the amount of law enforcement officers ambushed by 
domestic extremist individuals. The domestic extremists are affiliated with groups and/or 
movements such as sovereign citizens, White Supremacy, Black separatists, militia 
extremists, and/or antigovernment extremists.  
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The researcher contacted as many Hampton Roads law enforcement 
representatives as possible. The personnel were from federal, state, local, and university 
law enforcement government levels. The purpose was to gauge the overall threat level (if 
any) that the domestic extremists pose to law enforcement members in their respective 
jurisdictions. Additionally, the researcher shared some of the statistics collected from a 
national perspective and associated case studies to underscore the severity of the threat. 
The second goal in gathering information from the law enforcement organizational 
perspective was to identify currently used techniques (i.e., community policing, 
community outreach, various law enforcement tactics, etc.), whereby the identification 
and threat from the various extremists are being addressed and keeping both officers and 
the community safe from these severe threats of violence. 
The final and most important goal of the current study was to share the research 
with the law enforcement community members regarding domestic extremist threats, not 
just in the Hampton Roads, VA, area, but nationally, through professional law 
enforcement organizations. It was the researcher’s intention to share the overall results 
with each participating agency to learn what works in one jurisdiction, and/or bring up 
possible solutions, such as a Hampton Roads law enforcement task force dealing with 
extremism. The point of sharing the information among the participating agencies was for 
raised awareness and increased officer safety. Saving even one law enforcement life 
through the current research would be worth the countless hours collecting the important 
information. Finally, the extremists who affect one area of Hampton Roads will likely 
travel to other areas of Hampton Roads in an effort to spread their views.  
  
25 
 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
Based on modern world events and the propensity for violence, most of U.S. law 
enforcement officer safety awareness and recognition is centered on the sinister violence 
surrounding international terrorism groups and is so warranted. However, U.S. law 
enforcement’s overall safety and security has been at a staggering crisis level due to the 
increased violence against police from domestic extremist groups (i.e., sovereign citizens, 
militia extremist groups, White supremacists, Black separatists, and/or any other 
antigovernment group/individual) and their overall propensity to violence on U.S. soil.  
National numbers over the last 10 years have indicated a strong surge in the 
number of law enforcement officers ambushed by domestic extremist individuals. 
Moreover, the 2017 ambushed style shooting death of a New York City police officer in 
the Bronx signaled the latest in a growing number of officer deaths in 2017, up 20% from 
this time in 2016 (“Police officer deaths,” 2017). In fact, a total of 134 police officers 
died in 2017 alone, and of those deaths, 46 were from gunfire, 1 was stabbed, 6 died from 
vehicular assault, and 5 were killed by assaults (Officer Down Memorial Page, 2018a). 
Other data indicated that 2018 would be another violent year against law enforcement 
members. According to the National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund’s 
(NLEOMF) website, for preliminary 2017 law enforcement officer fatalities, 98 law 
enforcement officers lost their lives (National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund, 
2017b), which is a minus 6% reduction from 2016 during this time, but it is still a very 
troubling number. Of the deaths, 36 of 98 officers were killed (a minus 22% change) 
during this time 2017, when 46 law enforcement officers were killed by firearms 
(National Law Enforcement Officer Memorial Fund, 2017b).  
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Unprecedented law enforcement deaths have occurred at the hands of these 
domestic extremist/right-wing/antigovernment groups for about 10 years from 2007 - 
2017, but a dramatic surge in the senseless and sinister violent acts over the last 10 years 
has shocked law enforcement members. From reviewing literature/studies, what data is 
available about this surge against law enforcement members? Also, who exactly are the 
groups/individuals causing the violence, and how do they continue to operate and carry 
out their attacks? What are some possible solutions from the law enforcement 
organization/community in reviewing vital literature/studies? Finally, what are some 
research gaps the researcher identified about the process? Perhaps law enforcement is not 
properly, or even at all, identifying a shooter’s background/domestic extremist group 
affiliation, or even reporting the information to the various data collection agencies, such 
as the National Law Enforcement Memorial, BJS, or any other national data source 
pertinent to this topic. 
Domestic Extremist Violence Data 
The first part of the literature review was used to examine relevant secondary data 
and case studies to explore the domestic extremist threat against U.S. law enforcement.  
 Extreme ideologies cause right-wing radicals to attack officers. Antigovernment 
extremists, such as militia groups and sovereign citizens, believe that police are agents of 
an illegitimate government, while White supremacists believe that police are tools of a 
Jewish-controlled government. The same ideologies sometimes cause extremists to act 
out violently when they randomly encounter police in routine situations. Moreover, 
because right-wing extremists frequently engage in criminal activity—both ideological 
and nonideological—police responding to reports of criminal activity may encounter 
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extremists committing a crime or who are fugitives from justice. Such situations can turn 
deadly. Unfortunately, relatively few officer safety courses incorporate information about 
the dangers to police from domestic extremists. 
As officials of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) purported, not one domestic 
extremist group has a monopoly on creating the most violence against law enforcement 
around the nation. However, a large number of police officers have been killed at the 
hands of Black nationalists. The ADL officials noted that in two 2016 occurrences—in 
Dallas, TX, and Baton Rouge, LA—8 police officers were killed in the ambushes, in 
Dallas by Micah Xavier Johnson, a member of a Black nationalist group, and in Baton 
Rouge by Gavin Eugene Long, a member of a Black nationalist group and an 
antigovernment sovereign citizen movement (Anti-Defamation League, 2016).  
The troubling issue regarding these police killings was the fact that the officers 
killed in the ambushes were killed as acts of retaliation. Specifically, both Johnson and 
Long killed these officers in retaliation for African Americans being killed by the police 
in other jurisdictions around the nation. ADL officials reported:  
These killings represent the worst spate of Black nationalist-related murders of 
police officers since the late 1960s and early 1970s, when more than two dozen 
police officers and several more corrections officers were killed by Black 
nationalists, particularly from the Black Liberation Army and the Black Panther 
Party (no relation to the New Black Panther Party). (Anti-Defamation League, 
2016)  
The first half of 2016 showed an increase in police officer deaths, with 57 officer 
deaths between January 1 and July 5, 2016 (“Police officer deaths,” 2017). Not 
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surprisingly, the weapons of choice for the police officer killings were guns. Gun-related 
deaths have risen by 9%, from 22 to 24 for 2017 (“Police officer deaths,” 2017). What all 
of the key data indicated was that police officers’ murders in 2016 made it the deadliest 
year for police in 5 years, with a total of 135 officers killed (“Police officer deaths,” 
2017). What does this mean for law enforcement officers on the streets and for future 
potential violence? Most appalling is the fact that “people are now more willing to 
engage the police in combat,” as Randy Sutton, stated (“Police officer deaths,” 2017).  
In 2016, approximately 50,000 law enforcement officers were severely assaulted 
and even shot (“Police officer deaths,” 2017). Specifically, in 2016, 64 officers were 
killed in the line of duty by gunfire, while 20 were ambushed and killed, compared with 
only 6 killed in 2015. The statistics showed more than a 300% increase in ambushes from 
2015. Furthermore, since the beginning of November 2016, ambush attacks involving 
multiple officers and 10 line-of-duty deaths (LODD) resulted from gunfire. But, these are 
not just numbers; these are lives of people who are dedicated to service. What is so 
disturbing about these attacks is that there is no one region where these attacks are taking 
place. The events are happening all over the country and involve individuals from all 
walks of life (Bureau of Justice Assistance, Valor, 2016). 
Moreover, according to a preliminary report from officials of the National Law 
Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund (NLEOMF), the number of law enforcement 
officers shot and killed in the line of duty increased sharply in 2016 compared to 2015. 
The overall number of officer fatalities increased by 10%, though remaining lower than 
the average for the previous 10 years. “The NLEOMF officials found that 64 officers 
were killed in firearm-related incidents in 2016 — a 56% increase over 2015, when 41 
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officers were killed. That was the highest number of firearms-related deaths recorded 
since 2011, when the tally was 73.” (National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, 
2016)  
As police violence has significantly increased, NLEOMF (2016) officials reported 
in a statement, “those shooting deaths included 21 deaths in ambush-style shootings ... 
the highest total in more than two decades.” The increase was partly caused by a few 
high-profile shootings that took the lives of multiple officers, NLEOMF (2016) officials 
noted, "Eight multiple-shooting death incidents claimed the lives of 20 officers in 2016, 
tied with 1971 for the highest total of any year since 1932.   
 The year 2014 was on track to be the deadliest year on record since 2001. Many 
law enforcement officers lost their lives in the World Trade Center attacks in New York 
City and the Pentagon, just outside Washington, DC. According to the NLEOMF, at one 
point in 2014, there were 23 law enforcement shooting deaths, compared with 15 
shooting deaths at the same time the previous year (2013). In 2014, there was one point 
where 62 police officers had been killed, while 45 were killed in 2013 at the same time of 
year. The figures included traffic-related incidents. Finally, with loss of two Las Vegas 
police officers in 2014, and with a 53% increase in shooting deaths from last year (2013), 
according to Riddell (2014), the factors have contributed to the growing concern about 
the influence of radical groups (Riddell, 2014). 
 The ADL officials took this growing domestic concern a step further and 
reported a “de facto” war (Anti-Defamation League, 2014) against law enforcement 
members by radical right-wing extremists, which included both antigovernment 
extremists and White supremacists, as shown in the targeted murder of two Las Vegas 
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police officers. The ADL (YEAR) officials reported that these extremists have 
intentionally embattled law enforcement officers, while other extremists have conducted 
violent acts when dealing with law enforcement in unexpected encounters with the 
police. What was the most troubling, according to the ADL officials, was that the violent 
acts against the police are not a joint and long-planned effort to kill the law enforcement 
officers in cold blood. Rather, they are a multitude of independent attacks stemming from 
right-wing ideologies (ADL, 2014). 
The murder and extremism rates in the United States increased significantly in 
2016. According to the ADL (2016) officials, “more domestic extremists killed more 
people in 2015 than in any previous year since 1995, the year of the Oklahoma City 
bombing.” (ADL, 2016) However, based on the June 2016 Orlando Pulse nightclub 
shooting, 2016 quickly became the deadliest year in terms of extremist killings in the 
United States. Furthermore, the ADL (2016) state that “the domestic extremist murder 
tally keeps rising as law enforcement officers uncover the motivation and ideology 
behind these killings, because it sometimes takes months and/or years to unmask this 
motivation.” (ADL, 2016) The ADL (2016) officials reported:  
ADL’s preliminary tally for 2016 is already at 69, a figure that includes the 49 
killed by Mateen (Orlando nightclub shooter), as well as 20 other murders 
committed by White supremacists, antigovernment extremists such as sovereign 
citizens, and Black nationalists.   
The year 2016 was the deadliest on record in the United States for attacks by 
domestic extremist since 1970, when the ADL first started collecting data on these 
killings. Many people who were not killed by an extremist were severely wounded and 
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injured. According to the ADL (2016) officials, “police uncovered more and more 
sinister plots and prevented more such senseless violence from occurring.” (ADL, 2016)  
To underscore the severity of the increased domestic extremist violence, the ADL 
(2016) officials reported that from the years “2012–2016, at least 56 shooting incidents 
between police and domestic extremist occurred (the vast majority of them shootouts or 
incidents in which extremists shot at police)” (Anti-Defamation League, 2016). “During 
these encounters, extremists shot 69 police officers, 18 fatally” (Anti-Defamation 
League, 2016, p.3). 
The police ambushes in Dallas and Baton Rouge were approximately one-third of 
that earlier multiyear total (See Table 1). Table 1 also shows the massive disparities in 
right-wing extremists’ killing of police officers as compared to domestic Islamic 
extremist killings.  
Table 1. 
Police Officers Killed in the United States by Domestic Extremists, 1965–2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from the Anti-Defamation League. Murder and Extremism in US 2016.  Retrieved from 
https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/MurderAndExtremismInUS2016.pdf. p.5 
 
Although officials from the ADL reported (2016) a massive increase in Black 
Years  By Left‐Wing
Extremists 
By Right‐Wing
Extremists 
By Domestic 
Extremists 
         Total 
1965 ‐ 1970 
 
3 0 0  3
1971 ‐ 1980 
 
25 1 2  28
1981 – 1990  5 6 0  11
1991 – 2000 
 
1 16 0  17
2001 – 2010 
 
2 24 0  26
2011 – 2016 
 
8 10 1  19
Total  44 57 3  104
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Nationalist violence against law enforcement and violence in general across the United 
States, White supremacy violence rates decreased in 2016. Moreover, ADL 
representatives reported that the “White supremacists were responsible for only 7 of the 
69 extremist-related murders committed in the United States in 2016” (Anti-Defamation 
League, 2016). The ADL spokesperson alluded the low White supremacy violence rate 
was caused by other domestic extremist groups being active, specifically centering on the 
2016 presidential election race. (ADL, 2016) 
To show the severity of violence and death against law enforcement in 2016, “118 
law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty, of which 66 police officers were 
killed as a result of a felonious criminal act.” (FBI, 2016) The number of police officers 
killed in 2016 increased by 25 officers from 2015 and showed an increase of 17 deaths 
from 2012, with an increase of 8 deaths from 2007 (“White nationalists,” 2017). What is 
unclear from the data was who were the perpetrators responsible for the increase in 
violence. Were they part of a domestic extremist group and/or ideology? There has been 
a growing intelligence gap with this topic and with the data collected. Who are these 
people and what are their motivations behind these law enforcement killings?   
A disturbing trend with the 2016 statistics was the fact that “17 of the police 
officers were killed via ambush (entrapment/premeditation), which showed that the 
killers were waiting to murder these officers,” (FBI, 2016) a common tactic among 
domestic extremists, notably the ambush killings in Dallas and Baton Rouge, surrounding 
Black separatist and antigovernment extremism. Also, three police officer killings were a 
result of unprovoked attacks (“White nationalists,” 2017), which followed the same idea 
that these officers were either targeted and were just going about the normal course of the 
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law enforcement business. Figure 2 shows the increased number of ambush deaths of law 
enforcement officers in 2007–2016, and the ambush category itself ranks as one of the 
highest categories in terms of officer deaths since 2007.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Law enforcement officers feloniously killed.  Figure courtesy of the FBI: UCR. 
Retrieved from https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2016/officers-feloniously-killed/tables/table-
23.xls 
Not surprisingly, “offenders used firearms to kill 62 of the 66 victim police 
officers in 2016” (“White nationalists,” 2017). 
An additional 2014 study conducted by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 
showed another alarming violent trend toward law enforcement, as right-wing extremists 
have been killing law enforcement at a consistently growing rate. To expand on the point, 
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ADL representatives reported that in the  
1960s and 1970s, it was left-wing groups like the Black Liberation Army who 
targeted police for killing. However, by the 1980s, right-wing extremists began to 
surpass left-wing extremists in causing police deaths.” The number of officers 
killed by right-wing extremists more than doubled in the 1990s, then increased by 
50% more in the first decade of the 2000s. Five officers were killed by right-wing 
extremists from 2011 to 2014, not counting the Las Vegas incident (Anti-
Defamation League, 2014, p.1). 
Adding more credence to the growing violent trend toward law enforcement, 
members of the ADL (2014) stated that from 2009 to 2013, 43 separate violent incidents 
between domestic extremists (of all types) and law enforcement in the United States took 
place. The violent incidents included situations in which gunfire was exchanged between 
police and extremists (shoot-outs), situations in which extremists fired at police but 
police subdued the extremists without having to return fire, and situations in which 
officers had to use their firearms to protect themselves against extremists. Surprisingly, of 
the 43 incidents, 39 incidents involved extremists sporting some sort of extreme right-
wing ideology. Analyzing the different domestic extremist groups, White supremacists 
took part in 21 incidents, while antigovernment extremists were involved in 17 more. An 
anti-Muslim extremist was involved in one incident (the other four incidents included one 
with a left-wing extremist and three with domestic Islamic extremists). In the shooting 
incidents, the extremists shot 30 officers, of which 14 were fatal. Many other officers 
sustained nongunfire injuries during some of these encounters (Anti-Defamation League, 
2014). Figure 3 and Figure 4 clearly show the vast propensity of violence by the domestic 
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right-wing extremists. A thorough explanation with case studies regarding exactly who 
are these domestic and/or right-wing extremists will be given in the next section of the 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Shooting incidents between domestic extremists and law enforcement, 2009-
2013, by ideology.  Figure courtesy of the Anti-Defamation League, 2014, p.1. Retrieved 
from https://www.adl.org/blog/officers-down-right-wing-extremists-attacking-police-at-
growing-rate 
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Figure 4. Domestic extremists-related police officer killings in the United States, 1964-
2014.  Figure courtesy of the Anti-Defamation League, 2014, p.1. Retrieved from 
https://www.adl.org/blog/officers-down-right-wing-extremists-attacking-police-at-
growing-rate 
 
Firearms were the weapons of choice in most of the domestic extremist incidents 
noted in the ADL study from 2016. Representatives from the ADL reported that almost 
all of the 69 victims killed by domestic extremists were killed with firearms. The ADL 
officials stated, “Though it is common for people to associate extremists with exotic 
weapons such as bombs or other weapons of mass destruction, overwhelmingly 
extremists in the United States, regardless of movement, are at their most lethal when 
employing firearms” (Anti-Defamation League, 2016, p.3) 
Building on the firearms theme regarding domestic extremism violence with the 
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literature review, Gruenewald (2011) examined far-right perpetrated homicides from 
1990 through 2006, studying individuals arrested on terrorism charges and found 
terrorists were relatively more likely to be charged with firearm offenses. According to 
Gruenewald (2011), far-right extremist-perpetrated homicides were primarily committed 
with firearms and committing the homicide itself without ideology-based factors.  
The possible nexus between firearms and gun control challenges for the mentally 
ill and their possible association with the domestic extremist threat poses a serious test to 
the overall safety and security of law enforcement members. Wolf and Rosen (2015) 
shared the opinion that “people assume those with mental illnesses are more prone to 
violence than those without these issues” (p. 853). Furthermore, Wolf and Rosen (2015) 
stated, “the truth is that individuals falling in the category of mentally ill only account for 
a small fraction of all violent conduct. Simply having a mental illness is not a strong 
predictor of future violence” (Wolf & Rosen, 2015, p. 853). Finally, Wolf and Rosen 
(2015) argued that the real factors in gun control and the mental health system were to 
understand genuine mental illness (getting people the necessary help and medication) and 
gun control policies (different states/different policies). 
The researcher has reported data found on domestic extremist threats and violence 
statistics for the current literature review. However, what about other sources in relation 
to domestic extremist information? Furthermore, how reliable is this information? These 
were some of the questions asked by Chermak, Freilich, Parkin, and Lynch (2012) in 
their study, American Terrorism and Extremist Crime Data Sources and Selectivity Bias. 
Chermak et al. (2012) posited that collecting information on domestic terrorism, 
or terrorism in general, could lead to misleading statistics/data based on a selectivity bias, 
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especially utilizing open source data as what was (and still is) used in many areas of 
terrorism research. Chermak et al. (2012) examined the analysis performed on the far-
right homicides rates “captured from 10 of the sources used by the Extremist Crime 
Database to identify homicides committed by far-rightists in the United States between 
1990 and 2008” (p. 198):   
These 10 sources include 3 noted scholarly databases or academic listings (Global 
Terrorism Database; American Terrorism Study; Hewitt’s chronology of “lone 
wolf” violent crimes), two law enforcement and official sources (FBI.; the State 
and Local Anti-Terrorism Training listings), two major watch-group 
organizations (Anti-Defamation League; Southern Poverty Law Center), and 
systematic media searches through LexisNexis web-engine; the Ross Institute 
Internet Archives for the Study of Destructive Cults, Controversial Groups and 
Movements, as well as incidents uncovered by ECDB [United States Extremists 
Crime Data Base] coders as they reviewed information generated from the 
previous 9 sources. (Chermak et al., 2012, pp. 198–199) 
Chermak et al. (2012) were very skeptical on the way information was being 
collected from the 10 sources, most notably the ECDB, as this data could be 
misrepresented or uncorroborated, and they had questions on validity of the data. For 
example, Chermak et al. (2012) pointed out that perhaps the homicides mentioned in the 
ECDB were miscategorized by the police, and possibly these “deaths” were in fact 
suicides, natural death, or even nonideological in nature, but were counted as “far-right 
extremist homicides.” Another valid point made by Chermak et al. (2012) concerned 
nonprofit advocacy organizations, such as the Anti-Defamation League and the Southern 
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Poverty Law Center making claims of far-right extremist violence without any 
substantive evidence, perhaps to underscore their belief on the rise of hate crimes.  
Finally, what about the international influence and the international threat picture 
facing individuals in the United States regarding overall safety and security, notably the 
threats against law enforcement members? How does the international influence compare 
to the domestic influence and threats? Concerning this point, the current study was used 
to address the growing threats of violence against U.S. law enforcement from 
antigovernment individuals—extremist’s groups and the ever-growing sovereign citizen 
movement—and vital data was collected to show these alarming trends. From the New 
America Foundation group, pertinent data was collected on deadly Jihadist attacks and 
deadly right-wing attacks in the U.S. since 9/11, with a disturbing amount of right-wing 
attacks outnumbering Jihadist attacks by 38 to 26. (newamerica.org, 2016). After the 
unfortunate San Bernardino (March 2015) and Orlando (June 2016) nightclub shootings, 
the Jihadist attacks outnumbered the right-wing attacks 94-48 (New American 
Foundation Group, 2016). However, the right-wing attacks were still actively involved in 
national violence in 2018. Cases in point include the 2016 Dallas police ambush, the 
2015 Charleston Church shooting, and the 2015 Colorado Planned Parenthood shooting. 
To further show the smaller numbers of anti-Muslim extremists, Charles Kurzman 
(2013) conducted a significant qualitative case study research project, titled Muslim-
American Terrorism: Declining Further. The vital research, beginning in 2001, showed 
that the number of Muslim American–involved terrorism cases continued a downward 
trend. Furthermore, according to Kurzman (2013), the spike in terrorism cases in 2009 
renewed these concerns (of an increase in Muslim American terrorists), as have repeated 
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warnings from U.S. government officials about a possible surge in homegrown Islamic 
terrorism. According to Useem (2012), the predicted surge has not materialized, and thus 
the international influence seems to more about a myth.  
Additionally, Kurzman (2016) conducted a similar qualitative case study research 
titled, Muslim-American Involvement with Violent Extremism, 2015.  During the research, 
Kurzman found that “eighty-one Muslim-Americans were associated with violent 
extremist plots in 2015, the highest annual total since 9/11” (Kurzman, 2016, p. 1). 
Despite this massive increase in Muslim American international influence arrests, the 
most in one year since 9/11, the majority of the arrests were for traveling overseas or 
attempting to travel overseas in an attempt to join an international terrorist group and not 
part of a violent act. However, Kurzman (2016) made the assessment that the last part of 
2015 was relatively quiet for Muslim Americans being arrested or part of a terrorist 
incident, but the San Bernardino incident brought the international influence back into the 
spotlight. Finally, Kurzman (2016) attempted to put the international versus domestic 
extremist violence in the U.S. into perspective by stating: 
“Five plots (multiple subjects involved in violent plots) engaged in violence in the 
United States in 2015, killed 19 people, and raised the total killed since 9/11 to 69.” (p.1) 
Over the same period, more than 220,000 Americans were murdered. In 2015 alone, 134 
Americans were killed in mass shootings (Kurzman, 2016).  
Another interesting research topic that is investigated annually by Charles 
Kurzman, from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and published by the 
Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, was his research on Muslim-
American Involvement with Violent Extremism. Most notably from his last research, 
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published on January 26, 2017, “Forty-six Muslim-Americans were associated with 
violent extremism in 2016, a 40% drop from 2015, but higher than the annual average 
since 9/11 (27 per year, for a total of 414 over more than 15 years)” (Kurzman, 2017, p. 
2). Kurzman studies were particularly vital to the current study because they showed the 
disparity in the decrease in internationally inspired U.S. attacks versus the increase in 
domestic extremist-inspired attacks across the nation. To underscore the domestic 
extremist U.S. threat, Kurzman (2017) wrote, “In 2016 alone, 188 Americans were killed 
in mass shootings; this figure does not include the victims of Muslim-American 
extremist” (p. 2). 
Furthermore, Kurzman (2017) noted only those two incidents occurred with a 
nexus to U.S. police violence. Specifically, during the late hours of January 7, 2016, in 
Philadelphia, PA, perpetrator Edward Archer shot officer Jesse Hartnett multiple times 
(who miraculously survived), and told police investigators, “I follow Allah. I pledge my 
allegiance to the Islamic State, and that’s why I did what I did” (Whelan, Schaefer, 
Roebuck, & Farr, 2016). The other case involving law enforcement violence was that of 
subject Khalil Abu Rayyan, from Dearborn, MI, who was being arrested for intending to 
shoot up a Detroit-area church in support of ISIS (Ellis, 2016). Post arrest, Abu Rayyan 
pledged to kill the police officer who arrested him on these charges. (Ellis, 2016)  
To conclude, and to underscore the severity of the ongoing domestic extremist 
threat, according to ADL representatives, White supremacist murders more than doubled 
in 2017. The alarming murder rate among White supremacists “far surpasses murders 
committed by domestic Islamic extremists and makes 2017 the fifth deadliest year on 
record for extremist violence since 1970” (Anti-Defamation League, 2018a, p.1). Two 
correction officers and one police officer were killed by extremists in 2017, stressing the 
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need for officer safety vigilance. The increase in right-wing extremism violence from 
2016 was responsible for 59% of all fatalities in the U.S. (Anti-Defamation League, 
2018b). Figure 5 shows the right-wing extremism violence surge since 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Domestic extremist-related killings in the U.S. by perpetrator affiliation (2008–
2017). Diagram courtesy of ADL. ADL Report: White Supremacist Murders More Than 
Doubled in 2017. Retrieved from https://www.adl.org/news/press-releases/adl-report-
white-supremacist-murders-more-than-doubled-in-2017 
 
Domestic Extremist Identification and Ideology  
Research Question 2: Who exactly are these domestic extremist groups and what 
are their ideologies/motivations? With increasing violence being used against U.S. law 
enforcement, a deeper understanding about this phenomenon is essential. Doing so can 
lead to insight about who exactly are these individuals and/or groups and what are the 
ideologies responsible for the sinister violence against U.S. law enforcement. 
Furthermore, are these just groups with violent natures, or are individuals involved with a 
domestic extremist theme? What about the lone wolf persona? What is a lone wolf 
terrorist? How does mental illness play a part in the mind-set of a terrorist? These are just 
some of the questions that the current research study was used to address and provide 
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some clarity.  
To better understand the domestic extremist threat, a basic understanding of the 
groups and ideologies must be achieved before any subsequent research is performed. 
The last step is vital for law enforcement on many various fronts, most notably for officer 
safety concerns and proper identification of these threats. For the current study, the 
following American far-right definition was used. “There are three major ideological 
movements within the American violent far right: (a) a racist/White supremacy 
movement, (b) an anti-federalist movement, and (c) a fundamentalist movement.” 
(Perliger, 2012, p. 2)   
According to the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) leaders (2013), membership in 
the militia arm of the patriot movement has more than quintupled over the 5 years (2008 
– 2013), and those participating in the sovereign citizen movement have increased their 
numbers over the same period. The ADL (2018a) officials defined the patriot movement 
as:  
A collective term used to describe a set of related extremist movements and 
groups in the United States whose ideologies center on antigovernment 
conspiracy theories. The most important segments of the “Patriot” movement 
include the militia movement, the sovereign citizen movement, and the tax protest 
movement (p. 1).  
Mark Pitcavage, director of investigation research at ADL pointed out, the nation 
is at the largest reemergence of right-wing antigovernment groups since the Oklahoma 
City bombing in 1995. Pitcavage also stated that most of his training for police officers in 
the past was pretty much split between teaching White supremacist information and about 
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antigovernment groups. It has become a 90/10 split in favor of antigovernment groups. 
Pitcavage stressed how this is a huge concern as reported in Riddell 2014).  
As the violent trends continue, the need for robust law enforcement training is 
necessary in terms of officer safety issues or for staying extremely vigilant in dealing 
with these types of individuals, groups, or with sovereign citizens. With officer safety in 
mind, the Anti-Defamation League (2014) officials made a convincing assessment, 
“Because right-wing extremists frequently engage in criminal activity—both ideological 
and non-ideological, police responding to reports of criminal activity may encounter 
extremists committing a crime or who are fugitives from justice. Such situations can also 
frequently turn deadly” (ADL, 2014, p. 2). Essentially, the right-wing extremists’ lure 
police into a police matter without knowing how dangerous or depraved these extremists 
are until it is too late. ADL representatives stressed the need for more police officer 
training that deals exclusively with domestic extremist or far-right issues (Anti-
Defamation League, 2014). 
To underscore the amount of hate groups around the nation, Southern Poverty 
Law Center leaders stated that there were 939 known hate groups operating across the 
country, including: (a) neo-Nazis, (b) Klansmen, (c) White nationalists, (d) neo-
Confederates, (e) racist skinheads, (f) Black separatists, (g) border vigilantes, and others 
(Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014a). Furthermore, the Southern Poverty Law Center 
leaders have seen hate groups increase by 56% since 2000. This has undoubtedly been 
fueled by anger and fear over the nation’s ailing economy, an influx of non-White 
immigrants, and the diminishing White majority, as symbolized by the election of the 
nation’s first African American president. These factors are creating a powerful 
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resurgence of the antigovernment patriot movement, which in the 1990s led to a string of 
domestic terrorist plots, including the Oklahoma City bombing. Interestingly enough, the 
number of patriot groups, including armed militias, increased following the election of 
President Obama in 2008, rising 813%, from 149 groups in 2008 to an all-time high of 
1,360 in 2012. The number decreased to 1,096 in 2013 (Southern Poverty Law Center, 
2014a). In addition to the economy issues, and according to speaker Laurie Wood (2014), 
senior intelligence analyst at the Southern Poverty Law Center, “Housing/mortgage 
issues have been an impetus in the formation of these patriot groups, as these groups 
blame the U.S. government for the economic failures, just like the Sovereign Citizen 
movement” (Wood, 2014). 
Finally, to highlight the overall propensity for violence against law enforcement at 
the hands of these extremists, ADL leaders stated these “extreme ideologies cause right-
wing radicals directly to attack officers” (Anti-Defamation League, 2014a, p.1). 
Furthermore, these extremists view law enforcement members as “illegitimate 
government employees,” as expressed by various militia extremist and sovereign 
citizen’s groups and members, while White supremacists believe that police are tools of a 
Jewish-controlled government. The belief is very problematic and can become extremely 
violent when law enforcement members unexpectedly encounter an extremist without any 
warning or knowing the background of the individual, only to have the extremist lash out 
against the officer. Having officers trained to understand these extremist ideologies and 
their propensity of violence is an area where the ADL believes the law enforcement 
community is lacking and could prevent more lost lives.  
The domestic extremist groups and individuals researched in the present study are 
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listed below, as relevant case studies are discussed to illustrate and underscore these 
severe threats against law enforcement members: (a) White Supremacy, (b) 
Antigovernment/Sovereign Citizen Movement, (c) Black Separatist Extremists, and (d) 
Lone Wolf.   
White Supremacy 
“Pat asked me if I could hurt, beat or kill the cop what would I do. I told him I 
would kill him” (Convicted felon White supremacist telling confidential human source 
about his plan to kill a law enforcement officer.) 
 Another area of great concern for the lives of U.S. law enforcement officers 
regarding the domestic extremism threat is an area that epitomizes another significant 
threat for the overall safety and security of the American public—that of the White 
supremacy extremist group. According to the National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), led by the University of Maryland, 
White supremacy extremists can be best defined as:  
Actors who enable the execution of violence indirectly through assistance—such 
as providing funding, transportation or logistical support, and/or training—or 
directly participate in acts of unlawful violence directed at the federal 
government, ethnic, racial, and/or religious minorities, including Jewish persons 
in support of their belief that Whites are intellectually and morally superior to all 
other races. (START, 2017, p.1) 
White supremacy groups include the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), neo-Nazi groups, 
White nationalist groups, and the racist skinhead groups, to name a few of this large 
domestic extremist’s category. Most of their victims are Jewish and/or of African 
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American descent or any unfortunate victims who get in their way concerning their 
political and/or ideological goals as exhibited in the next few case studies.  
Who exactly are these White supremacists? How do they recruit and radicalize 
individuals to join their cause and wreak havoc on the American public? According to 
Holt and Bolden, (2014), the way the White supremacists communicate on the Internet 
makes them different from many other more sophisticated criminal organizations. By 
viewing White Nationalist Web sites, forums, blogs, and other social media sites, the 
researchers were able to find many significant methodologies and ways in which these 
White supremacists communicate with each other.  
White nationalists begin their recruitment and attempt to hide their identities. 
Approximately 30% of all threads (n = 18) began with a user asking a question, and the 
majority of these questions focused on some sort of protective technology to hide an 
individual's location or identity. (Hold & Bolden, 2014). For instance, “several users 
asked questions about the use of Tor, a free proxy service that helps to anonymize an 
individual's web traffic.” (Holt & Bolden, 2014, p. 84). Utilizing Tor software helps hide 
a person’s identity, often sought by law enforcement and any other investigative 
agencies.  
 Holt and Bolden (2014) found another tool used was how the White supremacist 
users came out and asked on these extremist topic forums on how to conceal their 
identities and do IP tracing more discreetly:   
One user wanted information on IP tracing to minimize his on-line footprint: I ask 
because I am part of some non-racialist forums, and the thought has crossed my 
mind that I would most likely be immediately banned from them if it were 
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discovered that I am a regular poster over here (Holt & Bolden, 2014, p. 85)   
Holt and Bolden (2014) make a compelling argument that “since a small number 
of forum users had demonstrable technical skill, they act as a key resource for the broader 
population of unskilled users” (p. 89). The individuals act as their group’s IT department 
and don’t hide their ways to skirt the system in these forums. Rather, they instruct others 
on ways to hide their own identities, then, once established online, trade their sinister 
views. Finally, Holt and Bolden (2014) asserted that the reason why they make these 
forums technologically easy for users to enjoy online discreet posts is that they want to 
make this more of a community recruitment, one where there is a united front pitch rather 
than an aggressively technological enterprise dependent on expensive software and 
resources.  
Other vital data concerning domestic extremists’ violence revolves around the 
White supremacy movement. According to members of the ADL officials:  
Among domestic extremist movements active in the United States, White 
supremacists are by far the most violent, committing about 83% of the extremist-
related murders in the United States in the past 10 years and being involved in 
about 52% of the shootouts between extremists and police. White supremacists 
also regularly engage in a variety of terrorist plots, acts and conspiracies. 
However, White supremacists also have a high degree of involvement with 
traditional forms of criminal activity as well as ideologically based criminal 
activity. Most of the murders committed by White supremacists are done for 
nonideological reasons. However, even if such murders are ignored, White 
supremacists still commit the most lethal violence of any domestic extremist 
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movement in the United States (Anti-Defamation League, 2015, p. 1). 
A prime example of the callous nature of this extremist group and the overall 
threat to American law enforcement is when Polk County, Iowa, attorney John Sarcone 
spoke of the November 2, 2016, calculated killings of Urbandale police officer Justin 
Martin and Des Moines police sergeant Anthony “Tony” Bemino. The two police officers 
died at the hand of suspect Scott Michael Greene, in which Sarcone portrayed Greene as 
a sick, demented killer who hated the police. In fact, “Sarcone said that Greene simply 
did not like police officers.” He noted Greene’s documented struggles with mental illness 
but dismissed it as a justification for the killings. “He planned this out completely” 
(Rogers, 2017).  
Even more disturbing during the Greene investigation press conference was that 
the county attorney showed a hit list of members that Greene either had already killed or 
wanted to kill, as he inscribed these names on his jail cell wall (Rogers, 2017). Greene 
even had a tally like a score for a baseball game: “greene-2, UPD, DMPD-0” with check 
marks next to both of the police victims (Rogers, 2017).  
To highlight his White supremacist background, Greene had a longstanding battle 
with law enforcement in which he was kicked out of a high school football stadium for 
waving his Confederate battle flag in front of several African American subjects and was 
arrested in 2014 for first-degree harassment in which he threatened to kill an African 
American male and called him racist names. This domestic extremist background 
epitomizes the overall threat seen in the nation today, especially how deeply rooted this 
hatred is and how it can simply boil over when feeling threatened by people from other 
races and/or considering law enforcement the enemy.  
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Other notable examples in which the White supremacy extremist group led the 
violence against law enforcement was that of Wade Michael Page, the August 5, 2012, 
Wisconsin Sikh temple shooter. An ex-army soldier and self-proclaimed member of the 
Hammerskins Nation, a large violent White supremacist skinhead group based in Texas, 
Page grew tired of the different races threatening the so-called “White nation” and felt 
that he had to act, in addition to leading others to fight and to stop hiding behind the 
computer or making excuses (Bauer & Richmond, 2012). Page attacked the Oak Creek, 
Wisconsin, Sikh temple and killed 6, severely wounding 4 others, including a police 
officer.  
Another White supremacy hatred example in the ongoing White supremacy threat 
toward U.S. law enforcement was that of vocal White supremacist Christopher Cantwell, 
who garnered national attention after the infamous Charlottesville rally on August 12, 
2017. He was quoted as saying in a documentary, “These people want violence, and the 
right is just meeting a market demand."  Cantwell had a history of violent threats that also 
extended to law enforcement (“5 things to know,” 2017). 
Cantwell had also expressed grave threats toward the government and the police. 
Cantwell called for ousting the government and advocated killing government agents (to 
include police officers). Cantwell even celebrated the ambush murders of New York City 
Police Department officers Wenjian Liu and Rafael Ramos and said he once considered 
going on a bloody rampage like Vegas police ambush killer Jerad Miller (“5 things to 
know,” 2017). 
Finally, one of the largest and unfortunate police killings in America was 
perpetrated by White supremacist Richard Andrew Poplawski. On April 4, 2009, three 
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City of Pittsburgh police officers (Paul Sciullo III, Stephen Mayhle, and Eric Kelly) were 
fatally shot, and a fourth, Timothy McManaway, was wounded after responding to a 
domestic dispute (Poplawski’s mother called 911) at the home of Richard Andrew 
Poplawski (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015). Poplawski, a discharged Marine, was 
afraid that the government would take his weapons, and he single-handedly picked off the 
officers one-by-one with his AK-47 assault rifle and a .22-caliber rifle. Poplawski was 
also wearing a bulletproof vest. Poplawski “who had posted his racist and anti-Semitic 
views on White supremacist websites” (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015, p. 1), was 
afraid that the U.S. government may soon be used against American citizens and that the 
government was easily influenced by Jews. Furthermore, Poplawski told police 
investigators that he fired additional shots into the bodies of the police officers “just to 
make sure they were dead” and said he “thought I got that one, too” when told that the 
fourth officer survived (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2015). At the time, it was the 
largest and deadliest single act of violence against law enforcement members by a 
domestic political extremist since the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Poplawski was 
sentenced to death in 2011. 
On January 11, 2018, Aryan Nations gang member Ronnie Lucas Wilson shot at a 
Knoxville, Tennessee, police officer during an attempted traffic stop, wounding the 
officer. Wilson was eventually captured while jumping out of a burning house a few days 
later, but the mentality and propensity of violence associated with these domestic 
extremist groups continues.  
What these deadly examples/case studies clearly show is that these domestic 
extremists threats toward law enforcement are not going away. Strong arguments can be 
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made that these threats and overall violence will increase due to the unfortunate race wars 
and senseless violence as seen at the Charlottesville protest. What makes these extreme 
threats so troublesome, let alone the violence acts, is that the individuals and views are in 
the country and are at times unpredictable, as seen in the 2012 Sikh shooting. Who would 
keep score on the number of killings someone has made against government officials? 
Unfortunately, this is the type of sinister violence facing U.S. law enforcement.  
Regarding violence in general (minus the law enforcement threats) around the 
United States today, the White supremacy threat remains real. According to Bjelopera 
(2017), FBI and Department of Homeland Security (DHS officials released a joint 
intelligence bulletin stating that White supremacists “were responsible for 49 homicides 
in 26 attacks from 2000 to 2016 ... more than any other domestic extremist movement” 
(Bjelopera, 2017, p. 16). According to an FBI bulletin, “White supremacist groups were 
likely to commit more violent attacks and continue to post a threat of lethal violence over 
the next year” (“White nationalists,” 2017, p. 1).  
Other vital data concerning domestic extremists’ violence revolves around the 
White supremacy movement. According to the Anti-Defamation League,  
Among domestic extremist movements active in the United States, White 
supremacists are by far the most violent, committing about 83% of the extremist-
related murders in the United States in the past 10 years and being involved in 
about 52% of the shootouts between extremists and police. White supremacists 
also regularly engage in a variety of terrorist plots, acts, and conspiracies. 
However, White supremacists also have a high degree of involvement with 
traditional forms of criminal activity as well as ideologically-based criminal 
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activity. Most of the murders committed by White supremacists are done for 
nonideological reasons. However, even if such murders are ignored, White 
supremacists still commit the most lethal violence of any domestic extremist 
movement in the United States. (Anti-Defamation League, 2015, p. 1) 
To fully understand and mitigate the domestic extremist threat associated with 
this violent group, a robust federal investigation needs to be performed to address all of 
violence. As surprising as it may sound, Senator Claire McCaskill (D-Missouri) advised 
during a Senate hearing that violence at the hands of White supremacists almost tripled in 
America compared to international-inspired terrorist groups such as ISIS (“White 
nationalists,” 2017). Furthermore, the senator made a very important point in terms of 
how government leaders are taking this threat seriously. “Congress has held multiple 
hearings on ISIS, but we have had zero hearings on the threat of domestic terrorists, and 
the threat they pose, and our response to it” (“White nationalists,” 2017, p. 1). Even civil 
rights supporters claim that since the term terrorism has been much discussed, but only 
with Muslims responsible for terrorism. Terrorism is not mentioned in the same breath as 
violence by these White supremacist groups, antigovernment groups, and any other far-
right groups. Several FBI investigations are used to support the notion that the federal 
government leaders should be doing more in terms of mitigating violent white 
supremacy. FBI Director Chris Wray told the Senate Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee that his office had approximately 1,000 open 
international terrorism cases and approximately 1,000 open domestic terrorism cases 
(“White nationalists,” 2017). Wray stated that he did not have the statistics comparing 
White supremacist attacks versus the number of internationally inspired attacks (i.e., 
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ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and others). Other sources have indicated that the “number of White 
supremacist attacks and foiled plots is as high as two-to-one relative to Islamist attacks 
and foiled plots” (“White nationalists,” 2017).   
One federal challenge in recognizing this growing domestic threat is based on 
what U.S. attorneys and/or local district attorneys charge these domestic extremists. 
Many of these White supremacist, antigovernment extremists and/or Black extremists are 
given weapons charges, explosives charges, homicide, manslaughter, and/or hate crimes 
charges, but not terrorism charges like many of the internationally inspired Jihadists are 
charged. It is very uncommon to see a domestic extremist charged with a federal and/or 
state terrorism charge. These statutes are mostly utilized for the internationally inspired 
perpetrator. As a result, many of these domestic extremists are not recognized in the 
criminal justice system as being domestic extremists. Instead, they are convicted as gun 
felons with their ideology and/or extremist affiliation left out of the criminal history 
report. As a result, the methodology or cause in the increase of gun arrests may be 
categorized as an increase in gang and/or drug activity, not as a result of domestic 
terrorism. 
Antigovernment Extremists 
The dawn of a new day. May all our sacrifices be worth it. (Warren, 2014). Jerad 
Miller’s Facebook page – a day before the killings 
“He came in, shouting, ‘The revolution is about to start,’ something about a war, 
and that the cops were on their way,” (p.1) according to a witness in the brutal and 
senseless murders of two Las Vegas police officers, Alyn Beck and Igor Soldo. What 
triggered this event on June 8, 2014, as killers Jerad Miller and his wife, Amada, walked 
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into a pizza restaurant and started shooting the officers who were innocently having 
lunch? After shooting the policemen at point-blank range, the husband and wife killers 
took the officers’ weapons and reportedly covered them with a Revolutionary War-era 
Gadsden flag, which depicts a coiled snake and the words “Don’t Tread on Me.” The 
killers had been at Clive Bundy’s ranch during his standoff with federal officials in April, 
though the rancher’s family said Monday the two had been chased away (Riddell, 2014), 
due to the couple’s extreme radical views and self-admission by the Bundy bunch that 
these two were too extreme toward their cause.  
Why are these two murders so significant, besides being obviously heinous acts 
committed against two dedicated public servants, as it pertains to the resurgence in 
violence against law enforcement? They are another example of a domestic extremist far-
right group committing violent acts against law enforcement.  
 What exactly are antigovernment groups? According to the Southern Poverty 
Law Center (SPLC) officials, (2017)  
 antigovernment groups identify with their own governing style and warn of 
potential government violence toward government officials (mainly law 
enforcement), stating that a revolution is coming.” These groups vehemently 
abide by the New World Order philosophy and often participate in baseless 
conspiracy theories and implement their own antigovernment policies and 
procedures. (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017, p.1) 
Another definition of this domestic extremist group is “these attacks motivated by 
opposition to government forces without the expressed goal of establishing an alternative 
government” (Quinn, 2016). 
56 
 
 
 The SPLC has reported that there are 623 active antigovernment groups (both 
militia and other antigovernment groups) nationwide, including Alaska and Hawaii 
(Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017). Of special note is the fact that these groups have 
their highest numbers since 1996, the year after the Oklahoma City bombing, when there 
were 858 groups (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017).  
 Concerning the Law Vegas police officer murders, “The Millers had an ideology 
that was along the lines of militia and White supremacists: and that law enforcement was 
the oppressor,” said Assistant Sheriff Kevin McMahill (Riddell, 2014). According to 
officials at the International Union of Police Associations, there is more direct violence 
against law enforcement from these extremist groups, which is very concerning. Another 
alarming trend is how the Internet and social media sites are spreading anticop rhetoric 
around the country, where these demented groups constantly feed each other. (Riddell, 
2014) 
 The year 2014 was on track to be one of the deadliest years since 2001, the year 
of the World Trade Center attacks, for U.S. law enforcement. There was a 53% increase 
in shooting deaths from 2013, which led researchers to conclude that this alarming trend 
is a result of these radical extremist groups. (Riddell, 2014) 
To underscore the severity of these domestic extremist threats, large law 
enforcement associations, such as representatives from the International Union of Police 
Associations and National Sheriff’s Association, say they have seen increased activity by 
members of the sovereign citizen movement, an antigovernment, White supremacist 
organization, and that the antigovernment patriot and militia movements that targeted 
officers. This increase from the last few years (2009 – 2014) (Riddell, 2014), has 
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garnered the attention of law enforcement, especially as it pertains to the sovereign 
citizen movement. According to the National Sheriff’s Association, the sovereign citizen 
movement is well armed and unpredictable when dealing with them for the first time. 
More information about the sovereign citizens is covered in the next section.  
To better understand the antigovernment movement, its propensity for violence, 
and the groups affiliated with this movement, ADL staff reported that membership in the 
militia arm of the patriot movement has more than quintupled over the past 5 years (2009 
– 2014), and those participating in the sovereign citizen movement have increased their 
numbers over the same period. ADL speaker Mark Pitcavage stated, “We are 5 years into 
the largest resurgence in right-wing antigovernment groups since … the Oklahoma City 
bombing” (Riddell, 2014). Additionally, Pitcavage stated that back in 2008; ADL’s 
briefings for police officers were evenly split between providing information on White 
supremacist organizations and antigovernment groups. Riddell (2014) reported it was 
more like a 90/10 split in favor of antigovernment groups, according to the ADL, 
showing how this has become a huge concern. 
Jerad and Amanda Miller are prime examples of the domestic extremism threat 
currently seen in the United States and how their militia style patriot movement possesses 
hatred and threats of violence toward law enforcement. Specifically, Jared Miller’s 
Facebook “manifesto spoke of a tyrannical government needing to be overcome through 
citizen rebelling” (Riddell, 2014), which makes law enforcement (and other government 
officials) their natural enemies. According to members of the ADL, this is just one of the 
disturbing trends seen in U.S. law enforcement, especially in the area of offering 
antigovernment/extremists views on social media and the need for citizen revolt. 
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To further illustrate Jerad Miller’s manifesto ramblings, see Miller’s Facebook 
blog (see Figure 6) 6 days before the attack on Las Vegas police officers Alyn Beck and 
Igor Soldo.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Jerad Miller Facebook blog. Facebook blog courtesy of Lydia Warren, Online 
messages White supremacist couple Amanda Jerad Miller gunned two police officers 
Wal-Mart Shopper Taking Lives. 
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Sovereign Citizens 
“We have the right to keep and bear arms in order to shoot our own politicians. 
We have the right to keep and bear arms to shoot the police, to shoot your local 
government officials, your state officials, your president, your congressman, your 
senators.”  (Quote from Sovereign “guru” Alfred Adask, who stated this message 
in one of his writings) (American Crime Prevention Institute, 2012, p. 11) 
 
The sovereign citizen movement has been mentioned in the current study as it 
relates to far right/antigovernment extremists and the threat of violence. How exactly 
does this movement relate to the current study, and who makes up this group? How 
threatening is this group and what is its background and movement size?  
A good definition by the FBI of this movement is: 
The FBI defines sovereign citizen extremists as individuals who openly reject 
their US citizenship status, believe that most forms of established government, 
authority, and institutions are illegitimate, and seek, wholly or in part, through 
unlawful acts of force or violence, to further their claim to be immune from 
government authority. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political 
activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent 
tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected. 
(“White nationalists,” 2017, p.1) 
One significant study stated, “Law enforcement is much more concerned about 
sovereign citizens, Islamic extremists, and militia/patriot group members compared to the 
fringe groups of the far right, including Christian Identity believers, reconstructed 
traditionalists (i.e., Odinists), idiosyncratic sectarians (i.e., survivalists), and members of 
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the doomsday cults. In fact, according to Carter, Bryant-Lukosius, DiCenso, Blythe, and 
Neville (2014), sovereign citizens were the main threat toward law enforcement; 
however, in terms of other domestic extremist groups (e.g., KKK, Christian Identity, neo-
Nazis; racist skinheads; extremist environmentalists; extreme animal rights extremists), 
these threats were perceived as not as threatening as the sovereign citizen movement.  
The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) researchers Carter, 
Chermak et al. (2014) completed in-depth surveys with more than 364 officers 
representing 175 state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to examine perceptions 
of: the threat of terrorism; the nature of information sharing; and whether agencies are 
prepared to deal with terrorist attacks. Based on Carter et al. (2014) surveys and overall 
research, Rivinius (2014) stated that the far-right/antigovernment sovereign citizen 
movement was the most highly ranked perceived threat among law enforcement 
members, with 86% of participants agreeing or strongly agreeing that it was a serious 
terrorist threat. Additionally, these surveys indicated that sovereign threats have increased 
dramatically in rank over the years from an earlier survey implemented in 2006-2007, 
which showed Islamic extremists to be law enforcement’s top concern. In that survey, 
approximately 67% agreed or strongly agreed that Islamic extremists were a serious 
threat (Rivinius, 2014).  
To further show this significant opinion from U.S. law enforcement regarding the 
“far right/extremist’s groups” threat, Schanzer, Kurzman, Tolliver, and Miller (2016) 
surveyed approximately 382 U.S. law enforcement agencies of all sizes from January 
through May 2014. The researchers asked members of these U.S. law enforcement 
agencies, “What are the main violent extremist threats that your agencies face?” 
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(Schanzer et al., 2016, p. 63). Very similar to the START survey, the category of 
antigovernment violent extremism was the most popular choice among the law 
enforcement agencies, much more popular than Al-Qaeda inspired violent extremism. 
This clearly shows a domestic extremist threat pattern among law enforcement members 
and affected agencies.  
According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (2014b), the sovereign citizen 
movement holds a truly bizarre ideology that can be very violent. Growing at a fast pace 
since the late 2000s, members of this complex antigovernment group believe that they, 
not judges, juries, law enforcement or elected officials, get to decide which laws to obey 
and which to ignore, and they do not think they should have to pay taxes. In fact, they 
exhibit a strong animosity toward the federal government with a deep distrust of law 
enforcement in general. (Southern Poverty Law Center (2014b) 
Paper terrorism seems to be their theme, according to representatives from the 
SPLC, as sovereigns are clog up the courts with indecipherable filings and then can get 
violent, when cornered, many of them lashing out in rage and frustration. In the most 
extreme cases, they perpetrate acts of deadly violence, usually directed against 
government officials. A prime example of sovereign citizens lashing out toward law 
enforcement occurred in May 2010, when a father-son team of sovereigns murdered two 
police officers with an assault rifle when they were pulled over on the interstate while 
traveling through West Memphis, Arkansas. Unfortunately, these two West Memphis 
police officers had no chance to defend themselves, nor did they know who they were 
dealing with on the side of the road. 
According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (2014b), the sovereign citizen 
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movement is rooted in “racism and anti-Semitism, though most sovereigns, many of 
whom are African Americans, are unaware of their beliefs’ origins. From their formation 
in the early 1980s, the sovereign citizen movement mostly attracted White supremacists 
(discussed more in the next chapter) and anti-Semites, mainly because sovereign theories 
originated in groups that saw Jews as working behind the scenes to manipulate financial 
institutions and control the government (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014b). Whites 
were heavily recruited in becoming sovereigns back at the implementation of this 
movement, and this ideology still holds true to a high degree. According to the SPLC, the 
sovereign movement argued that the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, which 
guaranteed citizenship to African Americans and everyone else born on U.S. soil, also 
made Black Americans permanently subject to federal and state governments, unlike 
themselves (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014b).  
Since its inception, the sovereign belief system was that of a conspiracy theory in 
which at some point in American history, the U.S. government set up by the founding 
fathers—with a legal system the sovereigns refer to as “common law”—was secretly 
replaced by a new government system based on admiralty law, the law of the sea and 
international commerce. Under common law, or so they believe, the sovereigns would be 
free men. Under admiralty law, they are slaves, and secret government forces have a 
vested interest in keeping them that way. Some sovereigns believe this perfidious change 
occurred during the Civil War, while others blame the events of 1933, when the U.S. 
abandoned the gold standard. Either way, they stake their lives and livelihoods on the 
idea that judges around the country know all about this hidden government takeover but 
are denying the sovereigns’ motions and filings out of treasonous loyalty to hidden and 
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malevolent government forces (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014b). 
One of the dangers of the sovereign citizen movement and a challenge to the U.S. 
government is that it is impossible to accurately gauge the number of sovereign citizen 
members present in the U.S., which is mostly based on the fact that the movement 
generally does not have a central governing body or organizational leadership structure as 
most groups/movements have to carry out their missions/goals. Consequently, many 
affiliated sovereign splinter groups/organizations exist in today’s society, as well as 
numerous outspoken individual sovereigns. However, according to the SPLC (2014b), in 
the mid-1990s, the IRS estimated that there were approximately 250,000 tax protesters in 
the U.S., people who believe that the government has no right to tax income. Not all of 
them were full-blown sovereign ideologues. Since the late 1990s, an abundance of 
evidence suggests that the sovereign citizen movement’s growth has been explosive, 
although there have been no more recent IRS estimates, because Congress in 1998 
prohibited the agency from tracking or labeling those who file frivolous arguments in lieu 
of paying their taxes. A conservative estimate of the number of all kinds of tax protesters 
today would be about 500,000 according to the SPLC. Using this number and 
information derived from trials of tax protestors and reports from government agencies, a 
reasonable estimate of hard-core sovereign believers in early 2011 would be 100,000 
with another 200,000 just starting out by testing sovereign techniques for resisting 
everything from speeding tickets to drug charges for an estimated total of 300,000. As 
sovereign theories go viral throughout the nation’s prison systems and among people who 
are unemployed and desperate in a punishing economy, and with fertile prison 
recruitments, this membership number is anticipated to grow rapidly. (SPLC, 2014b) 
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In terms of extreme violence, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center 
(2014b), “when a sovereign feels particularly desperate, angry, battle-weary and 
cornered, his next government contact, no matter how minor, can be his final straw” (p. 
1). The resulting rage can be lethal. In 1995 in Ohio, a sovereign named Michael Hill 
pulled a gun on an officer during a traffic stop. Hill was killed. In 1997, New Hampshire 
extremist Carl Drega shot and killed two officers and two civilians and wounded another 
three officers before being killed himself. In that same year in Idaho, when brothers Doug 
and Craig Broderick were pulled over for failing to signal, they killed one officer and 
wounded another before being killed themselves in a violent gun battle. In December 
2003, members of the Bixby family, who lived outside of Abbeville, S.C., killed two law 
enforcement officers in a dispute over a small sliver of land next to their home. In May 
2010, Jerry and Joseph Kane, a father and son sovereign team, shot to death two West 
Memphis, AR, police officers who had pulled them over in a routine traffic stop. Later 
that day, the Kanes were killed in a fierce shoot-out with police that wounded two other 
officers (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2014). The case involving the Kanes became the 
main reason why law enforcement officials reported to the START survey on why these 
sovereign citizens are law enforcement’s primary concern, especially as it pertains to 
officer safety issues and not knowing who is being stopped alongside the road.  
To validate the seriousness of the sovereign citizen violence, lecturer Laurie 
Wood (2014), from the Southern Poverty Law Center, stated the following in her in-
depth presentation on sovereign citizen extremism: 
There were 7 LEO deaths associated with sovereigns since 2010: 
• May 20, 2010: Brandon Paudert and Bill Evans, West Memphis, Arkansas, 
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Police Department 
• Aug. 16, 2012: Brandon Nielsen and Jeremy Triche, deputies, St. Johns the 
Baptist Parish, Louisiana, Sheriff’s Department. 
• Sept. 4, 2012: California Highway Patrol Officer Kenyon Youngstrom, near 
Alamo, California. 
• June 8, 2014: Igor Soldo and Alyn Beck, Las Vegas, Nevada, Police 
Department. (Wood presentation, 2014) 
Sovereign citizen ideology states that America is a national illegitimate police 
state. Members can be so extreme that they have been known to open fire on officers at 
traffic stops (Jerry and Joe Kane, West Memphis, AR, May 20, 2010, as a prime 
example). Such people pose an extensive threat to law enforcement officers. According to 
an FBI 2011 report, the sovereign citizen domestic threat will most likely increase rapidly 
in the future due to the growing unrest and unemployment rates around the country. 
Neiwart (2017) stated, “Sovereign citizens alone, according to the database, have been 
responsible for 14 attacks on law enforcement from 2008 to 2016, which led to the deaths 
of nine officers and injuries to 12” (p. 37). “Of the 40 total plots and attacks targeting 
police, 83% involved right-wing antigovernment extremists, resulting in 23 fatalities, 
which is higher and more volatile than any other domestic extremist groups and/or 
international extremist groups.” (Neiwart, 2017, p.37)  
 A more recent killing of a law enforcement officer came at the hands of 
antigovernment extremist Matthew Riehl, a veteran of the Wyoming Army National 
Guard. On New Year’s Eve, 2017, Douglas County (Colorado) sheriff’s deputies 
responded to a domestic disturbance at Riehl’s apartment complex, where he waited and 
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ambushed six people, including killing one deputy, Zackari Parrish, 29 years of age, and 
severely injuring four other deputies. Riehl’s ultimate rage was over a speeding ticket he 
received a month earlier in which he sent numerous harassing (and possibly threatening) 
e-mails to the court and to a sheriff’s sergeant. Riehl also “purchased nine guns and two 
receivers, including a plum crazy AR-15 receiver with a magazine that can hold 100 
rounds” (Matthews, 2018, p. 4). Unfortunately, all of these Riehl purchases were made 
before he was placed on a mental health hold for his suspicious and erratic behavior 
following his honorable discharge from the Wyoming Army National Guard in 2012. 
This case example is a perfect illustration of the intelligence gaps and challenges facing 
the law enforcement community and the mental health community when dealing with a 
subject’s mental health condition and the need to either prevent him or her from owning 
firearms and/or taking them away in order to avoid another such ambush.   
 Another law enforcement officer death at the hands of an antigovernment 
movement is that of the May 16, 2017, murder of Broadwater County, Montana, Deputy 
Sheriff Mason Moore. Deputy Moore was shot and killed while pursuing a vehicle driven 
by Lloyd Barrus, while his son, Marshall, continued shooting at law enforcement. 
Ultimately, Marshall was shot and killed by police at the scene. Deputy Moore lost his 
life not knowing who he was dealing with. An investigation revealed the Burrus’s were 
involved in a prior violent encounter with law enforcement in Idaho in 2000, where they 
were involved in another police chase and ended up shooting and bringing down a police 
helicopter involved in the chase (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017). “Barrus’ other 
son, Jeffrey, then 20, is still serving a 25-year prison term after pleading guilty to 
attempting to kill police officers” (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017). Per the Southern 
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Poverty Law Center, Lloyd Barrus also served time after that incident, and his 
antigovernment beliefs appear to have hardened while in prison. Lloyd Barrus’ bail was 
set at $2 million, and he faced 16 counts of murder, 14 of which were for deliberate 
attempted homicide, and prosecutors were seeking the death penalty (Southern Poverty 
Law Center, 2017).  
 Another violent law enforcement killing at the hands of an antigovernment 
inspired individual looking to make a name for himself and for his beliefs is that of 
murderer Eric Frein. “Accused murderer Eric Frein thought killing police would spark a 
national revolution bringing political change” (Brelje, 2014, p.1). This incident is just 
another prime example from the years 2008 – 2017 in which an antigovernment extremist 
looked at the federal government as the enemy and took action into his own hands, 
ending an innocent life by fatally shooting one Pennsylvania state trooper and severely 
injuring another. The attack happened on September 12, 2014, at the Blooming Grove 
State Police Barracks. After leading law enforcement on a massive manhunt for 
approximately 7 weeks through the Poconos region in Pennsylvania, Frein was eventually 
captured. He had already sent a letter to his parents explaining some of his motives: 
Our nation is far from what it was and what it should be. There is so much wrong 
and on so many levels only passing through the crucible of another revolution can 
get us back the liberties we once had. Tension is high at the moment and the time 
seems right for a spark to ignite a fire in the hearts of men. What I have done has 
not been done before, and it felt like it was worth a try. (Barbash, 2014) 
What is so disturbing about the Frein incident and for many other domestic 
extremist violent acts toward law enforcement, and/or violence in general, is that often 
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there are no clues, or a known identified pattern/plot recognized by law enforcement, let 
alone apparent to people close to the killers. Frein, with his antigovernment views, went 
unknown about his plot until it was too late. Unfortunately, one state trooper lost his life, 
while another one ended up fighting for his own life. It is here, as a classic example from 
the Frein case study, in which law enforcement clearly has the disadvantage in 
recognizing/identifying these domestic extremist threats in an expeditious manner (or 
even at all). Frein ambushed Pennsylvania state trooper Byron Dickson II as he opened 
the barracks door and stepped outside. This is the trend with domestic extremists as it 
relates to their sinister violence toward law enforcement based on their extremist 
ideology and/or views, whether the perpetrator is antigovernment, sovereign citizen, 
White supremacist, black separatist, extremism individual, and/or a combination of those 
views.  
Black Separatist Extremist 
“The suspect said he was upset at White people. The suspect stated that he wanted 
to kill White people, especially White officers.” (“Dallas police shooting,” 2016) 
Comments made by Dallas Police Chief David Brown, July 8, 2016 
 Black separatist extremists, or what the FBI calls Black identity extremists (BIE), 
are another domestic extremist group of concern, especially as it applies to the safety of 
law enforcement members. The FBI concluded that BIEs are very likely to be the 
catalysts for an increase in premeditated, retaliatory lethal violence against law 
enforcement and will advocate for this violence against law enforcement in the future 
(Chia, 2017). To get a good perspective on what this group is, its ideology, and its 
mission, and how this threat applies to the law enforcement community, some definitions 
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have been added.  
One good definition of this group came from the State of New Jersey, Office of 
Homeland Security and Preparedness website, dated January 17, 2017: 
Black separatist extremists are individuals or groups that seek to establish an 
independent nation for people of African descent through force or violence. These 
groups claim superiority over Whites, are typically anti-Semitic, and oppose 
integration and racial intermarriage. (State of New Jersey, Office of Homeland 
Security and Preparedness, 2017, p.1)   
 However, the FBI defines Black identity extremists as the following: 
As individuals who seek, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or 
violence, in response to perceived racism and injustice in American society ... of 
establishing a separate Black homeland or autonomous Black social institutions, 
communities, or governing organizations within the United States. This desire for 
physical or psychological separation is typically based on either a religious or 
political belief system, which is sometimes formed around or includes a belief in 
racial superiority or supremacy. The mere advocacy of political or social 
positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic 
embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be 
constitutionally protected. (“Black Identity Extremists,” 2018, p.1) 
Of importance to the current study, the BIEs started as a result of “perceptions of 
police brutality against African American spurred an increase in premeditated, retaliatory 
lethal violence against law enforcement” (Chia, 2017, p. 1). This domestic extremist 
group’s identity began recently, according to Chia, who suggested that the Black identity 
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extremists term advocates a cohesive, all-encompassing ideology (Chia, 2017). One ex-
government official told Foreign Policy, “they (government) are grouping together Black 
Panthers, Black nationalists, and Washitaw Nation” (Chia, 2017). 
To put this ideology in the proper context with the current study, Black separatist 
extremist ideology contributed significantly to the law enforcement death statistics that 
became part of this research project, with many senseless killings of law enforcement 
killings around the nation. The August 2014, Ferguson, MO, killing of Michael Brown 
was the spark that started the massive gunfire around the nation as it pertains to the 
senseless killings of law enforcement members. Moreover, FBI representatives asserted: 
BIE perceptions of police brutality against African Americans have become 
organizing drivers for the BIE movement since 2014, resulting in a spike of BIEs 
intentionally targeting law enforcement with violence. In all six targeted attacks 
since 2014, the FBI assesses it is very likely the BIE suspects acted in retaliation 
for perceived past police brutality incidents. Even though five of these attacks 
occurred following controversial police shootings of African Americans by White 
police officers, BIE targeting of officers was not, in every incident, based on their 
specific race. (Chia, 2017, p. 4) 
Black separatist extremist member Micah Johnson was responsible for killing five 
police officers and injuring nine others at a Black Lives Matter protest in Dallas on July 
7–8, 2016 (State of New Jersey, Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, 2017). 
Johnson, a member of the New Black Panther Party’s (NBPP) Houston Chapter for about 
6 months, was asked to leave the group since he was unable to follow the chain of 
command protocols. He carried out his attack on the Dallas police, because he was upset 
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over the shootings of Alton Sterling in Baton Rouge, LA, and Philando Castile near St. 
Paul, MN, that occurred a few days earlier (State of New Jersey Office of Homeland 
Security and Preparedness, 2017). This one incident perpetrated by Johnson was the 
largest death toll for U.S. police officers in a single event since 9/11. According to the 
FBI, during Johnson’s standoff with police, he “told police negotiators he was upset 
about recent police shootings and White people, and expressed a desire to kill White 
people, especially White officers” (Chia, 2017, p. 1). 
On October 23, 2014, Black extremist Zale H. Thompson attacked four New York 
City Police Department (NYPD) officers in Queens, with a hatchet. Thankfully, none of 
the officers were killed, however, one officer sustained an injury to the side of his head, 
while another officer sustained an injury to his arm. The two remaining NYPD officers 
shot and killed Thompson (Chia, 2017). To underscore the severity of threats against law 
enforcement members from these extremist groups, according to the FBI:  
Thompson was angered after a recent spate of deaths at the hands of the police. In 
his own writings, Thompson advocated for armed struggled against “the 
oppressors” and “mass revolt” against the U.S. social, economic, and political 
systems, which he perceived to be “White dominated.” He also described the 
United States as a “beast” and called for “chopping off” its head, hands, and feet. 
(FBI, 2017, p. 4)  
Another prime example of Black separatist extremist violence against U.S. police 
officers is that of the Lakeem Keon Scott case study. On Thursday, July 7, 2016, just a 
day after the Philando Castile police shooting outside of St. Paul, MN, and the day 
before, in which Alton Sterling was killed by Baton Rouge, LA, police, Scott fired at a 
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motel and at passing cars on a highway. According investigators from the Tennessee 
Bureau of Investigation, Scott wanted to harm police officers and others because he was 
angered by the Castile and Sterling shootings just hours before. Scott was Black, and all 
four of his victims were White, including a wounded police officer who was shot in the 
leg (Salinger, 2016). 
Particularly troublesome about this section of the study was the fact that most of 
the law enforcement violence suffered at the hands of these Black extremists was a direct 
result of a police officer deadly interaction with an African American subject elsewhere 
in the nation. The 2014 Ferguson, MO. incident has become viewed as the spark that 
started this so-called war on cops, and/or the Ferguson effect, the unfortunate interactions 
between the police and the community that still continues.  
This has had a profound effect on the policing tactics being employed currently. 
MacDonald (2016) stated:  
The incessant drumbeat against the police has resulted in what Sam Dotson, 
police chief of St. Louis, called the “Ferguson effect.”  Cops are disengaging from 
discretionary enforcement activity, and the “criminal element is feeling 
empowered” (p. 56). 
Furthermore, in respect to the Ferguson effect: 
As 2015 progressed, few law-enforcement practices escaped attack for allegedly 
imposing unjust burdens on Blacks. But it was the virulent anti-cop rhetoric that 
was most consequential. Officers working in inner cities routinely found 
themselves surrounded by hostile, jeering crowds when they tried to make an 
arrest or conduct an investigation. Cops feared becoming the latest YouTube 
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pariah when a viral cell-phone video showed them using force against a suspect 
who had been resisting arrest.  
As a direct consequence of how the police were effectively performing their jobs, 
the police began to disengage from proactive policing. Rather than getting out of 
their squad cars to question an individual who appeared to be hiding a gun, 
officers increasingly just drove on by, waiting for the next robbery or shooting to 
come over the police radio. Criminal summons and misdemeanor arrests for 
public-order offenses plummeted. (MacDonald, 2016, p. 3) 
Finally, as a direct result of this change in police tactics, MacDonald suggested 
that criminal organizations and criminals in general were getting away with crimes they 
had been arrested for in the past. Furthermore, violent crime increased since the Ferguson 
incident. MacDonald wrote, “Homicides in the country’s 50 largest cities rose nearly 
17% in 2015, the greatest surge in fatal violence in a quarter-century, reports the 
Washington Post” (MacDonald, 2016, p. 1). Unfortunately, as the protests continued in 
the aftermath of police officers using deadly force on an African American subject, this 
increase of crime wave and/or rates also soared. The increased violence against law 
enforcement officers rose with it, as shown in the case studies. 
Lone Wolf Extremism 
Much of the current study’s discussion has centered on domestic extremist 
individuals and/or affiliated domestic extremists’ groups and their propensity for violence 
against U.S. law enforcement and violence in general. Pertinent case studies were also 
discussed on how these extremist groups violently protect their own image and/or turf 
and how deeply rooted these groups are in terms of overall hatred. The current section of 
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the discussion breaks away from the group mode and/or the extremist organizations 
perpetrating all of this violence. How about individuals and/or those loosely affiliated 
with these domestic extremist groups, perpetrators who cause violence against law 
enforcement and the concern of how to track down these individuals before such 
senseless violence occurs? Officers working in the field for a number of years will know 
the troublesome groups and their propensity for violence, their beliefs, and their general 
location. However, with individuals’ private beliefs, those who do not commit to any 
group, few people know what they believe in, what makes them tick, and what might 
make them erupt. A practitioner of law enforcement will not have any information, such 
as possible motives, and/or steps leading to any sort of violence, on an individual until 
the act of violence occurs. The situation is very troublesome. Since little research has 
been conducted on these individuals, including a lack of central definition(s) on these 
lone wolf offenders, and how that might apply to the current level of violence seen in 
America, the researcher’s main motive was to add some clarity and perspective on how 
dangerous and violent this particular group of people can be. A lone wolf terrorist is best 
defined as:   
A lone actor (wolf) terrorist is defined by Horgan, Gill, Bouhana, Silver, and 
Corner as “an individual lacking any ties to a terrorist/violent extremist group … 
These individuals typically engage in violence in support of a group and/or 
ideology within the sample, including those inspired by Islamist, right-wing, 
leftwing, nationalist, and single-issue ideologies. (Corner & Gill, 2017, p. 1) 
 Another pertinent definition is:  
Lone wolf terrorism involves terrorist attacks carried out by persons who (a) 
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operate individually, (b) do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network, 
and (c) whose modi operandi are conceived and directed by the individual without 
any direct outside command hierarchy. (Bjelopera, 2017, p. 53) 
The reason why both definitions were mentioned was to add some clarity to the 
lone wolf persona and/or offender perspective, because many questions have been asked 
about who these people are. A significant takeaway from these definitions is that 
typically these violence attacks are carried out by a single individual who may have been 
influenced by another group and/or organization. According to Bjelopera (2017), “when 
it comes to violence attributed to White supremacist extremism (WSE), lone wolves play 
a prominent role” (p. 53). Furthermore, “lone wolves filter in and out of WSE groups and 
they can either get dismissed from these groups because of their ‘violent tendencies’ or 
voluntarily leave because they find the organizations too passive” (Bjelopera, 2017, p. 
53). 
An excellent example of how a lone wolf violent encounter occurred as a result of 
being dismissed from a larger extremist group, to make his or her name known is that of 
the unfortunate shooting death of Stephen T. Johns, 39, a Holocaust Museum security 
guard on June 10, 2009, at the hands of extremist James von Brunn. After the shooting, as 
von Brunn wrote to the leader of the large White supremacist group, Church of the 
Creator, looking for respect and acknowledgment of his extremist neo-Nazi views, the 
leader of the group ignored von Brunn’s political views and viewed von Brunn as too 
incorrect. “My trial was not mentioned in their publications or discussed at their 
meetings" (Keller, 2009). Unfortunately, this example shows just how extreme these 
individuals can be in terms of bringing attention to themselves and being too extreme (or 
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in this case too politically incorrect) for an extremist group’s views and/or ideology.  
In terms of the current discussion, lone wolf, lone actor, and lone perpetrator will 
all be considered the same philosophy when elaborating this type of threat to U.S. law 
enforcement. Another prime example of this type of lone perpetrator threat as it relates to 
the domestic extremist and antigovernment-influenced ideology and threat is the 
senseless violence perpetrated by Gavin Long with his July 17, 2016, ambush on the 
Baton Rouge Police Department. As a response to the Alton Sterling death (suffered by 
the Baton Rouge Police Department on July 5, 2016), Long shot and killed two Baton 
Rouge police officers and one East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office deputy. Long 
ended up shooting six police officers in total, killing three of them, before ending his own 
life. Traveling from Dallas, TX, Long, a former Marine (discharged in 2010), spent the 
last few days of his life in protest over his perception of law enforcement as the 
oppressors after a recent wave of police shootings around the nation, most notably in 
Baton Rouge and in Falcon Heights, MN (Philando Castile).  
 What is so troublesome for members of law enforcement in the Long case study 
violence is the difficulty in tracking/mitigating individuals who spew hatred toward law 
enforcement. Even though Long posted his own video on YouTube a few days before his 
ambush of the Baton Rouge Police Department, it was not found until it was too late, 
long after the violence against the police officers. Investigators at the crime scene found a 
card on Long’s body stating that he was possibly a member of the Washitaw Nation 
(Berlinger, 2016), a sovereign citizen tribe per the Southern Poverty Law Center. Other 
reports have Long affiliated with a Black separatist group, but this has not been 
confirmed (Berlinger, 2016). In any event, per Long’s YouTube posting a few days 
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before the traffic Baton Rouge shootings, Long stated the following: 
I just wanted to let y'all know, don't affiliate me with nothing, he says. He says he 
wanted people to know that his actions were his alone. He then goes on to list 
organizations that he says he has no affiliation with—including the Nation of 
Islam, Floyd Mayweather's The Money Team (he's wearing their hat), and terror 
groups like ISIS. (Berlinger, 2016) 
Zierhoffer (2014) made a compelling argument regarding the 
tracking/investigating of a lone wolf, because they are loosely affiliated with a group (if 
at all). Lone wolves present a significant challenge in identifying before attacks. 
Zierhoffer (2014) in his research project titled, Threat Assessment: Do Lone Terrorists 
Differ from Other Lone Offenders, raised national intelligence community issues when it 
came to the lone wolf threat:   
Research into terrorism is predominantly focused on organizations and the 
concepts of social psychology that explain the influence of groups on the recruit. 
Research on lone offender terrorism has been minimal, seemingly because 
terrorism is most often regarded as a collective activity. From the perspective of 
social psychology, it is relatively easy to understand how a disenfranchised 
individual can be drawn into a terrorist group. With a rise in individual attacks 
since 9/11, it may be important to research other forms of terrorism. (Zierhoffer, 
2014, p. 48) 
Zierhoffer (2014) based her threat assessment on 10 criteria, including mental 
illness and organization, then applied these criteria to the overall case study research 
project, which included the following lone wolves: Theodore Kaczynski (the 
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Unabomber), Eric Rudolph (the 1996 Olympic bomber), and Abdulhakim Mujahid 
Muhammad (Carlos Bledsoe). Furthermore, what makes these three more elusive to track 
is that they were already American citizens living ordinary lives before they engaged in 
criminal acts. Zierhoffer (2014) made a compelling point that these lone wolves are very 
difficult to detect in the first place, because they are not tied to an organization already 
under surveillance. 
To mitigate these lone wolf attacks, Zierhoffer (2014) stressed the need for 
community involvement in reporting any suspicious activity/behavior to the appropriate 
law enforcement, which can be rather difficult, because many of these lone wolves are 
very introverted and are often disconnected from their communities. However, Zierhoffer 
(2014) stated the following regarding the mind-set of these lone terrorists: 
Research suggests how lone terrorists tend to be intelligent individuals who look 
internally for the authority needed for taking action rather than relying on others, 
and most were unsuccessful in their social lives. In spite of the lack of deep 
connection, there were people in the lives of each of these terrorists who could 
report on changes in behavior and bring their concerns to authority, as happened 
in the case of Kaczynski. (p. 60) 
The last opinion is true in preventing a lone wolf attack. However, it is very 
difficult regarding community involvement when the lone wolf attacker is introverted, as 
was the unfortunate Las Vegas mass shooting case involving perpetrator Stephen 
Paddock. With very little law enforcement involvement and no known international and 
domestic extremist group and/or inspired involvement, Stephen Paddock symbolizes the 
greatest fear in today’s volatile world, an unknown person killing massive innocent lives 
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for no apparent reason. On October 1, 2017, when Stephen Paddock took 59 innocent 
lives, including a police officer and wounded hundreds more on the Las Vegas strip, he 
made all of these “lone wolf” fears and/or persona characteristics come true at the evilest 
levels. How can law enforcement stop people like this?   
One criminal profiler stated, “Paddock was a pathological gambler, psychopath, 
and a sociopath. He was predisposed from birth and childhood to harbor extreme 
internalized shame, low self-esteem, depression, and aggressive anger” (Harris, 2017). 
However, how, using the law enforcement community and academic research, can 
anyone mitigate this type of threat of mass violence to people they are dealing with 
perpetrators with these types of personalities and/or mental disorders? The Las Vegas 
incident is especially troublesome when someone like Paddock really never had any law 
enforcement dealings. He had no previous arrests, encounters with the police, official 
police investigations, or traffic tickets, just to name a few background bits of information 
that could shed some light on why Paddock did what he did and how to stop the next lone 
wolf attack. Perhaps America’s leaders should look into exploiting that gray area of 
undiagnosed (or even diagnosed) mental illness and gun control as it pertains to the lone 
wolf persona.  
The next section will be used to investigate the question of how significant mental 
illness is in a terrorist’s world/mind-set. Is there a reason to be concerned about 
undiagnosed mental illness, especially regarding a lone wolf actor?   
According to Corner and Gill (2017), when researching the mental illness 
diagnoses in terrorist activities/individuals/groups around the world, including the U.S., 
domestic terrorists (far-right) were diagnosed as being 40.4% lone wolves having a 
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mental diagnosis versus 7.6% (far-right groups having a mental diagnosis). The data 
indicated the need for more research and corrective ways to address the violent issues 
plaguing the modern nation, especially pertaining to lone wolf right-wing domestic 
terrorism. 
The case study examples showed the greatest law enforcement/intelligence 
community challenge in trying to mitigate the domestic extremist threats against 
members of law enforcement. More research is needed on the lone wolf topic. It was very 
difficult to track and monitor these types of lone offenders, who may have adopted some 
ideology from a group, but ultimately plan to carry out their sinister plots on their own. 
Domestic Extremist Prevention Strategies 
Research Question 3: What are some practical solutions from a community 
policing/intelligence perspective?   
Based on existing studies and research, what are some common themes in 
attempting to alleviate the senseless violence perpetrated against U.S. law enforcement 
members? What do law enforcement members perceive as the greatest threat?  
 Americans are now confronted with a growing threat from homegrown 
extremists, and solutions need to be generated to mitigate the threats. Mantel (2015) 
stressed that members of the American public and the federal government should pay 
more attention to far-right extremism and its potential for mass-casualty violence, instead 
of international inspired attackers (Mantel, 2015). This part of the literature review is 
used to offer some solutions from journals and other sources to mitigate the domestic 
threats. A government, community, and an intellectual approach was used during this 
portion of the literature review to gauge any intelligence gaps or if there is too much 
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research in a particular area.   
 To battle the threats in modern America, a multifaceted tactic must be taken by 
the intelligence and law enforcement communities, which should begin on two fronts at 
the top: the executive branch of the U.S. government and with the National Security Staff 
(NSS)–Homeland Security Council. Leaders of the two organizations can set the agenda 
on how to combat this serious issue and how to deploy valuable resources to fight back.  
 In August 2011, the executive branch created the Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States strategy in conjunction with the 2010 
national security strategy, in a proactive effort to enhance partnerships and understanding 
of what tools and methods are most effective in the fight against homegrown extremism. 
(The White House, 2011) Specifically, the strategy looks to:  
1. enhance federal engagements with and support to local communities that may be 
targeted by violent extremists;  
2. build government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent 
extremism; and  
3. to counter violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals (The White 
House, 2011).  
Moreover, the community awareness and policing association initiative is 
empowered as the main objective in getting communities involved with the issues at 
hand, enabling the individual to take ownership of and responsibility for being a part of 
positive change for communities. In concert with the 2011 Empowering Local Partners to 
Prevent Violence Extremism in the United States initiative, the Strategic Implementation 
Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
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was presented to members of the public, most notably, to the law enforcement and 
intelligence communities members, later in December 2011, to provide guidance, and, 
according to White House representatives, “to describe the range of actions we are taking 
to improve or expand these efforts” (White House, 2011, p. 7). Specifically, the Strategic 
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States builds upon the Empowering Local Partners theme and incorporates more 
of a community policing model, as well as government and police expertise in handling 
these threats.  
 Another crucial initiative created to act in concert with the White House’s 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States initiative 
is that of the Using Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism: Five Key 
Principles for Law Enforcement developed by the Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS) program through the U.S. Department of Justice. According to the members of 
the Department of Justice, the real principle to realize for U.S. law enforcement 
nationwide is to detect and solve problems, in addition to identifying the problem areas to 
mitigate these senseless violent extremist acts (International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, 2014). 
However, the research conducted by Schanzer et al. (2016), titled The Challenge 
and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism, 
addressed a more totality of community resources and community approach, not just with 
law enforcement, in order to foster better relationships between law enforcement and the 
public in the mission to curb homegrown extremism violence. Taylor and Russell (2012) 
stated that regarding law enforcement members’ reliance on modern technology in 
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combating crime, human relationships/effective communication with the community at 
large is still the most important in preventing crimes. 
To expand on the vital research of 382 national law enforcement agencies, and in 
concert with the 2011 White House initiative, Empowering Local Partnerships to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States, the main focus by Schanzer et al. (2016) was to 
gauge how the initiative was working. Schanzer et al. (2016) were interested in collecting 
data on the community and law enforcement pulse regarding if violent extremism really 
was in those jurisdictions and to decipher how these law enforcement agencies were or 
were not handling violent extremism. Schanzer et al. (2016) recommended that if any 
violent extremism can be mitigated in a particular community, a robust and fruitful 
relationship must exist between the police and the community they serve.  
 Although Schanzer et al. (2016) concentrated on combating international-inspired 
violence extremism across many U.S. jurisdictions, many of the challenges recognized by 
the researchers can (and should be) applied to the domestic violent extremism. Schanzer 
et al. (2016) presented the following law enforcement challenges in mitigating this 
violent extremism threat: 
1. Muslim American communities are perceived as the ones that are being 
discriminated against, as they are given the extra burden from law enforcement in 
stopping internationally inspired terrorism (Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other international 
influenced and/or sponsored terrorist organizations). Muslim Americans feel that other 
communities and/or cultures are not being pressured to do the same. The Muslim 
American community is pushing back, saying that other non-Muslim communities are not 
being pressured to stop antigovernment violence and/or racism or other domestic violent 
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extremism actions. Schanzer et al. (2016) found that leaders of many police agencies 
around the nation had presented sufficient efforts and programs to work with the Muslim 
community in preventing extremism, but not so much with other communities in 
mitigating domestic extremists.  
2. “Some Muslim Americans believe that policing outreach and engagement 
initiatives may be linked to efforts to conduct surveillance on Muslim American 
individuals and/organizations” (Schanzer et al., 2015, p. i). This is a very important 
challenge in restoring public and police cooperation and building a bridge of trust. 
Without trust and cooperation, it does not matter which community the law enforcement 
serves, no cooperation and/or peace will ensue. The challenge is very important to the 
domestic extremist arena, because many of these extremists are U.S.-born citizens and 
can easily blend into their respective societies. Hence, the community is vital in reporting 
any suspicious and/or potential criminal behavior, especially as it pertains to any possible 
violence against law enforcement.  
3. Schanzer et al. (2016) portrayed a very positive relationship between the Muslim 
community and local law enforcement that serve their communities. However, this 
cannot be said about the relationship between federal law enforcement officials and 
leaders of the Muslim community, since Muslims pointed out issues with airport 
screening and with the ongoing national immigration agenda (especially with the 2017 
travel ban in certain Muslim countries, part of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., and section 301 of title 3, United States Code and 
subsequent amendment of said act due to the political backlash in certain Muslim 
communities around the world). What is positive about the research data was that local 
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law enforcement appears to have a healthy relationship with the Muslim community, 
which can lead to other positive crime-mitigating factors such as an increased number of 
tips and/or sources the Muslim American community can report. Members of the Muslim 
American community can work more hand-in-hand with their respective local police 
department officials and make a difference in combating violence crime. Since members 
of local law enforcement are the eyes and ears of their jurisdiction, the relationship 
between the Muslim American community and law enforcement is vital for mitigating 
violent extremism. However, the challenge rests with the local law enforcement agencies 
developing the same kind of relationships with other members of their respective 
communities to curb domestic extremism and other associated violent criminality.   
4. Schanzer et al. (2016) found if law enforcement is effective in handling other non-
terrorism and/or non-criminality issues in the Muslim American communities they serve, 
they are more prone to get more support and compliance with these communities. For 
example, recognizing various Muslim events and/or celebrations will go a long way to 
help law enforcement with this relationship, especially if the local police agency 
administers traffic control and/or security at a particular venue, for example, which would 
unfortunately be considered a dangerous precedent for law enforcement in terms of 
domestic extremist events, such as a White nationalist parade or an antigovernment 
protest. The domestic angle would be very difficult to coordinate and get members of a 
community to accept unless law enforcement is proactive in their security mind-set and 
can communicate with those community members and/or groups that might have an 
adverse effect on these racist groups’ protests and/or activities. Finally, law enforcement 
officials being prepared for these events and quelling potential acts of violence is very 
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much needed in that particular community.  
5. The last vital challenge found by Schanzer et al. (2016) was that the lack of local 
law enforcement community policing resources and other pressing policing and/or 
community priorities have made it difficult for the police to maintain effective 
community outreach. The research has indicated that when police departments across the 
nation experienced budgetary issues, getting a well-trained officer (or even one at all) 
could be a real challenge, especially with many other pressing law enforcement and 
community needs, such as an increase in drug abuse (notably heroin), an increase in gang 
activity, and more firearms crimes. “We found that preventing violent extremism, while a 
pressing national issue, is not a top priority for local police that must address violent 
crime, drugs, gangs, and a host of other public safety concerns” (Schanzer et al., 2016, p. 
ii). 
One of the major data points from Schanzer et al. (2016) was how administrators 
from individual law enforcement agency was tackling this violent-extremist issue. 
Specifically, Schanzer et al. (2016) asked the question of members of all law enforcement 
agencies (regardless of agency size), “Please indicate which strategies your agency uses 
to address violent extremism” (p. 13). One of the lowest responses to the question was 
the “Lack of outreach and engagement with the communities that may be targeted for 
recruitment to violent extremism” (Schanzer, 2016, p. 15), which raised the question of 
whether this is common for all jurisdictions across the nation. If so, then this is a major 
research gap and needs to be investigated in specific areas around the U.S. Such an 
answer indicated that members of these law enforcement agencies do not think there is an 
extremism issue in their own jurisdiction and do not use community policing techniques 
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and/or community outreach to address these concerns. Perhaps they do not have the 
personnel to create a dedicated community policing program to combat the extremism in 
their community.  
According to Schanzer et al. (2016), antigovernment violent extremism was seen 
as the major violent extremist’s threat. Interestingly, each category of law enforcement 
agency (state agency, small, midsize, large, and all agencies) had antigovernment 
overwhelmingly selected as the main threat in each of their jurisdictions. Other domestic 
extremism threats, such as “racist violent extremism, environmental violent extremism 
and anti-capitalist violent extremist” scored high, but less than Al-Qaeda inspired violent 
extremism (Schanzer et al., 2016, p. 63). This research illustrates how many of the 
members of those law enforcement agencies considered the domestic extremist angle 
more threatening overall when compared to internationally inspired extremism. 
(Schanzer et al., 2016) 
Another vital theme generated from Schanzer et al. (2016) was the overall lack of 
trust and relationship between the police, the government in general, and the community 
they served. Overall, the highest percentage of responses received from law enforcement 
in terms of barriers they have seen in employing a community policing strategy to 
mitigate violent extremism were (a) lack of trust in the police and government, (b) 
language barriers, and (c) cultural misunderstanding, indicating that the community 
policing framework is simply not working. Perhaps the agency does not have dedicated 
officer(s) to fulfill the community policing role due to budgetary and/or funding reasons 
(as stated in the study), it wasn’t a high priority for the agency, and there were not 
enough training opportunities for their members. The barriers were very telling in terms 
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of a lack of communication and harmony with the community and also showed a lack of 
dedication to the community policing model to mitigate the threat of violent extremism.  
Another vital theme found during the study was how members of law 
enforcement agencies did not know the pulse of their own community when it comes to 
evaluating the effectiveness of its work with communities to counter violent extremism 
(Schanzer et al., 2015). According to the results, a majority “(62.3%) of all agency 
leaders do not evaluate this effectiveness, which shows that the agency leaders have other 
pressing needs and/or do not value such a relationship with the community when facing 
the violent extremism challenge.” (Schanzer et al., 2015, p.87)  
With the counter violent extremist programs mentioned in this section of the 
literature review, a few challenges were also found. Vidino and Hughes (2015), in the 
research titled, Countering Violent Extremism in America: Program on Extremism, 
explained there was no agency clearly taking ownership of the overall program. “While 
Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) and National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) have done an 
admirable job coordinating Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) despite poorly scoped 
policy directive, the effort would benefit from clear leadership” (Vidino & Hughes, 2015, 
p. 18). The three-city pilot program and research project showed no clear direction on the 
overall national program’s objectives. While it seems that state and local levels of law 
enforcement/intelligence agencies have their priorities established for the program, the 
priorities are not evident at the national level or from a federal manager’s perspective on 
running countering violent extremist programs. 
Addressing racism in America and attempting to mitigate domestic extremist 
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groups like White supremacists, fundamental changes need to be employed positively in 
the community and among failed criminal justice policies. In the study, Image Isn’t 
Everything: Contemporary Systemic Racism and Antiracism in the Age of Obama, 
Ostertag and Armaline (2011), shared the opinion that as “public intellectuals we all must 
tackle this race issue as a community at large.” (p. 284) Finally, building on the 
community togetherness/involvement angle, Lyons and Roberts (2014) stated that the 
public would be more forthcoming with crime tips and overall assistance knowing that 
the authorities would take them, and the crime being reported seriously. Lyons and 
Roberts (2014) made their assessment as part of their overall research on the need for 
more reporting, defining, and investigation of bias crimes.   
Additionally, Lyons and Roberts (2014) pointed out the failed government 
implementation of the war on drugs back in the 1980s and the mass incarceration policies 
that resulted in the failure, which formed a racial divide, resulting in the current race 
wars. One example, according to Lyons and Roberts (2014), was that “White 
unemployment, economic destabilization rates continue to rise and immigration rise.” 
(p.270) Furthermore, according to Ostertag and Armaline (2011): 
White supremacist organizations and ideology continue to poison and drive 
debates over everything from immigration reform to domestic economic policy. 
We might learn from the Southern Poverty Law Center and take such threats more 
seriously by adopting a markedly less liberal (“just ignore them, and they’ll go 
away”) and more active approach to boldly confronting White supremacy in our 
communities and their legitimacy in policy debates. (p. 284) 
In furtherance of the vital relationship between the community and the police 
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theme being discussed, mitigating the far-right domestic extremism/hate group threats 
starts right at the center of the community. Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak, and 
Freilich (2014) researched a vast number of U.S. counties from the 1990–2000 and 2001–
2012 periods. Not surprisingly, Adamczyk et al. (2014) found the areas of the country in 
which the far-right hate groups were rampant in their views also had a higher number of 
ideologically motivated homicides. 
The results are striking for many reasons. First, law enforcement can use the data 
to effectively mitigate the threats by building a better rapport with the members of the 
hate groups (understanding of amendment issues but violent crimes will not be accepted 
nor tolerated). Furthermore, more understanding and awareness, but yet law-abiding, 
could be raised by both sides (hate groups and police) and better communications can be 
made to alleviate a considerable proportion of violent acts. Adamczyk et al. (2014) made 
it known that if members of the communities and counties do not make any significant 
changes the relationship between the groups and with the community members (police 
and private citizens), violent acts will unfortunately continue. During their research, 
Adamczyk et al. (2014) made an interesting assessment of how economics and poverty 
levels did not play a major role in their study when it came to the variable causing the far-
right groups to commit more violence. However, more community involvement between 
the far-right groups, the police, and community leaders is necessary and needs to be dealt 
with proactively, or this violence will continue.   
This portion of the literature review has involved more of a community and law 
enforcement themed approach in mitigating the domestic extremist threat. From a law 
enforcement perspective on dealing with these domestic threats, the Study of Terrorism 
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and Responses to Terrorism (START), Carter et al. (2014) completed an in-depth survey 
with more than 364 officers representing 175 state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies around the nation. Carter et al. (2014) examined the perceptions of their 
respective organizational dynamics and/or terrorism threat readiness. Moreover, Carter et 
al. (2014) focused on the threat of terrorism, the nature of information sharing, and 
whether agencies were prepared to deal with terrorist attacks. As part of the study, Carter 
et al. (2014) provided a snapshot of law enforcement members’ opinions of dealing with 
these domestic extremist threats.  
One vital trait for law enforcement and its personnel to be successful in meeting 
the goals in mitigating domestic extremist threats was that the agency must be prepared. 
Carter et al. (2014) stated being prepared means having adequate and trained personnel, 
acceptable resources of equipment and funding, sufficient training, and also possessing 
what Carter et al. (2014) said was excellence in working with other agencies.  
Building on the preparedness theme, Carter et al. (2014) found a large amount of 
responses from their survey stating that one of the most crucial elements of preparedness 
was having the respective agency consider the importance of training in day-to-day 
preparedness and understanding the many threats presented to law enforcement. 
Similarly, Carter et al. (2014) found that most of the responses from law enforcement 
members showed they felt that if their respective agency leaders would release needed 
assessment reports and analytical documents pertaining to the threats, it would help the 
overall preparedness for mitigating domestic threats. Having key relationships with other 
government levels of law enforcement scored a huge response in the survey. Awareness 
of an agency’s key resources and personnel, and utilization of this component, would also 
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help each individual agency’s preparation for domestic extremism.     
Fisher, Oddsson, and Wada (2013) asked if class and/or racial factors impacted 
police force size, which raised the question if their question also aligned with domestic 
extremist issues and/or challenges. Are these social and policing factors important in 
securing modern communities and producing better community/policing relationships? 
Fisher et al. (2013) found city leaders were more apt to increase policing tactics in those 
areas of the city where poverty and economic inequality exist at the same time. Also, 
hiring a diverse police force was very significant, even if not being done as it should 
around the nation. Based on Fisher et al. (2013) view, the police force’s makeup should 
mirror the community it serves.  
Another theme was the continuously expanding job description for a modern 
police officer, which included an awareness of what a police officer must politically and 
professionally endure on a daily basis, what characteristics or traits an officer on patrol 
should be able to readily recognize, and whether the individual’s actions may be 
indicative of a domestic extremist threat.  Gruenewald, Kiefer, Suttmoeller, Chermak, 
and Freilich (2016) attempted to answer the questions by studying the violence in police 
officers’ case studies.  
Routine traffic stops were unfortunately the case of most of the law enforcement 
homicides committed by these far-right domestic extremists. Gruenewald et al. (2016) 
pointed out, “Many deadly far-right attacks on police are often triggered by seemingly 
routine traffic stops that quickly escalate into deadly violence” (p. 233). As such, since 
the state, local and tribal police perform many of these traffic stops, advanced awareness 
and training is needed for the officers who risk their lives on a daily basis doing routine 
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traffic stops. Since many of these deadly traffic stops came at the hands of sovereign 
citizens, by recognizing their symbols, such as “Don’t tread on me” bumper stickers, 
fictitious license plates, not rolling down their windows, and other identifiers could save 
police officer lives if the officer is properly trained. 
Another significant finding by Gruenewald et al. (2016) was the assessment that 
most law enforcement homicides by domestic extremists were directly related to recent 
racial incidents of deadly force on a subject elsewhere in the nation. Notable was the 
uproar of the Black Lives Matter movement. As a result, lone actors retaliate against the 
police in a violent way. Gruenewald et al. (2016) pointed out; little can be done to 
mitigate these ambushes. 
Finally, Gruenewald et al. (2016) shared their opinions in regard to other criteria 
in which law enforcement members have been killed by far-right extremists. The most 
prevalent criteria were: (a) defending family, (b) defending property, (c) avoiding arrest, 
and (d) mission offense. The mission offense category was what the study authors 
deemed one of the most undetectable in terms of identifying the suspect, since many 
times far-right suspects are not part of any organization/group but are lone wolves, 
sometimes described as a “ticking time bomb,” ready to carry out violence (Gruenewald 
et al., 2016). 
Much of this portion of the literature review was used to discuss how U.S. law 
enforcement leaders have shifted priorities and changed since 9/11, especially in dealings 
with U.S. domestic extremists; there are other deeply rooted police practices. In 
American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice 
Alternative, Schulhofer, Tyler, and Hug (2011) looked at the procedural justice model 
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and its policy implications in policing.  
Schulhofer et al. (2011) reported that Whites and minorities wanted the same 
thing from the police: fair treatment and respect. Schulhofer et al. (2011) made 
recommendations on how policing could have a heavy influence on the community being 
served and overall public perception. The perception should give law enforcement 
administrators the pulse needed to change/modify existing law enforcement functions, 
operations, or programs and possibly to devote resources to a particular need in the 
community (Schulhofer et al, 2011). Schulhofer et al. (2011) stated that forming policing 
methods toward the public perception of needs would make for a more lawful society and 
especially alleviate conflict between the police and the public.  
What exactly is the pulse of America as it relates to the view of the police and the 
job the police are performing around America? According to Ekins (2016), 68% of White 
Americans have a favorable view of the police, while only 40% of African Americans 
and 59% of Hispanics have a favorable view. Furthermore, when broken down by 
political party, Republicans had an 81% favorable view, Independents had a 59% view, 
while Democrats had a 59% view (Ekins, 2016). Ekins (2016) stated that two major 
categories surround the political parties’ views: confident gaps matter and “no cop” or 
“anti-cop.” 
The confident gaps matter category stemmed from how the public perceived how 
the law enforcement agency did its overall job. Ekins (2016) indicated the higher the rate, 
the less conflict between the police and their citizens.  
Ekins (2016) pointed out that no one group was considered “anti-cop,” but that 
the public perception and confident gap meter was very important to the overall 
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relationship between the community and the police:  
The right people are out there now, and they are ready to move. The choice is 
clear–we have to change the game to defeat violent extremists. For the sake of our 
future, and that of our children, I pray we make the right choice now. (Mann, 
2015, p.280) 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation will be used to focus on possible solutions 
from a community perspective and how to mitigate the domestic extremist threats toward 
law enforcement members. Furthermore, chapters 4 and 5 will attempt to offer solutions 
to this critical issue facing U.S. law enforcement members by first researching a 
significant sample size of various government levels of law enforcement agencies 
(federal, state, and local) around the Hampton Roads, VA (Norfolk), area and determine 
if these agencies even have programs for combating domestic extremism threats or some 
sort of a community-based policing model (i.e., the Community Oriented Policing 
Services–COPS through the U.S. Department of Justice or some sort of a bottom-up 
method for getting community leaders together). Themes or key words were collected 
through interviews with various law enforcement personnel about their agency’s 
programs, utilizing vital concepts from programs from Mann’s (2015) Game Changers: 
Going Local to Defeat Violent Extremists: 
We need people to unify around a game-changing methodology that works. This 
is sorely needed in today’s rapidly changing and dangerous world. These true 
believers are the junior to mid-level leaders of today. They may not be in charge 
yet, but they will be soon. It may take five to ten years for these future senior 
leaders to move to positions of influence, but they will get there. And when they 
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do, this book and the network behind it will be there for them (Mann, 2015, p. 
279).  
What is the significance of Mann’s book and his perspectives? How does a retired 
U.S. Army Green Beret officer offer solutions to the problem of U.S. domestic extremist 
issues plaguing society? How do these perspectives, which were originally geared more 
toward repairing and stabilizing Afghan villages during the global war on terrorism 
influence the nation’s policing efforts and relationships with the communities they serve? 
What Mann offers from his dedicated service to our country through the U.S. Army are 
approaches that offer stability in war-torn, savaged areas such as Afghanistan, and, 
applied properly, can lead to positive results between the police and the citizens they 
serve. (Mann, 2015) Mann teaches these concepts in other areas of the world and, most 
importantly, in the U.S. to law enforcement as a way to curb the extremist challenge. As 
Mann stated in his book, he “proposes a local, or as it if often called, bottom-up 
stabilization approach, which is a paradigm shift from how we (the U.S. government) 
operate today” (Mann, 2015, p. xix).  
The discussion will be used to center on how law enforcement leaders and 
members of the intelligence community should employ, adapt, and apply the vital tools 
that have been utilized effectively around the globe, especially during the Afghanistan 
village stabilization operations (VSO) post 9/11, which will help defeat the extremism 
threat, and, more significantly, improve law enforcement relations with the communities 
they serve to address the root of the problem. 
 According to Mann (2015), “Any time you can remove a key enemy leader from 
the equation, that’s a good thing.”  However, Mann (2015) added “Air strikes and drone 
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strikes will never defeat this problem, no matter how senior the leaders are whom we 
kill” (p. 26). Mann (2015) often describes this method of killing targeted leaders as only 
“Band-Aids to the real problem.”  Furthermore, Mann’s theory and vision extend to the 
mistaken theory of how the best way to combat these extremists; vast resources, 
personnel, and ability to recruit, is for foreign powers, such as the United States to flex 
their muscles and dictate their authority and power over these fragile Third World nations 
(Mann, 2015). The mistake in this belief was that the strong power’s government, vast 
money and resources, and top-down government approach will stimulate the invaded 
country’s economy and will allow for a buy-in and overall trust of the U.S. government 
in these war-torn areas.  
According to Mann (2015), this is the exact opposite of what happened in 
Afghanistan and other areas of the world. Mann wrote, “The real center of gravity in this 
epic fight is local clan populations and the tribal societies, which provide men, resources, 
money and ideas. Our enemy gets this and does it every day. Look at how ISIS exploits 
marginalized Sunni clans in Iraq to fight against the largely Shia-dominated and U.S.-
supported Iraqi government” (Mann, 2015, p.26). In other words, leaders as a 
government work with the locals (tribes, clans, other societal groups), no matter if it’s in 
Afghanistan, Colombia, or somewhere else. Extreme measures like drones being 
employed overseas is a prime example of how a community buy-in will not be effective 
unless America utilizes a bottom-up community approach. The same concepts and/or 
themes are applicable to the nation’s domestic extremist mitigation strategies in getting 
the necessary buy-in within communities.  
In the current volatile world, ISIS and other extremist groups know that the U.S. 
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will not deploy resources or personnel until at the very last moment—or not at all—based 
on lack of resources, so these extremist groups take advantage of their geographical 
locations and clan affiliations. These extremist groups take advantage of the U.S. 
government’s misadventures with operations such as counterinsurgency actions and 
failed rebuilding efforts with critical infrastructure that leave the area worse off than 
before. Mann (2015) stated, “This is a leadership issue. The days of American 
isolationism have long passed. Violent extremists will exploit the actions we don’t take 
more than the actions we do take. It won’t be easy. There must be a patient will to win 
that transcends policy and politics. Our leaders must embrace policies that stretch beyond 
political terms of office by putting our country – not politics – first” (p. 26).  
 “Understanding the gap between status and contract society is the first step of 
understanding local realities of Afghanistan – and other countries where violence 
extremists operate. Since the terror attacks of 9-11-2001, we have struggled to do this” 
(Mann, 2015, p. 26). This is the main thesis behind Mann’s (2015) argument in his book 
Game Changers.  Utilizing Mann’s model, the contract society is the formal government 
in a particular society/state, and the status is illustrated by the marginalized villages and 
communities in that particular society. The model is used to make a strong argument that 
shows how as a society leaders are failing their own people in their own country with an 
incorrect mind-set, thus leading to discontent between the government and its people. 
According to Mann (2015), especially since 9/11, the gap between the government and its 
people is continuously getting wider and wider, which is demonstrated by the unfortunate 
volatile nature existing between the police and the citizens they serve.  
 “Relationships are critical to maintaining balance between clans and preventing 
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honor-based feuds from getting out of hand” (Mann, 2015, p. 33). Relationship building 
is the main impetus behind stabilizing villages and communities. Mann discusses four 
huge game-changer items that must be executed accurately to see positive societal results:  
1. “Get surrounded and conduct bottom-up VSO” (Mann, 2015, p. 217). The main 
point behind this game changer is to essentially live with the community you are 
attempting to stabilize and reestablish a real trust factor. In fact, the U.S. Army Green 
Berets did this several times, along with other military service members, in an attempt to 
stabilize the Afghan nation. Encompassing this vital approach and showing a particular 
community that their identity and overall self-worth is respectful and admirable will go a 
long way in bridging that gap between the contract society (centralized government) and 
the status society (villages and communities). A successful approach will garner respect 
between the two entities and squash any threat of extremism. A prime example of 
bridging the gap, in the U.S. law enforcement world with respect to the community they 
are servicing is that of the eruption of violence after the 2014 Michael Brown, Ferguson, 
Missouri, incident. One of the major reasons why the chaos ensued after this shooting 
was the distrust among the Ferguson police and the citizens of the city of Ferguson. As 
Mann (2015) stressed, trust is vital in establishing harmonious relationships with the 
community at large.  
“Living among the people is a team effort. It is not just for the advisors at the tip 
of the spear. It involves politicians, senior headquarters leaders, and others all the way 
down to the local community leaders. We should employ all available resources and 
relationships to gain swift entry into communities. If not, intimidation takes over and 
YouTube beheadings take center stage” (Mann, 2015, p. 132). This is where U.S. 
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societies are failing to get community leaders involved with social issues such as 
policing, crime, and overall security concerns that need a total societal approach.  
2. “Meet them where they are.” (Mann, 2015, p. 218). The researcher of the current 
study was deployed from 17 May through 16 July 2010 with the U.S. Coast Guard during 
the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico, where he used the VSO approach 
effectively. Mann (2015) felt awful for the victim’s families of the explosion and the 
people living in the gulf area who had to endure yet another tragedy. It was just five years 
earlier that Hurricane Katrina hit the same area. Being from the north and never having 
visited Louisiana, the researcher depended on the locals to assist him in 
providing/allocating the resources needed in order to prevent oil from reaching the 
delicate land/shore. He learned a great deal about their local customs, their culture, and 
especially their passion for the marine life in their area. The researcher said he was not 
going anywhere until he felt their area was safe from the oil. He worked 16 hour days to 
accomplish this and made himself always available to parish presidents, civic leaders, and 
concerned citizens. It took a while to gain their trust, but he did, to the point where a few 
parish presidents told him that they didn’t want him to leave the area, and one sheriff 
offered him a full-time job. (He already had one and was currently on active duty.) The 
researcher’s initiative and drive during this tragedy was to make things right, utilizing 
local resources and strong accountability.  
3. “Connect through extreme collaboration” (Mann, 2015, p. 218). A robust 
community buy-in plan is needed for a community to be successful in mitigating 
extremist threats. Everyone must work together, which includes youth service 
organizations, county housing and health officials, local and state elected officials (to 
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include leaders, mayors, budget administrators, etc.), criminal justice and law 
enforcement officials, educational leaders, business leaders, representatives of the faith 
community, and private funding organizations. Incorporating all these entities in a 
community plan will get a better representation of the community’s population sample, 
with better input on how to address the various threats. Most importantly, community 
mitigating solutions can be addressed from the bottom up instead of top down. 
Establishing fruitful and meaningful relationships/partnerships will go a long way in 
protecting the good of the community.  
4. “Tell a story that sticks” (Mann, 2015, p. 218) is a key concept very similar to the 
previous concept in which generating a key community action plan, connecting all of the 
community’s pertinent resources (agencies) and establishing sound relationships is key to 
the community’s overall success in preventing extremism. Providing a narrative in terms 
of a sound counter-extremism community action plan and then backing it up with the 
operational portion of the plan with the necessary key resources/relationships is needed 
for a successful extremism mitigation program/safeguards from violence extremism.  
U.S. Community Policing Plan 
“The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2011, left a lasting impression on national 
homeland security policies and law enforcement strategies at federal, state, and 
local levels. A recent report indicates that there are now 1,271 government 
organizations and 1,931 private organizations involved in homeland security, 
intelligence-gathering, and counterterrorism issues. The US Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) alone has contributed more than $340 billion between 
2004 and 2009 toward the development of new agencies centered on the goal of 
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improving the coordination of policing agencies through intelligence sharing. If 
we learned anything from 9/11 it was that proper coordination of police and 
security agencies as well as the sharing of intelligence information in this country 
was almost non-existent prior to the attacks” (Taylor & Russell, 2011, p. 184).  
Besides the unfortunate bloodshed of all of these traumatic events, what is the 
common ingredient of all of these violent shootings: (a) 2015 San Bernardino shooting; 
(b) 2015 Chattanooga, TN, military shooting; (c) 2015 Colorado Planned Parenthood 
shooting; (d) 2015 Charleston church shooting; (e) 2014 Las Vegas Police ambush; (f) 
2013 Boston Marathon bombing; (g) 2012 Sikh Temple shooting; (h) 2012 St. John’s 
Parish police ambush; (i) 2009 Fort Hood shooting? What can the government do to curb 
these senseless violent acts in the future? This discussion includes the vital White House 
initiative Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 
developed in August 2011, to act as a force multiplier for all government levels of law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies in order to attempt to curb the challenge of 
homegrown extremism. Also, this discussion will utilize the community policing model 
through the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to address/offer solutions to 
the homegrown extremism issue, instead of the easy solution to creating another military 
branch made up of cops and police administrators, which would spend countless amounts 
of money on military equipment and operate on a military operations plan. 
The Challenge 
 “Now, at this pivotal moment, we continue to face serious challenges to our 
national security, even as we are working to shape the opportunities of tomorrow. Violent 
extremism and an evolving terrorist threat raise a persistent risk of attacks on America 
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and our allies” (White House, 2015, p. 2). “We have emphasized community-based 
efforts and local law enforcement programs to counter homegrown violent extremism and 
protect vulnerable individuals from extremist ideologies that could lead them to join 
conflicts overseas or carry out attacks here at home” (White House, 2015, p. 2). These 
statements from the 2015 National Security Strategy reiterated the gravity of the 
homegrown extremism challenge America faces and attempts to deal with.  
Over time, the greatest threat to the U.S. homeland came to be posed not so much 
by groups operating overseas (although a number of plots conceived by al Qaeda 
and its affiliates have been thwarted over the last decade), but from “self-
radicalized, homegrown extremists in the United States (Vidino & Hughes, 2015, 
p. 2). 
In 2010, then-Attorney General Eric Holder indicated that the terrorist threat had:  
... changed from simply worrying about foreigners coming here, to worrying 
about people in the United States, American citizens—raised here, born here, and 
who for whatever reason, have decided that they are going to become radicalized 
and take up arms against the nation in which they were born (Vidino & Hughes, 
2015, pp. 12–13). 
Between 2001 and 2013, more than 200 U.S. citizens and permanent residents 
were convicted of terrorism-related activities. This figure clearly indicates that a 
small but significant number of American citizens and residents embrace Jihadist 
ideology and are committed to using violence, at times against fellow Americans, 
to this end (Vidino & Hughes, 2015, p. 13). 
This is another example in which a diverse and robust community policing and/or 
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intelligence mitigation plan is needed to address these potential violent acts, since not 
only is the domestic extremist a viable threat, but Jihadist ideology has been a major 
threat since 2001.  
According to the New America Foundation’s International Security Project 
(2015), which houses a database to track homegrown extremism since 2001, the increase 
in numbers of homegrown extremists is staggering. According to the New America 
Foundation International Security Project (2016) website:  
The purpose of this database is to provide as much information as possible about 
American citizens and permanent residents engaged in violent extremist activity 
as well as individuals, regardless of their citizenship status, living within the 
United States who have engaged in violent extremist activity. We examine both 
those individuals motivated by Jihadist ideology, understood as those who worked 
with or were inspired by al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups, as well as those 
motivated by other ideologies that are non-Jihadist in character, for example right 
wing, left wing, or idiosyncratic beliefs. Here I provide some of the core findings 
including the number of extremists indicted or killed by year, the overall number 
of extremists indicted or killed since 2001, and the number of people killed by 
extremists since 2001. This data was last updated in August, 2015. (New America 
Foundation Group, 2016) 
To break down New America’s database/statistics as of 2015: “499 of total 
extremists, 317 individuals charged with jihadist terrorism, 182 nonjihadists, 45 victims 
killed by jihadists and 48 victims killed by right wing extremists” (New America 
Foundation Group, 2016, part I, p.1). Figure 7 shows the data variables.  
105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Homegrown extremism 2001-2015.Diagram courtesy of New America’s 
International Security Program. Retrieved from https://www.newamerica.org/in-
depth/terrorism-in-america/ 
 
To reiterate the significance of the discussion on curbing homegrown extremists, 
homegrown extremism is examined at both an international influence (San Bernardino 
shooting) and a domestic influence (right-wing or antigovernment) (Charleston, SC; Las 
Vegas ambush). A strong argument can be made that the tougher issue in fighting 
homegrown extremism is that of domestic homegrown extremism. “Some terrorism 
experts say the American public and the federal government should be paying more 
attention to far-right extremism and its potential for mass-casualty violence” (Mantel, 
2015, p. 771). A major example of the thought of far-right extremist mass-casualty 
violence is the Black Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, SC, massacre in June 2015, in 
which White supremacist Dylan Roof shot and killed nine African American church 
worshipers in a mass shooting. What does the law enforcement community feel about the 
increased violence from these far-right groups? 
While experts say most adherents of extremist movements are not violent, a 
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recent survey found that police agencies are more concerned about violence by 
antigovernment extremists than by Islamic extremists. The threat of violence has 
spurred debate about the strength of the government’s efforts to fight extremism 
and whether it should try to prevent far-right radicalization of young people. 
(Mantel, 2015, p. 771)   
The Remedy 
 To combat these threats in America, a multilateral approach must be taken by the 
intelligence community, and it starts on two fronts at the top: the executive branch of the 
U.S. government and with the National Security Staff (NSS)—the Homeland Security 
Council. Leaders of the two organizations set the agenda on how to combat this serious 
issue and how to deploy valuable resources to fight it. The executive branch in August 
2011, created an Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
States strategy in conjunction with the 2010 National Security strategy in a proactive 
effort to enhance partnerships and understanding of what tools and methods are most 
effective in the fight against homegrown extremism. Specifically, the strategy is used to 
examine: “1) enhance federal engagements with and support to local communities that 
may be targeted by violent extremist; 2) build government and law enforcement expertise 
for preventing violent extremism; and 3) to counter violent extremist propaganda while 
promoting our ideals” (White House, 2011, p.2).  
 This section of the discussion will give a breakdown of why this initiative is 
America’s best chance to curb extremism violence and to do so while upholding the 
Constitution and protecting the public’s freedom and liberty.  The model is a community 
awareness/policing initiative with the main objective of getting communities involved 
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with the issues at hand, which is a win-win situation for both the public and the law 
enforcement/intelligence community, as it gives everyone an opportunity to contribute.  
 In concert with the 2011 Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violence 
Extremism in the United States initiative, the Strategic Implementation Plan for 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States rolled out 
a few months later in December 2011 to provide guidance, and, according to White 
House representatives, “to describe the range of actions we are taking to improve or 
expand these efforts” (White House, 2011, p. 7). Specifically, the Strategic 
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States has three major objectives, which are discussed to stress the significance of 
each: “1) Enhancing federal engagement with and support to local communities that may 
be targeted by violent extremists; 2) Building government and law enforcement expertise 
for preventing violent extremism; and 3) Countering violent extremists propaganda while 
promoting our ideals” (White House, 2011, pp. 7–18). 
“Enhancing federal engagement with and support to local communities that may 
be targeted by violent extremists” (p.9) is arguably the most crucial objective in the 
Strategic Implementation Plan to prevent violent extremism. The objective involves 
communication and important interactions with the public and the need to develop those 
vital local government/community partnerships. According to White House staff: 
Just as we engage and raise awareness to prevent gang violence, sexual offenses, 
school shootings, and other acts of violence, so too must we ensure that our 
communities are empowered to recognize threats of violent extremism and 
understand the range of government and nongovernment resources that can help 
108 
 
 
keep their families, friends and neighbors safe (White House, 2011, p. 9).  
As noted in the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners, engagement is 
essential for supporting community-based efforts to prevent violent extremism, 
because it allows government and communities to share information, concerns, 
and potential solutions. Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss violent 
extremism are to: (1) share sound, meaningful, and timely information about the 
threat of violent extremism with a wide range of community groups and 
organizations, particularly those involved in public safety issues; (2) respond to 
community concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better 
understand how we can effectively support community-based solutions. (White 
House, 2011, p. 7) 
The key concept in all of this is effective engagement with the community and 
highlighting the community policing approach.  
The next relevant challenge, then, is how and who drives this initiative at the 
federal level. According to White House representatives: 
A National Task Force led by Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), was established in November 2010 to help coordinate 
community engagement at the national level. It includes all departments and 
agencies involved in relevant community engagement efforts and focuses on 
compiling local, national, and international best practices and disseminating these 
out to the field. (White House, 2011, p. 8) 
The following are some examples of engagement efforts that are, or will be, 
coordinated with the Task Force (White House, 2011, p. 9): 
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 The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) this year doubled 
its outreach to communities and expanded its quarterly engagement roundtables 
to 14 cities throughout the country. During Fiscal Year 2011, CRCL also 
conducted 72 community engagement events, some of which included CVE-
related topics. 
 State engaged on U.S. foreign policy with a range of interested domestic 
communities. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs alone conducted 80 outreach 
events over the past year. 
 DOJ has produced a number of brochures and other materials on civil rights 
protections and steps individuals can take to prevent or respond to 
discrimination, and has disseminated these to various communities, including 
those being targeted by violent extremists. DOJ has translated these materials 
into a number of languages, including Arabic, Somali, Urdu, Farsi, and Hindi. 
 DOJ, in coordination with DHS, expanded the Building Communities of Trust 
(BCOT) Initiative, which focuses on developing relationships among local law 
enforcement departments, fusion centers, and the communities they serve to 
educate communities on: (1) the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Initiative (NSI); (2) how civil rights and liberties are protected; and (3) how to 
report incidents in order to help keep our communities safe. DOJ continues to 
support the BCOT Initiative.  
“Building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent 
extremism”  is the critical objective of the Strategic Implementation Plan in determining 
exactly what homegrown extremism is and what it is not. As the White House initiative 
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states, “improve our understanding of violent extremism through increased research, 
analysis, and partnerships with foreign governments, academia, and nongovernmental 
organization” (White House, 2011, p. 12). Communication among all levels of law 
enforcement government is critical with this objective. The passing of significant 
information on possible extremist individuals with shared partners and getting partners 
trained on these issues is a monumental challenge in itself, but achieving this objective 
will act as a major force multiplier by acquiring the necessary intelligence to prevent 
another major attack.  
The third objective of the Strategic Implementation plan is “Countering violent 
extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.”  According to the White House 
initiative: 
As the National Counterterrorism Strategy emphasizes, [t]he United States was 
founded upon a belief in a core set of values that is written into our founding 
documents and woven into the very fabric of our society. Where terrorists offer 
injustice, disorder, and destruction, the United States must stand for freedom, 
fairness, equality, dignity, hope, and opportunity. The power and appeal of our 
values enables the United States to build a broad coalition to act collectively 
against the common threat posed by terrorists, further delegitimizing, isolating, 
and weakening our adversaries. (White House, 2011, p. 18) 
This major objective encompasses effective relationships among law enforcement 
partners and the communities they serve. Without this key relationship, this initiative will 
not work, and, even worse, violence could ensue. The relationship between law 
enforcement and the community leaders in the areas they service cannot be emphasized 
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enough. This initiative requires everyone agreeing to address community/national 
concerns. To underscore this last statement, the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC) in 2010 developed a Community Awareness Briefing (CAB) to inform members 
of the public about efforts by al-Qaida and its adherents and affiliates to recruit 
Americans. The CAB highlights recruiting videos and examples of violent extremist 
propaganda, while underscoring the fact that these materials are often easily available on 
the Internet. Most importantly, the CAB aims to facilitate a discussion about what 
government and communities can do, together and independently, to counter the threat of 
violent extremist narratives. The NCTC continues to deliver the presentation at forums 
composed of community leaders, educators, and parents in cities across the United States. 
In March 2011, NCTC held a workshop for local, state, and field-based federal officials 
on how the CAB could be used in engagement efforts when it makes sense and is 
appropriate. The researcher experienced firsthand this CAB training back in 2015, and 
how to get the community engaged with this pertinent awareness.  
Using Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism 
 Another crucial initiative created to act in concert with the White House’s 
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States initiative 
is that of the Using Community Policing to Counter Violent Extremism, 5 Key Principles 
for Law Enforcement developed by the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 
program through the U.S. Department of Justice. The goal of this project is to “increase 
the capacity of law enforcement nationwide to develop problem solving strategies to 
identify, prevent, and eliminate terrorist ideologies and behaviors.” (International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014, p.9) This initiative is community policing based, 
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thus effective relationship building, communications, and working harmoniously with 
community leaders is required. Additionally, building strong community bonds will turn 
into intelligence/information gathering on both sides, leading not only to extremism 
prevention but perhaps drugs, gangs, and other violence associated with criminality. 
Utilizing the COPS initiative centers on five key principles: 
Key Principle 1: Foster and Enhance Trusting Partnerships with the 
Community.  “Trusting partnerships are the cornerstone of community policing. 
When based on trust, transparency, respect, and mutual understanding, 
partnerships can foster the common purpose of keeping communities safe from all 
types of violent extremism.” (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014, 
p.9). Taylor and Russell (2012) stated regarding law enforcement’s reliance on 
modern technology in combating crime, “However, modern technology and 
sophisticated analysis programs cannot replace the need to foster and maintain 
human relationships with members of the public at large” (Taylor & Russell, 
2012, p. 86).  
Key Principle 2: Engage All Residents to Address Public Safety Matters.  
Engaging individuals on a broad array of public safety and quality-of-life issues allows 
individuals and groups to address their concerns. Various subsets of the community may 
have different priorities. Providing each group with a forum to address their specific 
grievances, which may also be underlying causes of radicalization to violence, can help 
community members feel more involved Engaging residents can be a valuable force 
multiplier for law enforcement. (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014, 
p.12) 
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 Key Principle 3: Leverage Public and Private Stakeholders.  Leveraging the 
strengths of public and private stakeholders allows law enforcement to utilize resources 
from the entire community, share valuable information across the entire spectrum of 
services, and increase public recognition and visibility of countering violent extremism 
initiatives. The stakeholders can also serve as liaisons between law enforcement and their 
communities. (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014, p.15) 
 Key Principle 4: Utilize All Partnerships to Counter Violent Extremism.  
Serving in a supporting role as educators, facilitators, and representatives of local 
government, law enforcement agencies can empower all of their partners—community 
members, public stakeholders, and private companies—to create counter-narratives, build 
resilience, and counter violent extremism. (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
2014, p.18) 
 Key Principle 5: Train All Members of the Department.  Training that 
complements the fundamental principles and tactics of community policing is necessary 
to facilitate the successful implementation of community policing training should be up 
to date and unbiased, stress the differences between countering violent extremism and 
counterterrorism, and be mandatory for all members of the department. (International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014, p.21) 
Closing 
 “Social control must deal not merely with the maintenance of order, but with the 
quality of the order that a given system is capable of sustaining and the procedures 
appropriate to the achievement of such order” (Skolnick, 2011, p. 207). “Thus, a given 
set of social and legal conditions may lead to order in a stabled democracy but not in a 
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stable totalitarian society” (Skolnick, 2011, p. 207).  The statements by Professor Jerome 
Skolnick stressed the real need for the community policing model as set forth by the 
federal government and re-created by the COPS program to avoid exacerbating the poor 
relationships in certain areas of the country between law enforcement and the 
communities they serve.  Additionally, “The factors that shape whether an organization is 
viewed as legitimate and trusted are simultaneously easy to understand and difficult to 
precisely define, and they have been a focus of study for many years” (Jackson, 2015, p. 
3).  
When there is a match between the values or ideas associated with the actions that 
an organization takes and the norms of acceptable behavior in the society around 
it, the organization is viewed as legitimate. When that organization is also viewed 
by an individual as fair, honest, reliable, competent, responsive, and – particularly 
relevant to police – acting with the right intentions, the organization is trusted. 
(Jackson, 2015, p. 3) 
Why is it necessary to discuss the legitimacy and trusted terms and the statement 
by Skolnick on social control in a stable democracy? All of these vital concepts are 
needed in the modern fight against homegrown extremism and to create a community 
concept where the practices being employed by law enforcement are legitimate, because 
acts are within the social means/appropriateness, and they are therefore trusted by the 
community. Without any of the effective communication and organizational concepts, the 
community will not buy in, and these key initiatives will go to waste, possibly leading to 
battles with law enforcement. Most significantly, curbing the homegrown threat will fail, 
because the timely exchange of criminal information will not happen amicably.  
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Summary 
This literature review from a three-pronged attack discussed a variety of sources 
and studies in which U.S. law enforcement has faced increased threats and violence from 
U.S. domestic extremists these last 10 years. Furthermore, the literature review addressed 
three main questions: (a) Is there any data to indicate an increase of law enforcement 
violence at the hands of these domestic extremists? (b) Who exactly are these domestic 
extremists and what are their ideologies, identifiers, and methods of operation? and (c) 
Why they are prone to this violence and what are some current domestic mitigating 
strategies in place to attack this problem?   
All the data and multiple case studies indicated this type of domestic threat is not 
going away. It has increased similar to international extremism threats as well. 
Knowledge of these domestic extremist groups has come a long way according to some 
researchers, especially implementing the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) as a way to 
track extremist-led homicides in America. With the ECDB in place, many sources of up-
to-date data on violence against U.S. law enforcement will serve future researchers well. 
Synthesis 
Many intelligence gaps were uncovered by the researcher. For starters, how do we 
know, as more domestic extremist information is gathered, that every law enforcement 
agency knows about these individuals and/or groups? Based on the data, it can be 
assumed that these individuals are from some domestic extremist group or organization. 
Additionally, how do leaders know that they are capturing information about threats to 
law enforcement, especially during a volatile time period concerning the health and 
safety of law enforcement members. Unfortunately, a police shooting could be 
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categorized by one police agency as just a “police shooting” without investigating the 
individual’s background and/or organization affiliations.  
In addition to relevant studies in the field (ECDB), the researcher also studied 
activist groups data (i.e., Southern Poverty Law Center, Anti-Defamation League, among 
others that collect “hate data”), nonprofit organization data (i.e., National Law 
Enforcement Memorial Fund and other groups), think tank groups (i.e., New America 
Foundation, RAND, and others), and government data (i.e., Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
among others) to carefully extract the data for the current study, and, if possible, make 
suggestions for future studies.  
Finally, the last question posed by the researcher was, “How do we mitigate these 
threats as a law enforcement community and as a community in general?” The literature 
review suggested ways in which homegrown extremism could be identified, recognized, 
and mitigated through both government programs and though community-based 
programs. However, how many such programs are being implemented in the Norfolk, 
VA, area and in other jurisdictions? The government program Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violence Extremism in the United States initiative, and the Strategic 
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the 
United States would act as force multipliers in an effort to mitigate the threat of domestic 
extremism violence facing the U.S. law enforcement. Is this federal program being 
implemented in law enforcement/community joint initiatives to curtail domestic extremist 
violence? These are some of the questions that went unanswered. More research is 
needed in this area, which the current study attempted to answer.  
Schanzer et al. (2016) concluded that to mitigate these violent extremist threats, a 
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community buy-in, in concert with law enforcement’s visions and missions, is required. 
In an effort to counteract this homegrown extremist threat, a real bond based on trust 
must be established in the community first (especially between community and civic 
leaders), then a strong bond with law enforcement must be established to enhance efforts 
to act as force multipliers in this crucial crime prevention measure. These ideas provide 
future research opportunities. As one researcher pointed out in the Schanzer et al., study 
(2016), “It seems like there is no direction at the federal level, and the state and local law 
enforcement has their own programs.” (Schanzer et al., 2016, p.3) This is a huge gap for 
intelligence and officer safety. It appears there is confusion on which agency runs these 
federal programs, and also on exactly how the programs should be implemented and what 
should be included in the training.   
Finally, from all levels of government, how are the programs being received in 
the community and how does law enforcement perceive these programs? Are they a great 
community resource, a waste of time, or are they not being implemented at all? These are 
just a few of the gaps found in the literature review that should be examined in future 
studies to help identify and sample various levels of government law enforcement and 
research the use (or its lack) of these domestic extremist mitigation programs and 
community involvement. 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
The current exploratory qualitative research project was used to focus on two 
major areas and/or themes to examine the increased domestic extremism threat toward 
U.S. law enforcement. The current study was used to explore the following question: 
What evidence and/or data was there to support the argument of a major upswing in 
violence against U.S. law enforcement at the hands of domestic extremists as compared 
to internationally inspired attacks? Just as important, in Chapter 2 discussed the various 
relevant case studies illustrating the propensity of violence directed at U.S. law 
enforcement by domestic extremist’s groups were also discussed to show who exactly are 
these groups and what are their ideologies and motivations. Finally, in Chapter 2, showed 
how each domestic extremist group and/or individual lone wolf has the propensity for 
violence against law enforcement personnel at unpredictable times. 
The second part of Chapter 2 discussed the current research literature to examine 
how the law enforcement community mitigates these threats from a community-based 
program initiative perspective. Are there any law enforcement or joint community-based 
programs in place to mitigate these threats? Perhaps these programs go by a different 
name but accomplish the same goals, hopefully reducing the amount of community 
violence. In particular, this law enforcement–based qualitative research section was 
directed at all government law enforcement levels (federal, state, county, city/town and 
even university police), in the Hampton Roads, Virginia, area.  
Part one of the research study focused on Research Questions 1 and 2. The main 
methodology and research technique utilized for this chapter utilized both a thematic 
analysis perspective and a case study approach. This portion of the research study utilized 
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secondary data. Specifically, the researcher collected key secondary data on the amount 
of law enforcement fatalities at the hands of domestic groups/individuals (sovereign 
citizens, White supremacists, militia extremists, Black separatists, and/or any other 
antigovernment groups/individuals), with no specific demographic (age, gender, 
ethnicity, only if they were part of a domestic extremist group/shared ideology), and 
confirmed that there has been a surge in the amount of violence against members of law 
enforcement. Patterns and/or themes were studied when collecting this secondary data as 
they pertained to the increase in violence against law enforcement members at the hands 
of domestic extremists. Specifically, the study was used to attempt to ascertain who and 
which group was responsible for this law enforcement violence, from a domestic 
extremist groups perspective, and how many occurrences/incidents of violence against 
U.S. law enforcement had there been compared to international-inspired extremist 
groups/individuals, which included determining which groups/individuals were 
considered by law enforcement as the most threatening. The secondary data, specifically 
the case study portion, was very telling.  
The secondary data was collected but not limited to the following sources, all of 
which are explained in the definitions portion of the current study: 
 Officer Down Memorial Page 
 National Law Enforcement Memorial Fund  
 Bureau of Justice Assistance 
 Anti-Defamation League (ADL) 
 International Security Program at the New America Foundation 
 Southern Poverty Law Center 
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 Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security 
Research question 3 was used to implement the grounded theory approach and 
also utilized the thematic analysis approach along with the open-coding method for the 
interviews and information gathering data. To collect data on Research question 3, how 
can the U.S. law enforcement/intelligence community counteract these domestic 
extremist threats and propensity of violence toward law enforcement, a purposive 
(selective) and/or expert sampling method was utilized. Regarding the sampling methods 
being utilized, 17 key law enforcement and intelligence personnel were selected as part of 
the law enforcement and intelligence expert interview information gathering on each 
agency’s domestic extremist preventive program and overall threat level perspective as it 
pertained to the domestic extremist threat. These purposive sample elements were 
selected from the research’s professional associations and sampling methods around the 
Hampton Roads area, and by the researcher showing up at various agencies asking to 
speak with a member knowledgeable in the field of research.  The researcher developed a 
more thorough spreadsheet that listed the Hampton Roads law enforcement agency, along 
with a point of contact.   
After the researcher utilized the purposive and/or expert sampling methods to 
choose the appropriate law enforcement and/or intelligence personnel to interview based 
on their knowledge of this subject area and experience in their current position, the 
researcher received purposeful feedback right away from the participants.  For example, 
three participants said that this topic has never been studied in this area before and that 
this project is a great idea.  Along with job experience and knowledge of this topic, the 
researcher ensured that each vital law enforcement and intelligence agency were 
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represented and interviewed to give the researcher an accurate depiction of thoughts and 
perspectives on this issue from the law enforcement and intelligence communities 
respectfully.  Regarding the vital law enforcement agencies in the Hampton Roads area, 
the researcher interviewed a participant from the major city police departments (except 
for one agency who declined after the researcher explained to a supervisor what the 
research is all about), multiple State Police offices that cover the Hampton Roads area, 
major university police departments, major federal law enforcement present in the area 
and town and county law enforcement agencies that cover certain jurisdictions of the 
Hampton Roads area.  A more thorough break down of these agencies is illustrated on 
page 125.  Of the approximate twenty-five law enforcement agencies invited to 
participate in this research study, fourteen agencies elected to participate. These fourteen 
participating agencies are, in fact, geographically representative of the Hampton Roads 
area.  This research used a representative law enforcement group inclusive of the varying 
levels of government including: federal, state, local, university police, and various 
intelligence agencies. The interviews of the aforementioned agencies, was instrumental to 
effectively illustrating the diversification that is specific to the Hampton Roads 
jurisdiction.   
To break down the representative sample size with this research study, and to 
obtain the appropriate sample size with this research project, the researcher utilized the 
checkmarket.com (2018) “sample size calculator.” Utilizing this tool, the researcher 
plugged in the sample size of twenty-five (actual amount of law enforcement agencies in 
the Hampton Roads area, with the goal of interviewing one person from each agency), 
then the researcher used a four percent margin of error (the margin of error “serves to 
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quantify the uncertainty associated with sampling in a poll or other survey” Lavrakas, 
2008, p.1), with a ninety-five percent confidence level.  Per this sample size calculator, 
the required sample size is twenty-five with fifty people needed to invite with a fifty 
percent estimated response rate. The researcher used a fifty percent estimated response 
rate due to his professional associations with these law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies and by utilizing an email, phone calls and in-person invite methods in order to 
achieve the required sample size. However, after the four-month invite initiative, in 
which the researcher reached out to approximately fifty-five Hampton Roads law 
enforcement and intelligence personnel, only seventeen agreed (from fourteen agencies) 
to participate in the research project.   
Next, the researcher calculated the sample size margin of error from the same 
useful checkmarket.com website. The research study’s population size stayed at twenty-
five, with the actual number of respondents (17) who agreed to participate in the research, 
plugged into the margin of error equation.  With a ninety-five percent confidence level, 
the margin of error ended up being 13.72 percent. What this tells the researcher is that the 
smaller the number in terms of a margin of error in a larger population size (say 3 percent 
for example), the more confidence the researcher would have in the overall results.  
However, in this research study, the 13.72 percent is a much larger disparity between a 
lower margin of error, and thus, the farther the views of the participants can wander away 
from the views of the total population. If the researcher was able to get seven more 
participants for this research, for example, and have twenty-four respondents, then the 
margin of error would be 4.08 percent and would represent the total population better but 
would not add significant value and information to the research study’s content.       
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The actual number of participants (17) in this research project was significant for 
a variety of reasons. To begin with, as the researcher interviewed representatives from 
each agency willing to participate, these participants would recommend to the researcher, 
“you need to speak with this person, from this agency, to give you a good perspective 
from their angle.”  This “purposive” and/or “expert” sampling method offered the 
researcher purposeful interviewees who were recognized by their fellow officers as 
experts on topics relating to my research. Finally, as the researcher approached his 
fourteenth interview, with all the vital law enforcement agencies having been interviewed 
and the important information collected, the final few interviews consisted of smaller 
sized agencies covering a smaller jurisdictional area.  These interviews did not add any 
additional information to the overall research project. In fact, these participants told the 
researcher to contact other law enforcement agencies in the Hampton Roads area (which 
the researcher had previously done). At the end of these interviews, the researcher re-
canvassed the Hampton Roads area law enforcement spreadsheet which was originally 
constructed. It was then determined that the researcher had, in fact, interviewed all the 
significant law enforcement and intelligence agencies desired. All these findings enabled 
the researcher to present the most accurate information with representative data as the 
findings specifically pertain to domestic extremist threats upon Hampton Roads area law 
enforcement members.   
The Hampton Roads, VA regional area was chosen for this portion of the research 
study due mostly to its vast demographic diversity among its population and to give the 
researcher a better representative sample perspective on this extremist issue among the 
law enforcement members being interviewed. Table 2 on the next page illustrates the 
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enormous diversity among its citizens in the Hampton Roads, VA area, as it relates to the 
state of Virginia and the United States, overall demographic population profile 
respectfully from the 2010 census.   
Table 2 
Hampton Roads, State of Virginia and the United States Demographic Profile, 2010. 
Source and data courtesy of Hampton Roads PDC-Virginia LMI (2018). 
virginialmi.com/report_center/community_profiles/5109000323.pdf 
 
The researcher determined the size of the law enforcement agency utilized for the 
present study by utilizing the FBI’s 2016 Uniformed Crime Report, Criminal Justice 
Information Services Division, categories for law enforcement group ranking based on 
the size of the population being served in their respective jurisdictions. The categories 
were instrumental in properly understanding the size of the law enforcement agency 
interviewed and for proper analysis on the overall size of the community they currently 
served. Table 3 shows the breakdown of each group determined by population size, how 
many of these agencies were interviewed for the current study, and how they were 
 
 
 
Total Population                          
 Hampton Roads  
         Population
 
          1,666,310 
              Virginia   
         Population 
 
           8,001,024 
   United States 
         Population 
 
      308,745,538 
        
Race 
     White 
     Black or African American 
     American Indian or Alaska Native     
     Asian 
     Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
     Other 
     Multiple Races 
 
Ethnicity 
     Not Hispanic or Latino (of any race)
     Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 
 
982,511
532,025
6,790
57,948
2,059
27,772
57,205
1,577,207
89,103 
5,486,852
1,551,399
29,225
439,890
5,980
254,278
233,400
7,369,199
631,825 
223,533,265
38,929,319
2,932,248
14,674,252
540,013
19,107,368
9,009,073
258,267,944
50,477,594 
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interviewed. 
Table 3 
Research Project by Size, Number of Participants, and How Interviewed 
Note: Group size determined by population group served courtesy of the 2016 Crime in the United States 
statistical table. Source: https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-
pages/tables/table-25/  
 
Typically, a Group I law enforcement agency includes a federal law enforcement 
agency such as the FBI, a state agency such as a state police, and a large municipal police 
agency serving large jurisdictions, such as New York City and the cities of Miami, 
Tampa, and Jacksonville, Florida, and Austin and Houston, Texas.  
A Group II law enforcement agency typically includes a smaller municipal law 
enforcement agency serving jurisdictions such as Charleston, South Carolina; Rochester, 
New York; Orlando and Tallahassee, Florida; and Pasadena and Waco, Texas.  
A Group III law enforcement agency typically includes a municipal law 
enforcement agency and/or a county sheriff’s department, such as Daytona Beach and 
Davie, Florida, and Galveston and Port Arthur, Texas. 
A Group IV law enforcement agency typically includes a municipal law 
Size  Number of law 
enforcement agencies 
interviewed 
How Interviewed 
Group I (serving over 250,000 
population) 
 
5  4 interviews in person 
1 via e‐mail 
Group II (serving 100,000 to 
249,000) 
 
4  5 interviews in person 
Group III (serving 50,000 to 99,999)  3  2 interviews in person 
1 via e‐mail 
Group IV (serving 25,000 to 49,999) 
 
0   
Group V (serving 10,000 to 24,999) 
 
1  1 interview in person 
Group VI (serving under 10,000)  1  1 interview in person 
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enforcement agency such as Coral Gables and Winter Haven, Florida, and Texas City, 
Texas.  
A Group V law enforcement agency typically includes a municipal law 
enforcement agency serving jurisdictions such as the cities of Naples, and St. Augustine, 
Florida, and Katy, Texas. 
A Group VI law enforcement agency typically includes a small municipal and 
college/university law enforcement agency serving areas such as the town of Pembroke 
Park, Florida, the village of Biscayne Park, Florida, and the city of Cactus, Texas. 
Utilizing concepts from existing research on countering violence extremism, the 
researcher in Chapter 4 collected relevant information and focused on individual 
interviews with law enforcement members with a background in their respective agency’s 
law enforcement and/or joint community mitigating programs in the Hampton Roads 
(Norfolk), VA, area. After the interviews, the researcher studied these responses, looked 
for common themes, and came up with conclusions relating to the research questions. 
The concepts and research themes utilized were:  
 Center for Cyber & Homeland Security, George Washington University. A 
vital research project performed by this university was titled Countering Violent 
Extremism in America by Vidino and Hughes (2015). Vidino and Hughes (2015) studied 
ways the U.S. government could lead a successful Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) 
program to address the ongoing domestic violence in the U.S. This center at George 
Washington University produces key research products on all forms of both domestic 
extremism and international extremism terrorism research.  
 Game Changers: Going Local to Defeat Violent Extremists by Lt. Col. (ret.) D. 
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Scott Mann, U.S. Army (2015) gives a vital firsthand perspective on how to stabilize 
villages globally in order prevent extremism/violence from occurring.  
 Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
States.  This is a U.S. Department of Justice program aimed at preventing extremism in 
America.  
 The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing to Prevent Violent 
Extremism.  Miller, Tolliver, and Schanzer showed how to create and implement a 
community outreach program. 
 At the time of the current research studies, no Hampton Roads regional research 
had ever been conducted on this topic as it pertains to domestic extremist violence against 
law enforcement members and the overall threat. The main part of the current study was 
to gauge law enforcements’ perspective on this topic and ascertain if the threat of 
violence was valid and needed to be addressed by the law enforcement community in 
order to safeguard lives.  
Interview Questions 
 The following open-ended questions were part of the current research study: 
1. What is your definition of a domestic extremist? 
2. Do you believe you have domestic extremists in your area of responsibility? If so, 
how many individuals/groups do you think you have? 
3. How has your agency perceived the domestic extremist threat in your area of 
responsibility? How about agencies around the country? 
4. Does your agency currently have a program aimed at combating this type of 
extremism or any type of law enforcement program similar to this? 
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5. How about a community-based program aimed at preventing domestic extremism 
or any other criminality issues seen in your jurisdiction? 
6. If not, did your agency have a program combating this type of extremism? 
7. If your agency does not currently have a program combating this type of 
extremism, why not? 
8. If your agency does have some sort of a community awareness and/or extremist 
prevention program, how would you describe its overall missions, goals, process, and any 
other positives and/or negatives? 
9. If you could start a new program within your department, what would it be? 
10. What is your opinion on the best way to combat this type of extremism? 
11. Have you heard of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Community Awareness Brief 
or the Justice’s-led community awareness program aimed at preventing extremism? 
12. How would you say is your agency’s relationship with the public? 
13. How would you improve your relationship with the public, i.e., more community 
involvement with joint programs (ride-along programs, fundraisers, class instruction, and 
describing police actions)? 
Research Design 
The major research design involved in the current study was that of exploratory 
research. An exploratory design is conducted about a research problem when there are 
few or no earlier studies to refer to or rely upon to predict an outcome. The focus is on 
gaining insights and familiarity for later investigation or undertaken when research 
problems are in a preliminary stage of investigation. Exploratory designs are often used 
to establish an understanding of how best to proceed in researching an issue or what 
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methodology would effectively apply to gathering information about the issue 
(University of Southern California, 2018). 
The main impetus behind this exploratory research was twofold: (a) to look at the 
overall national statistics and secondary data information on the number of police officers 
killed by domestic extremists, acquire valuable perspectives and identification on these 
extremist groups and individuals responsible for this violence; and (b) perform regional 
research in the hope of gaining insights and developing a threat picture of the activity of 
these groups and/or individuals in the Hampton Roads area. The exploratory research 
design for the current research consisted of two separate entities: (a) a secondary data 
collection and case study approach, and (b) a grounded theory approach.  
The researcher collected key and timely secondary data from the Officer Down 
Memorial Page, National Law Enforcement Memorial Fund, Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the International Security Program at the 
New America Foundation, Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Triangle Center on 
Terrorism and Homeland Security. Once the data were obtained, research into the 
reasons/motives (case studies) behind the law enforcement senseless killings was used to 
identify certain domestic extremist groups (sovereign citizens, White supremacists, Black 
separatists, lone wolves, and antigovernment extremists) responsible for this violence and 
provide a brief case history on each and its propensity for violence.  
The research design portion of the current study involved the use of the case study 
design. The current qualitative case study was an approach to research that facilitates 
exploration of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources, which 
ensured that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses, 
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which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood 
(Baxter & Jack, 2008). 
The researcher regularly monitored the data from these sources, because these 
sources continuously produce new data on the topic, along with information on killings 
on U.S. soil inspired by international terrorist groups. When collecting this information, 
the researcher ensured that the data collected met the criteria (violence caused by 
domestic extremist group/individual or lone wolf type, as compared to random shootings 
by an individual with no ties to any extremist group) and to ensure the group/individual’s 
ideology was mentioned. Furthermore, the researcher also queried these collection 
sources to ascertain if any other pertinent information with regard to the study was 
needed. Since these data sources normally break down their reporting/research by 
domestic extremist groups/individuals versus international-inspired terrorist groups (i.e., 
ISIS and/or any other international influences terrorist organization), the researcher 
contacted them when any data was unclear as to which group (domestic versus 
international) the data belonged to.  
The data collection method was used to help answer Research question 1, because 
the data were timely and continuously updated by the various sources. Utilizing many 
data sources gave a better picture of the threat compared to the international terrorist 
group–inspired attacks on U.S. law enforcement.  
Research Question 3 was used to ask, what are some practical solutions from a 
community policing/intelligence perspective? From existing studies/research, what are 
some common themes in attempting to alleviate this targeted and barbaric violence on 
U.S. law enforcement members and what do law enforcement members perceive as the 
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greatest threat today?” The grounded theory approach was utilized to answer this 
question.   
“Grounded theory refers to a set of systematic inductive methods for conducting 
qualitative research aimed toward theory development” (Glaser, 2018, p.1) This research 
study investigated ways, such as community programs and joint law 
enforcement/community-based programs, that might mitigate these threats, from the 
concepts and/or themes mentioned in Mann’s (2015) book. The main premise of the 
current study was to link the interviewees’ coded responses to these valuable community-
based grassroots joint law enforcement concepts. Following the grounded theory 
approach, the main study population was in Hampton Roads, Norfolk, VA, a robust law 
enforcement footprint. Since all government levels of law enforcement were represented 
in this area, collecting key data through interviews from these sources was invaluable in 
testing the research questions and Mann’s (2015) claims.  
An interview instrument was utilized for this portion of the current study: 17 
interviews were performed with at least 15 different law enforcement agencies in order to 
acquire key themes/concepts dealing with any possible mitigating program dealing with 
domestic extremism. A main component of the data collection method was to identify 
key codes/themes during the interviews or any subsequent comments made by the 
interviewee. This technique allowed the researcher to acquire key information from the 
police agencies. 
The main collection agenda with the interviews was to accurately gauge the 
domestic threat level in the law enforcement agency’s respective area of responsibility 
and any subsequent department/community changes over the years as it related to the 
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topic or created changes within the agency’s community. Additionally, the researcher 
looked to see if any sort of a domestic extremism program has been established in the 
interviewee’s jurisdiction, either as a stand-alone law enforcement program or one that 
combined both the community and law enforcement and acted as a joint awareness 
initiative and community resource. No names of individuals or agencies was mentioned 
in the study (unless desired by the interviewee and permission was received).  
The grounded theory approach was crucial to this portion of the current study. Not 
only did the researcher have the ability to collect valuable information from the 
interviews, but utilizing this information gave a better perspective on the Hampton Roads 
regions and an overall domestic extremist threat picture as it pertained to violence against 
law enforcement. The study was used to garner information on the region’s 
implementation of any law enforcement tactic aimed at curtailing extremism and/or 
community-based program on this threat that received positive and/or favorable results 
(i.e., lower crime rates, increased tips/participation from the community, and/or any other 
positive or negative feedback).   
Variables 
 Variables necessary for the current study, especially for the field interviews, were 
essential because they pertained to law enforcement’s participation and interest. When 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) gave permission to proceed with the study, the 
researcher immediately sent out 25 e-mails to leaders at the various Hampton Roads law 
enforcement agencies to request an interview. Only one representative responded. As a 
result, the researcher spent hours calling and driving around the Hampton Roads area and 
visiting these agencies to request an interview with a member knowledgeable in this field. 
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Fourteen agencies participated, while one agency declined. Another variable that had to 
be addressed was that many of these small agencies didn’t have an intelligence division, 
so many them had to contend with multiple criminalities without a devoted, specialized 
unit to handle domestic extremists and/or terrorism threats. From an organizational 
standpoint, many agencies felt that these domestic extremist threats were not as high as 
other agency and community priorities and concerns. Many agency representatives 
responded that they were aware of these extremists in their jurisdiction, but had other 
concerns, such as officer retention, gang issues, increase in juvenile crime, and suspects 
constantly being cycled through the criminal justice system with no solution in sight. 
 Other variables related to the interviewees’ perspectives were the amount of years 
on the job and overall experience with their law enforcement agency. One had over 35 
years on the job, while another has as little as 6 years. That particular variable did not 
concern the researcher much, as the intention was to interview a participant with 
knowledge of this topic, compared to a participant with 30 years on the job who just 
worked traffic and highway patrol. The interviewees gave satisfactory answers compared 
to personnel with 12–16 years of police experience, because they were more polished law 
enforcement personnel and had worked in busy and unpredictable times.  
Data Collection 
On October 29, 2017, permission was granted from the school’s IRB committee 
members, along with authorization to collect data in response to the researcher’s IRB 
application. Specifically, the researcher was authorized to collect secondary data and 
associated vital case study information regarding RQ1 and RQ2 and to conduct interviews 
as part of his open-coding analysis based on those interviews.  Consent to participate in 
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the current research study was obtained from the respective law enforcement agencies 
within the Hampton Roads area.  
During the research design discussion, it was indicated that in-depth interviews 
would be completed using the grounded-theory approach. Once the interviewee read the 
general informed consent form and agreed to be interviewed, the interviewee signed the 
consent form and participated in the interview. Each interviewee was advised before the 
interview started and during the interview that his or her identity and responses would 
remain anonymous unless he or she chose to make their identity known.   
Field notes were taken, which established a written record of the interviews. All 
interviewees were given the opportunity to clarify any responses and add comments at 
the end of the interview in order to add any information that was missed and/or to 
underscore a certain topic/response. The interviewer’s contact information was given to 
each interviewee at the end of the interview in the event that additional questions and/or 
information the interviewee wished to be exchanged. A project brochure, produced by the 
researcher, was given to each interviewee to demonstrate the researcher’s passion for the 
topic. 
Coding Process and Development of Themes 
As part of the thematic analytical portion of the current research study, coding of 
the interviews and the data that were collected during those interviews was necessary:  
Thematic coding is a form of qualitative analysis which involves recording or 
identifying passages of text or images that are linked by a common theme or idea 
allowing you to index the text into categories and therefore establish a framework 
of thematic ideas about it. (Gibbs, 2007, p. 39) 
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Coding for the law enforcement interviews was broken down into four steps: (a) 
fracturing the data, (b) creating codes, (c) interpreting the interviews, and (d) 
triangulating the data. After the 17 interviews were transcribed, a codebook was 
developed depicting 30 codes from the original data, in addition to the development of 
themes as recorded by the interviewer. The data were then coded for a second time, 
which further reduced the data into a more manageable system of coding. Themes were 
then developed and are discussed in Chapter 4. The final step was to triangulate.  
Triangulation refers to the use of multiple methods or data sources in qualitative 
research to develop a comprehensive understanding of phenomena. Triangulation 
also has been viewed as a qualitative research strategy to test validity through the 
convergence of information from different sources. (Carter et al., 2014, p. 545) 
Triangulation concept was crucial in this project, because the interviews yielded 
some surprising data. The comments made by the interviewees off the record were very 
telling of their opinions on the subject. Additionally, the researcher kept checking open 
source information as it pertained to threats from these groups and/or individuals or 
relationships with the public they served. In one interview, when the interviewee asked 
about his agency’s public perception, he answered, “Good.”  The researcher then asked 
him when this “good” started, because one of their officers shot an unarmed African 
American man a few years earlier and was subsequently arrested, prosecuted, and found 
guilty of manslaughter. He replied that his agency has done everything possible to work 
with the public, including a variety of community-based programs to improve relations.  
Verification Procedures 
 A thorough verification process was applied to the current study to ensure the 
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correct data was collected and was accurate and reliable. Verification is the process of 
checking, confirming, making sure, and being certain. In qualitative research, verification 
refers to the mechanisms used during the process of research to incrementally contribute 
to ensuring reliability and validity and, thus, the rigor of a research project. These 
mechanisms are woven into every step of the inquiry to construct a solid product by 
identifying and correcting errors before they are built into the developing model and 
before they subvert the analysis (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002). 
Investigator Responsiveness 
Morse et al. (2002) alluded the overall research is only as good as the 
investigator’s sound judgment, creativity, sensitivity, and flexibility and awareness in 
utilizing proper verification strategies that determine the reliability and validity of the 
evolving study. When the current study began, the researcher knew this would be an 
evolving project due to the fluidity of the violent times in the United States. The 
researcher was not naïve and knew that certain jurisdictions would not want to report 
certain issues in their area to avoid attracting attention to themselves. A prime example 
would be a gang problem in a certain affluent area, which community leaders didn’t want 
to address, which was why multiple sources of information were used to portray the topic 
as accurately as possible, especially in the Hampton Roads area. With the pertinent 
experience achieved over the years, both vocationally and educationally, the researcher 
knew what domestic extremism was in terms of ideology, identification, and overall 
criminality. The researcher knew how to differentiate between these groups and/or 
individual criminality when compared to a gang shooting. Using a gang shooting as an 
example, unless this gang shooting was committed by an extremist group, it was not 
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considered violence toward a law enforcement member.  
Verification Strategies 
According to Morse et al. (2002), there are five vital verification strategies that 
must be performed by the researcher in order build reliability and validity:  
1. Methodological coherence. With this step, the qualitative research question(s) and 
the mechanisms of the method must match. With the researcher’s background, he was 
able to ensure all data collected, as it related to domestic extremism, was properly 
categorized as such, especially as it pertained to the collection of secondary data as it 
pertains to this research study. The researcher also ensured that the interview questions 
were pertinent in the research study, which enabled proper information collection on the 
scope of the domestic threat in the Hampton Roads area.  
2. The sample must be appropriate. The researcher ensured that all interviewees had 
some sort of knowledge of the topic. He did this by asking the interviewee first if he 
knew about domestic extremists, then the researcher went over the different definitions as 
part of the study’s consent process.  When the researcher went to various law 
enforcement agencies, he requested to speak with someone with knowledge of this topic 
as well, as compared to talking with an officer working pistol permits, for example.  
3. “Collecting and analyzing data concurrently forms a mutual interaction between 
what is known and what one needs to know” (Morse et al., 2002, p.18). The researcher 
knew what data needed to be collected, especially as it pertained to the study with the 
Hampton Roads law enforcement group. This type of research has never been performed 
in this area, one of the main reasons why the researcher undertook this project.  
4. Thinking theoretically. The researcher used theoretical concepts from the U.S. 
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Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services, Community Awareness 
Program, from Mann (2015), and from The Challenge and Promise of Using Community 
Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships 
with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety research from the Triangle Center on 
Terrorism and Homeland Security, Duke University (Schanzer et al., 2016). The 
theoretical concepts from these resources assisted greatly in determining the success of 
each Hampton Roads law enforcement group utilizing a community policing approach in 
dealing with extremism in their respective jurisdictions.  
5. Theory development. As the researcher proceeded with the acquired data, 
systematic theories based on his overall findings were generated, especially regarding the 
field interviews. These theories were built upon comprehensive and robust information. 
Summary 
The chapter included the methodology for the overall research on the domestic 
extremist threat facing U.S. law enforcement members today, most notably in the 
Hampton Roads, VA area. Furthermore, the key data collection platform was mentioned 
in acquiring secondary data information, including vital case study information on how 
these individuals and groups are threatening the lives of law enforcement members. The 
key concepts, including the coding and theme collection, were discussed to accurately 
gauge the threat stream in the Hampton Roads area and to build upon key theories 
whether these extremists groups are threatening the lives of the Hampton Roads area law 
enforcement members.  
Chapter 4 includes the qualitative research findings with both parts of the research 
project resulting from the Hampton Roads area law enforcement and intelligence 
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members’ interviews, resulting in key thematic coding. The specific coding and 
development of themes stemming from the interviews are discussed and were utilized to 
build upon the key theories as they related to this national and area law enforcement 
officer safety issue. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
Field Interviews  
A total of 17 law enforcement and intelligence personnel were interviewed, both 
sworn law enforcement and civilian intelligence employees. Their law enforcement and 
intelligence experience ranged from 5 to 35 years, and all lived most of their lives in the 
Hampton Roads, VA area. These participants included police chiefs, lieutenants, 
sergeants, detectives/investigators, special agents, police officers, and intelligence 
analysts/specialists, all of whom had a unique perspective on their own agency’s 
operations, missions, and the topic at hand. Each participant given a research project 
brochure illustrating the study’s background, importance, researcher’s background and 
contact information (see Appendix), and a blank consent form, for them to sign and 
agreeing to his or her participation in the research study.  
A majority of the participant interviews were performed in person, whereas a few 
were done electronically due to a few participants requesting to fill out the interview 
sheet at a later time due to their work load/scheduling conflict. Each interview was 
transcribed as coding was compiled to present and develop themes. Table 3 shows the 
number of participants from each law enforcement agency size, sworn or civilian, gender 
(adds to the diversity population sample), race (adds to the diversity population sample), 
type of interview performed (in person versus e-mail format) and the average years of 
law enforcement and intelligence experience. 
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Table 4 
Deconstruction of Final Participant Statistical Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Number of law 
enforcement 
agencies 
interviewed 
Number of 
Interviews 
Sworn or 
Civilian 
Gender  Race Type of 
Interview (in 
person or via 
e‐mail) 
Group I (serving over 
 250,000 population) 
 
4 7 5 Sworn
2 Civilian 
7 Males 6 White Males
1 Black Male 
6 in person
1 via e‐mail 
Group II (serving 100,000 
 to 249,000) 
 
4 4 3 Sworn
1 Civilian 
3 Males
1 Female 
3 White Males
1 Black Female 
4 in person
Group III (serving 50,000 
 to 99,999) 
3 3 2 Sworn
1 Civilian 
1 Male
2 Females 
1 White Female
1 White Male
1 Black Female
 
2 in person
1 via e‐mail 
Group IV (serving 25,000 
 to 49,999) 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0
Group V (serving 10,000 
 to 24,999) 
 
2 2 2 Sworn 2 Males 1 White Male
1 Black Female 
2 in person
Group VI (serving under 
10,000) 
 
1 1 1 Sworn 1 Female 1 Black Female 1 in person
Average Years of Law 
Enforcement/Intelligence 
Experience 
18 years
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In Group I, seven interviews were performed from four agencies. Two agencies 
had multiple participants, which was done to speak to members of an agency with 
multiple specialties in the law enforcement and intelligence field. The participants each 
gave a unique perspective on the topic. Another agency had multiple participants due to 
the working area covered. This particular agency had two offices—one covered the 
western portion of Hampton Roads, while the other office covered the eastern portion, 
and the researcher wanted to ensure all areas were covered for the research study.  
Another fascinating aspect of the participants was the fact that the researcher was 
able to interview different ranks in the law enforcement world, giving an interesting 
perspective based on rank, what the participants saw in that particular area, and how to 
mitigate possible threats. Eighteen years of service was the average for this population, 
which was outstanding, because it brought very thought-provoking responses and 
opinions to study. Many of the interviewees had been residing and employed in their 
respective areas for a while and had seen many changes in their communities. They knew 
the Hampton Roads area very well.  
It was the researcher’s goal to get opinions from sworn officers, civilians, and 
both genders in order to see any differences. Approximately one-third of participants 
were civilians who often performed crime and intelligence analysis and research into the 
topics from a different perspective.   
Study Questions 
Information gathered through the interview process was organized into units of 
analysis. Participants were asked 13 questions, which yielded various results that 
indicated domestic extremist definitions, how each agency perceived these threats, how 
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to mitigate these threats, and what policy changes were necessary to effectively improve 
law enforcement handling of domestic extremism threats.  
Individual Textual Description by Question 
 Question 1:  What is your definition of a domestic extremist? 
After the researcher read the research’s background, especially of the domestic 
extremist nexus, the disclaimer, and any other vital ingredient to this research, question 1 
was immediately asked. The main premise behind this question was to ascertain the 
participants’ knowledge about “what exactly is a domestic extremist,” and the topic at 
hand.  Furthermore, the researcher was eager to hear who the participants thought were 
considered domestic extremists, either groups and/or individuals, and if training is really 
needed for this Hampton Roads study.  The most common response to this question was 
that of an individual and/or group seeking some sort of violence, death, and/or some 
serious physical injury to their target(s). Participant 17 stated that he considered all of the 
domestic extremist groups mentioned before the interview as vital domestic extremists 
who wanted to cause violence toward their intended targets. Another participant stated 
that the domestic extremist hoped to cause some “huge event” full of injuries and deaths 
in order to make known his intentions. Other popular responses include that of a 
“fanatical” ideology trait in order to achieve their overall goal. Extreme views against the 
government was another popular theme stated during the interviews, making extremists 
commit their acts as more of a “political” action and violent act to strike back at the U.S. 
government. Finally, many participants felt that these extremists were “racist,” and had 
(and continued to have) carried out their sinister plots against those individuals and/or 
groups who opposed their views (i.e., White supremacists). 
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The real goal of the question was to gauge the participants’ overall knowledge of 
domestic extremist groups and the ideologies often associated with these groups. Even 
though most of the participants felt that these domestic extremist groups were racist, 
antigovernment, prone to violence, and associated this definition with the sovereign 
citizen movement, many felt that an extremist could be international, domestic, and/or 
homegrown. The opinions were very telling in the respect that these law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies looked at the totality of threats and not at one particular crime group 
and/or individual, which is a good thing for mitigating any type of violence in a 
community. One participant stated that his agency was very proactive, and they were able 
to shift resources (i.e., personnel or enforcement procedures) in a particular part of their 
jurisdiction if needed. 
From the question, codes and themes were developed and are briefly described as 
follows: 
•  Racist Views (RV)  
•  Antigovernment (extreme views against the government) (AG) 
 Violent Acts (seeks harm, injury, and/or death) (VA) 
•  Fanaticism (ideological) (FI) 
 Question 2:  Do you believe you have domestic extremists in your area of 
responsibility? If so, how many individuals/groups do you think you have? 
The main intention behind this question was to ascertain if the participating 
agency had domestic extremists currently in their area of jurisdiction, and if so, did they 
have an idea how many and what type of domestic extremist groups and/or individuals. 
Since the researcher was new to the Hampton Roads area, (the main reason why he 
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undertook to study this area), this question centered on situational awareness and the 
overall area domestic extremist threat stream. Interestingly, most of the participants 
stated that they had a few sovereign citizens and Moorish Nation (a subgroup of 
sovereign citizens) and White supremacy groups had increased during the past year in 
terms of activity/recruiting. White supremacists were the biggest group in the Hampton 
Roads area. Five participants acknowledged large numbers of domestic extremists in their 
jurisdiction, but they could not assign a number to the amount. Participant 17 stated that 
in his jurisdictions, “We have all domestic extremist groups and/or individuals, including 
animal protestors,” but he was not sure how many. Only two agencies reported having no 
domestic extremist groups and/or individuals in their area of jurisdiction.  
From the question, these codes and themes were developed: 
• Yes; few; sovereign citizens/Moorish Nation (YFS) 
• Yes; White supremacists (biggest group) (YWS) 
• Yes; Unknown/hard to put number on identified individuals/groups (YU) 
 Question 3:  How has your agency perceived the domestic extremist threat in your 
area of responsibility? How about agencies around the country? 
Most of the participants responded that their agency perceived the domestic threat 
in their area of responsibility as low. However, another common theme was that 
Hampton Roads law enforcement agencies maintained vigilance and paid close attention 
to their community’s atmosphere in terms of possible violent acts.  One proactive agency 
(Participant 9) advised that his agency monitored any protests conducted in their 
jurisdiction in order to avoid any other group/individual disrupting the event and to 
maintain a peaceful protest. Participant 5 added that even though their threat level was 
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low, they had a “robust intelligence division that will monitor any suspicious behavior, as 
this threat cannot be ignored.” Furthermore, Participant 5 added that his agency trains 
their people concerning the lone wolf threat, and they carefully monitored any threats 
associated with such individuals. Participant 11 added that his agency did not see the 
domestic extremist threat as being all that high. Instead, they saw more street gang 
violence (i.e., Bloods), and as such, they concentrated on mitigating this violence by 
watching for gang wars. Participant 15 added that his agency greatly assisted the state 
and local police agencies by helping out with gang problems, “since they are a bigger 
program as compared to domestic and international terrorism concerns.”  
The second most-common theme associated with this question was that of high 
threats. Participant 4 added that his agency took these threats very seriously by allocating 
all resources for these threats and added the importance of interagency information 
sharing. Participant 1 added, “Any reports of domestic extremist activity would be passed 
to the local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) as they work well hand-in-hand.”   
The most common themes associated with this question were the possible flow of 
interagency intelligence sharing, an agency having its own dedicated intelligence unit 
looking at these threats and keeping close watch on their community’s problem areas. 
 From this question, the following codes and themes were developed: 
• Low (L) 
• High threat (H) 
• Maintain Vigilance (MV) 
 Question 4:  Does your agency currently have a program aimed at combating this 
type of extremism or any type of law enforcement program similar to this? 
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 The most common response to this question was that most of the agencies did not 
have a dedicated domestic extremist program. However, Participant 5 quickly answered 
this question by stating that his department “works with community service agencies and 
with the mental illness spectrum” in ensuring that a patient did not harm himself and/or 
others. Participant 6 added to the community service theme by stating that her agency had 
a robust community stabilization program and crisis intervention program dealing with 
mentally unstable people. Participant 6 said her officers attended civic meetings and 
community events in order to address any concerns. Participant 8 stated, “his agency 
trains church leaders on the various threats.”  The second most-popular theme associated 
with this question was that of the “community service and/or partnership program” aimed 
at mitigating community threats. Most agency members stated they had a dedicated 
intelligence unit looking at these various threats, reporting them to other agencies and/or 
with the JTTF.  
 Another interesting answer to this question was that a few participants stressed the 
need for more training within the department for overall awareness and identification of 
these groups and/or individuals. Some agencies had been training other criminal justice 
personnel on that subject. Participant 7 stated that his agency trained county judges, 
bailiffs, and sheriffs regarding the tactics utilized by the sovereign citizen movement.  
From this question, the following codes and themes were developed: 
• Community Based (CB) 
• Intelligence Dedicated Unit (IU) 
• Joint Law Enforcement Task Force (JTF) 
• No (N) 
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 Question 5:  How about a community-based program aimed at preventing 
domestic extremism or any other criminality issues seen in your jurisdiction? 
 Every member of an agency participating in the current research study reported 
that they had some sort of community-based program aimed at curbing violence in their 
jurisdiction. All but one participant mentioned some sort of a community policing 
initiative, community stabilization program, and/or robust community outreach done in 
order to enhance community relations and communications. Participant 9 stated that his 
agency “tailors community programs toward community needs.” Participant 15, from a 
federal agency, stated that they “link up with state and local agencies who directly 
interface with community groups and work with groups such as NAACP, and ADL, in 
order to ensure no hate crimes/violations have occurred and work at risk communities.” 
 Fostering community communication with each participant’s agency was another 
common theme for this question. According to Participant 1, her agency had a 
“neighborhood watch group, tip lines to call in for anonymous crime tips/suspicious 
person(s), and programs that encourage citizens to get involved reporting more incidents, 
since they are the eyes and ears out there.” 
From this question, the following codes and themes were developed: 
• Community policing (CP) initiative/tactics—to include more community 
involvement programs, better communication, crisis intervention programs, 
community programs aimed at community needs, neighborhood watch groups, 
and tip lines to encourage public calls.  
• No (N)–only 1 response. 
 Question 6:  If not, did your agency have a program combating this type of 
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extremism? 
 Most agency members participating in the current study responded to this 
question by stating that they had some sort of a community policing, community 
awareness, and/or program enhancing communication with the public they served in an 
effort to curtail any violent criminal acts.   
From this question, the following codes and themes were developed: 
• No, but a majority (8 agencies) reported a lot of community policing and 
programs aimed at getting community more involved (NCP). 
 Question 7:  If your agency does not currently have a program combating this 
type of extremism, why not? 
Most (if not all) of the responses from the participants involved in this research 
alluded to currently employing a strong community stabilization and/or policing program 
as the real reason why they did not have a specific preventive extremism program. As 
Participant 15 stated, “Our goal (and continues to be) is relationship building (with the 
public).” The answer sums up what these Hampton Roads law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies personnel stressed with their everyday job assignments and 
proactive community policing tactics, getting the public involved with serious social 
issues such as domestic extremist threats. Participant 2 stated, “We have community 
officers who encourage citizens to report any crime or suspicious activity.”  
Another common theme associated with this question was the fact that some 
agency members thought an extremist program was not needed. Participant 9 saw more 
“situational, juvenile and gang shootings” in his jurisdiction. He added that more 
attention should be placed at investigating gang violence and juvenile crimes, which was 
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the real reason for the violence in this jurisdiction. Participant 13 stated that his agency 
emphasized more vigilance and situational awareness for the patrol officers, as the real 
reason why his agency did not have a dedicated extremist program.  
From this question, the following codes and themes were developed: 
• Not Needed (NN) – lack of extremist activity, many of the shootings/violence are 
situational/gang shootings, already has a strong community stabilization program 
with great community rapport.   
• Currently does (CD) 
 Question 8:  If your agency does have some sort of a community awareness 
and/or extremist prevention program, how would you describe its overall missions, goals, 
process, and any other positives and/or negatives? 
The main theme associated with this question in terms of an agency’s 
goals/missions in overall community awareness and/or extremist programs was that of 
community support, community efforts, and communication platform. Participant 5 stated 
with regard to his agency’s goals/missions, “more community support, community 
policing efforts, better communication with the public and to reach out to more and more 
people to prevent lone wolf attacks.” Participant 14 stated that her agency’s goal was to 
make the public aware and to report, “See something, say something.” Participant 16 
said, “Get the message out of the various services we can assist with.” Almost every 
participant reported their agency having a positive program in working with the public.  
Another common theme associated with this question was the importance of 
positive relationships with other government agencies and/or leaders. Participant 5 stated 
that “good working relationships with city government leaders and federal partners, 
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including task forces, and other federal agencies is a must, and success is all about 
information sharing.” This opinion was shared by many other participants. 
More transparency and having the public see what the police do was another 
major theme with the question. Participant 8 stated, “Transparency is the key in fostering 
positive community relationship.” “We need to train our citizens or through an academic 
institution to see how we conduct our business,” was another opinion given by Participant 
8. Participant 4 added that “Awareness and educating the people in our community is key 
to preventing the extremism dangers.” As it pertained to transparency, Participant 7 
stressed the many hours of community outreach programs his agency performed in order 
for them to see what his agency did, including holding events in elementary schools, 
community centers, and retirement homes.  
From this question, the following codes and themes were developed: 
• Very Positive; excellent community support/community efforts/working 
relationships with government leaders/agencies (VP) 
• More Transparency – train citizens, make them aware (MT) 
 Question 9:  If you could start a new program within your department, what 
would it be? 
 The prevailing theme associated with this question was that of a community base 
program. As Participant 3 stated, a “bottom-up approach” was needed to encompass and 
build upon strengths of the agency, to address community concerns (i.e., gang and/or 
drug issues). Participant 9 stated that the “whole department needs to perform community 
policing efforts,” not just one division (patrol).  
 Another large theme discovered during the analysis phase of this question was 
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that of training. Participant 12 stated that more officers in her department needed more 
“domestic extremist training in the area of the sovereign citizen movement and White 
supremacy groups and/or ideology.” Participant 16 stated that his officers “need more 
tactical training on active shooters.”   
Another common theme associated with this question was that of having more 
officers on task forces in the Hampton Roads area for better intelligence sharing and 
enforcement opportunities. A few participants stressed the need for more participation on 
a task force in order to pass valuable information to each agency and bring it back to their 
senior leadership. Participant 10 stated that he wanted to see a “regional surge team 
where officers from each department are represented and enforce different parts of the 
Hampton Roads area where crime has increased, as this team will travel around the area 
as needed.” 
From this question, the following codes and themes were developed: 
• Community-Based Programs – more of a “bottom up” community approach/good 
for the community/needs (CBP) 
• Training – educate on officer safety issues pertaining to these extremist threats 
(TO) 
• More officers on task forces (JTF) 
 Question 10: What is your opinion on the best way to combat this type of 
extremism? 
Overall, the prevailing theme with this question was training. As Participant 5 
stated, “We need more training in the area of extremism.”  Participant 8 stated that “we 
need to understand them and their motivation behind their missions; we need to 
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understand the enemy.”  Participant 9 stated, “We need training across the board (training 
on all domestic extremist groups and/or individuals linked to this ideology).” This 
training theme also extends to officer safety policing tactics, as Participant 11 stated that 
his agency needs to learn better officer safety techniques when dealing with extremists.  
Another strong theme generated from this question was that of every agency and 
community leader being up-to-date in mitigating this threat. As Participant 7 stated, “All 
as one, work together (community leaders and government leaders), an all-hands 
approach” in mitigating these threats, in addition to “strong communication with each 
agency.” Good actionable intelligence was another strong theme generated from this 
question. Participant 13 stated that “strong intelligence led policing,” and was the key in 
mitigating extremism. Participant 3 added that “good actionable intelligence is needed in 
order to combat this extremism.” Participant 9 stated that a “robust intel group is needed” 
as well, in order to share pertinent intelligence in mitigating this threat.  
Utilizing a strong community policing initiative was another common theme on 
the best way to combat this extremism. Participant 2 stated, “Knowledge of people in the 
community and vulnerable areas” were the best ways to combat extremism. This went 
along with knowing the “pulse of your community” the officers were serving and 
utilizing the proper law enforcement and community resources in dealing effectively with 
this threat. Participant 5 stressed the importance of the community policing model and 
said, “It’s a great tool.” Employing a strong community policing model can also assist 
with receiving valuable tips from the community and utilizing this information firsthand 
to mitigate any threats. Participant 6 made an interesting point that often times extremism 
was tough to stop since law enforcement did not know that the individual had this 
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mentality. The researcher believed by employing a strong community policing model, 
that valuable information from the community would become available.  
From this question, the following codes and themes were developed: 
• Training – better officer safety techniques/awareness (ET) 
• Community policing initiatives – public awareness and reporting mechanism (CP) 
• Good actionable intel and sharing initiatives to include intelligence led policing 
initiatives (GAI) 
 Question 11: Have you heard of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Community 
Awareness Brief or the Justice’s led community awareness program aimed at preventing 
extremism? 
The main premise behind this question was to ascertain the participants’ 
knowledge about the U.S. Department of Justice’s Community Awareness Brief 
presented by the FBI. This was asked to see if these members of the Hampton Roads 
agencies received this extremism training and had a more extensive background on this 
subject. Of the 17 participants, 9 responders answered “no,” they had not heard of this 
brief/program, whereas 8 responders answered “yes,” they had heard of this program. 
This indicated that the topic needed to be taught more at all levels of law enforcement.  
From this question, yes (Y) and no (N) codes and themes were developed. 
 Question 12: How would you say is your agency’s relationship with the public? 
 Most of the participants interviewed for the current research study answered that 
their respective agencies had a very positive relationship with the public. In fact, most of 
the responses stated that they had a very good, good, or excellent relationship with their 
community. Participant 17 made an interesting comment that his agency had a very 
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positive relationship with the public: “We show them online what we are doing in terms 
of community events, become transparent and show how we help the public in dire 
needs.”  This was the transparency part of the other question. Even Participant 5 stated 
that his agency had a good relationship even though it could always be better. He stated, 
“There are still pockets of people who distrust the police.” However, he pointed out that 
his agency was very focused on building upon the community policing model and 
engaging with the community more in all phases (i.e., meetings, working with civic 
leaders, and building relationships in general). Participant 6 pointed out, “Staying 
engaged with the community is the key to success and address concerns.”  On the other 
hand, Participant 1 stated that since her agency was short-staffed, this presented a 
challenge in serving the community, especially with lapses in investigations.   
From this question, the following codes and themes were developed: 
• Very good – 6 responses (VG) 
• Good – 3 responses (G) 
• Excellent stay engaged – 2 responses (EE) 
 Question 13: How would you improve your relationship with the public, i.e., more 
community involvement with joint programs (ride-along programs, fundraisers, class 
instruction, and describing police actions)? 
 The prevailing theme associated with this question was the community approach 
and bottom-up method in stabilizing a community and fostering harmonious 
relationships. Nearly all of the participants mentioned some sort of a community 
relationship, community program, theme. Additionally, effective communication and 
staying engaged with your community were mentioned as vital ways in improving 
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relationships with the public. Most agency members reported that they were already 
performing these important community programs/events, such as ride-along programs, 
citizen academies, fundraisers, sporting events, and public outreach initiatives. 
Participant 5 stressed the importance of citizen/law enforcement relationships and 
understanding several times during his interview. Participant 1 made an interesting point 
by stating, “Be proactive [law enforcement agencies]. Don’t be afraid to try new things in 
the community if needed.”   
• More public/community involvement/relationships – 2 responses (MCI) 
• More public/community programs – 8 responses (citizen’s academies for youths, 
senior citizens, high schools, middle schools, picnics, homeless programs, joint 
sports coaching programs) (MCP) 
Coding 
After the 17 interviews in Hampton Roads, VA, were completed, they were 
transcribed, and the content of the interviews was reviewed and evaluated for 
consistency. As part of the qualitative process of the current research, codes were 
developed from those interviews and were specific to each question based on repetition 
and often used key words from the interviews. Information provided from the interviews 
was coded using predetermined master themes. A master code list, or codebook, was 
developed, with initially 35 individual codes.   
Development of Themes 
A second round of coding was conducted, and this resulted in the condensation 
and development of 24 themes, which included: 
1. Racist Views (RV) described those feelings/attitudes that are considered racist in 
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general. 
2. Antigovernment (AG) described the violent domestic extremist group in the 
research, including the sovereign citizen movement and those individuals who aligned 
with this ideology. 
3. Violent Acts (VA) described those individuals and/or groups that resorted to 
violent acts to express their views and/or carry out their overall mission and goals. 
4. Fanaticism (Ideological) (FI) described those views/opinions that were considered 
radical/extremist as compared to views shared by the general public.  
5. Yes; Few; sovereign citizens/Moorish Nation (YFS), described those participants 
who described as having a few sovereign citizen movement individuals and/or groups in 
their area of responsibility.  
6. Yes; White Supremacists – biggest group (YWS), described those participants 
who described the White supremacists extremist group as the largest group in their area 
of responsibility.  
7. Yes; Unknown/hard to put number on identified individuals/groups (YU), 
described those participants who acknowledged having domestic extremist 
individuals/groups in their area of responsibility, but unsure of exactly how many 
currently operate.  
8. Low (L) illustrated a low threat. 
9. High (H) illustrated a high threat. 
10. Maintain Vigilance (MV) illustrated an agency maintaining situational awareness. 
11. Training (ET) illustrated further training in the area of domestic extremist 
violence awareness and/or educating officer safety issues. 
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12. Intelligence/Information Sharing (IS) described the action in which law 
enforcement agencies share intelligence with each other as it pertained to criminal 
investigations and possible threats to the homeland.  
13. Joint Task Forces (JTF) described as a multi law enforcement agency comprised 
of local, state, and federal law enforcement members working on a certain criminality 
(i.e., terrorism, drugs, cybercrime).  
14. Community Based Programs (CBP) described those community programs aimed 
at increasing communication and harmony between the public and law enforcement, 
including a bottom-up approach/community needs.  
15. Intelligence Units (IU) described those law enforcement agencies that currently 
possessed a dedicated intelligence unit, usually comprised of sworn law enforcement and 
civilian analysts.  
16. Community Policing (CP) was defined as those law enforcement agencies that 
emphasized a joint community/law enforcement initiative to increase community 
awareness (i.e., school resource officers, community resource officers, Drug Abuse 
Resistance Education (DARE), religious and special events officers).  
17. Not Needed (NN) illustrated those agencies that did not have a program 
combating this type of extremism due to a lack of extremist activity. Many of the 
shootings/violence were situational/gang shootings (not extremists). The agency already 
had a strong community stabilization program with great community rapport. 
18. Currently Does (CD) illustrated an agency currently employing a program. 
19. Very Positive (VP) described those agencies with an excellent community 
support/efforts relationship with government leaders, agencies, and the public at large. 
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20. More Transparency (MT) described those actions and accountability measures by 
a law enforcement agency that should be made available for public view and 
consumption. 
21. Good Actionable Intel (GAI) described intelligence-led policing initiatives and 
sharing initiatives with other agencies.  
22. Excellent Stay Engaged (ESE) described those agencies that stayed active with 
their community’s needs and/or were current with any threat measures.  
23. More Public/Community Programs (MPC) described those initiatives/actions 
performed by law enforcement that produced positive results through a community 
policing model and/or public outreach initiative.  
24. More Public/Community Involvement/relationships (MPI) described those 
initiatives/course of business actions aimed at improving relations with the community at 
large.   
For the purpose of endorsing the validity of the research, the coding process 
themes were given to the researcher’s dissertation chair, also a veteran law enforcement 
management practitioner, in order to accurately code these key concepts gathered during 
the interviews.  Representing external validity, by validating the coding, ultimately will 
establish legitimacy of the coding portion of the research and correlate with the pertinent 
data collected.    
Qualitative Validation Techniques 
For the member check, all interviewees were given a brief on the project, 
especially the part being studied in the Hampton Roads area. After the consent form was 
signed by the participants, each answer was read back to the participant, who was given 
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the opportunity to change/add onto their responses. At the end of the interview, the 
participant was asked if he or she wished to make any changes or to add/delete any 
information discussed during the interview. One agency declined to participate in the 
research after the researcher briefed the representative on the research topic. Many 
interviewees offered compliments on this field of research, especially at it pertained to 
the Hampton Roads area. One respondent stated that this research topic was long 
overdue, and all law enforcement agencies and communities needed to understand this 
threat stream.  
Summary 
Chapter Four contained the pertinent Hampton Roads, VA, area-centric domestic 
extremist and law enforcement and community mitigation data, identifying potential 
domestic extremism threats and remedies to counteract these threats. The results from the 
17 interviews from 14 law enforcement and intelligence agencies were analyzed and 
compared to the specific theories mentioned in Chapter 2 as part of the current 
exploratory study, utilizing case studies and a grounded theory concept. The interviews 
were coded, and pertinent research themes were developed. Chapter Five contains a 
summary of the dissertation, conclusions, and recommendations for further research.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 Chapter 1 of the current exploratory research study set the grim tone of the 
increased violence against our law enforcement members in America at the hands of 
domestic extremists. Chapter 1 was used to underscore the history behind this 
phenomenon and how, from a law enforcement, academic community, and a national 
perspective, people need to work together to find ways to mitigate this violent trend. 
National statistics mentioned as part of the research, and the introduction of a Hampton 
Roads, VA law enforcement area research was outlined in order to gauge the overall 
threat against various levels of law enforcement in such a law enforcement and military 
rich environment.  The deadly trends seen around the U.S. currently were the main 
impetus in studying this topic in the Hampton Roads, VA, area to suggest some 
mitigation solutions to those agencies participating in this research. A community 
policing, joint law enforcement and community involvement model plan was seen as the 
most central idea for curtailing this troublesome social problem and protecting male and 
female law enforcement officers.  To provide a sound threat stream foundation based on 
Chapter 1, Chapter 2 involved the literature review on this subject, along with showing 
gaps in the research and the challenge in curtailing this officer safety issue. 
Also in Chapter 2, not only were domestic extremist violence secondary data 
introduced and shown how these domestic extremist issues have become more prevalent 
in the U.S. as compared to international-led extremist violence, the chapter also presented 
some prevention strategies on this topic. Key various domestic extremist groups and 
individuals were identified, their ideologies briefly explained, and their propensity for 
violence was highlighted through case studies. Key mitigating theories and strategies 
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were discussed, with an emphasis on a joint community and law enforcement approach 
along with a national security standpoint to curb the rise in violence against law 
enforcement members.  
Chapter 3 was used to explore why a robust qualitative plan was the best course 
of action for the current exploratory research study. Collecting firsthand opinions and 
perspectives from law enforcement members in the Hampton Roads area and sharing 
their views on this important issue was invaluable, along with comparing them to the 
crucial secondary data collected on this topic.  
After establishing critical coding and the development of key themes, the 
researcher carefully analyzed and evaluated the data collected from the 17 Hampton 
Roads law enforcement and intelligence staff interviews. The interviews provided fruitful 
opinions on the overall domestic extremist threat stream in the Hampton Roads area, 
ways to improve and/or continue great community relations, and ways to improve their 
own agency’s course of business, either with better training, communication, and/or 
having a large task force compiled of all the Hampton Roads law enforcement agencies 
with a concentration on making quality of life arrests and getting guns off the streets.  
Discussion of Findings for Qualitative Portion 
 During data collection, the following questions were asked of 17 Hampton Roads 
law enforcement participants. Twelve initial codes and/or themes were developed as a 
response to the following questions and overall opinions.  
1. What is your definition of a domestic extremist? 
2. Do you believe you have domestic extremists in your area of responsibility?  If 
so, how many individuals/groups do you think you have? 
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3. How has your agency perceived the domestic extremist threat in your area of 
responsibility?  How about agencies around the country? 
4. Does your agency currently have a program aimed at combating this type of 
extremism or any type of law enforcement program similar to this? 
5. How about a community-based program aimed at preventing domestic extremism 
or any other criminality issues seen in your jurisdiction? 
6. If not, did your agency have a program combating this type of extremism? 
7. If your agency does not currently have a program combating this type of 
extremism, why not? 
8. If your agency does have some sort of a community awareness and/or extremist 
prevention program, how would you describe its overall missions, goals, process, and any 
other positives and/or negatives? 
9. If you could start a new program within your department, what would it be? 
10. What is your opinion on the best way to combat this type of extremism? 
11. Have you heard of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Community Awareness Brief 
or the Justice’s-led community awareness program aimed at preventing extremism? 
12. How would you say is your agency’s relationship with the public? 
13. How would you improve your relationship with the public (i.e., more community 
involvement with joint programs, such as ride-along programs, fundraisers, class 
instruction, and describing police actions)? 
The questions were instrumental in collecting valuable information and opinions 
from the Hampton Roads law enforcement members as it pertained to the domestic 
extremist threat in their respective areas of responsibility. This key information resulted 
164 
 
 
 
in the development of the following themes:  
1. Racist Views (RV) 
2. Antigovernment (AG) 
3. Violent Acts (VA) 
4. Fanaticism (Ideological) (FI)  
5. Yes; Few; sovereign citizens/Moorish Nation (YFS)  
6. Yes; White supremacists – biggest group (YWS)   
7. Yes; Unknown/hard to put number on identified individuals/groups (YU)  
8. Low (L) 
9. High (H) 
10. Maintain Vigilance (MV) 
11. Training (ET) 
12. Intelligence/Information Sharing (IS)   
13. Joint Task Forces (JTF)   
14. Community Based Programs (CBP)  
15. Intelligence Units (IU)   
16. Community Policing (CP)   
17. Not Needed (NN) 
18. Currently Does (CD) 
19. Very Positive (VP) 
20. More Transparency (MT) 
21. Good Actionable Intel (GAI)   
22. Excellent Stay Engaged (ESE)   
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23. More Public/Community Programs (MPC)   
24. More Public/Community Involvement/relationships (MPI)    
These themes provided an excellent foundation for the development of the overall 
research’s findings and themes and provided the opportunity for future training of law 
enforcement in the Hampton Roads, VA area. These interviews gave the participant a 
better perspective of his or her agency’s challenges, as the researcher was told numerous 
times, “Good question. I really never thought of that.”  Moreover, additional research on 
this topic is needed, especially due to the fluidity of such violence around America. Also, 
as one police agent said, “We have a tough time keeping our officers here, as they tend to 
transfer after they get fully certified here in the state of Virginia.”  Having continuous 
training with this agency could ensure a top-notch education with officer safety concerns, 
especially because these threats and overall violence do not appear to be dissipating.  
Implications for Practice 
 One of the major goals of the current study was to make members of law 
enforcement agencies more aware of these domestic extremist groups and individuals and 
their overall desire for violence against the police. A few participants told the researcher 
that they are aware of these individuals in their jurisdiction, but they were not sure 
exactly where they resided, met and/or conducted their hateful/illegal operations. It was 
the researcher’s goal to motivate members of these agencies to investigate exactly where 
these individuals and groups reside and conduct their business so the next officer who 
shows up for a call does not get ambushed. If one officer’s life can be saved from this 
study based on greater awareness and vigilance, then the current study was well worth the 
time and research dedicated.  
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 One of the major themes mentioned during the interviews was the need for more 
training in this field. All participants had heard of the sovereign citizen movement and 
the White supremacist ideology, especially because they were only a couple hours away 
from the infamous Charlottesville, VA, incident. If properly implemented and with a 
large agency taking the lead with the training, perhaps the Joint Terrorism Task Force, 
more and more officers would understand this threat more accurately and be aware of the 
gravity of this violence. 
Recommendations for Changes in Current Law Enforcement Procedures 
Throughout the interview process and data collection, four significant themes kept 
occurring. 
 More training on this issue 
 Better intelligence sharing 
 More officers on task forces 
 Better communication with the public to prevent lone wolf attacks and within the 
department 
 More training. When interviewing the participants in the current research, one of 
the prevailing themes was for consistent training on this topic. The researcher was 
astonished to hear only mention of the sovereign citizen movement and street gangs, such 
as the Bloods. After the interview, and during some open discussion about the overall 
project, many of the participants stated, “I didn’t think of the militia groups and/or 
antigovernment individuals.”  Most of the participants thought of the extremist threat 
coming from street gang criminal enterprises and from the drug and gun trafficking 
criminal organizations. One participant mentioned, “Consistent training in this field is 
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needed within the department, in order to be more aware of their surroundings.”  Another 
participant stated that a “change is needed in how officers think (more awareness) for this 
topic; a change is needed in the law enforcement culture.” Furthermore, this type of 
training needs to be mandated by the state, which that participant also stated. If this 
training has to come from an outside source such as the Southern Poverty Law Center 
and/or the Anti-Defamation League, then those organizations should be contacted and put 
on a Hampton Roads area training list.  
The researcher mentioned these outside agencies and even himself as possible 
training platforms to a few participants who brought up the training challenge. 
Interestingly enough, all of these trainings, especially on domestic extremists, were what 
Carter et al. (2014) described were needed in modern law enforcement officers, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Many of his law enforcement participants stated, “The 
importance of training in overall day-to-day preparedness and understanding the many 
threats presented to law enforcement.” It was understood that some law enforcement 
agencies did not have the staff to cover training and/or the budget to allow officers to 
attend such training. However, if just one life could be saved, it seemed worth it.  
 Better intelligence sharing. The topic became highly important after 9/11 and 
yet it continues to be a stumbling block according to some participants. The response 
came from within the department and from outside agencies such as the state and federal 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Officer safety intelligence sharing must be 
better in order to save the lives of the men and women who work the streets protecting 
our communities. One agency member advised that better intelligence sharing must take 
place within their own department. The patrol and investigations sections had to talk 
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more often and effectively.  In any event, intelligence needed to improve, and the 
following two categories would certainly assist with this endeavor.  
 More officers on task forces. A few participants mentioned that by having more 
officers on task forces (i.e., terrorism, drugs, cyber, and safe streets) would allow their 
members of agency to know more about what was going on in other jurisdictions in the 
Hampton Roads area. The recommendation cannot be stressed enough in terms of 
intelligence sharing and information an officer can pass up and down the chain within the 
department, especially road patrol officers who usually deal with these extremists 
unexpectedly.  One participant said, “They know they have extremists in their 
jurisdiction, and they travel quite a bit.”  Having an officer on a Joint Terrorism Task 
Force working multiple jurisdictions and possessing that area knowledge would be 
extremely beneficial to all members of the task force. Every jurisdiction/member brings a 
specialty to the table and this information can be brought back to their respective 
agencies. One example of this would be having knowledge of a White supremacy group 
organized in one jurisdiction and actively recruiting and/or committing crimes in another. 
The officer who worked where the group mostly stayed would be important for being 
able to identify the key players, including their criminal history and whether they are 
known to carry weapons. 
 Better communication with the public/maintain strong community policing 
model. Having better communication with the public was a response that came from 
multiple interviews, especially when attempting to understand a community’s needs. The 
researcher was a little surprised to hear this, but it was quite pleasing to understand the 
officers were striving for good relations with their communities. One participant stated 
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that more police agencies should have a bottom-up approach in mitigating harmful threats 
and getting community leaders more active in the joint approach in securing their own 
communities. Better communication with the community in general was also a very 
popular theme mentioned in the current study. Participants said that having better 
communication with the public meant gathering more useful information from the public 
they served to help curtail possible future criminality and mitigate officer safety threats.  
 Based on this, the recommendation is to increase the community policing 
initiative and/or start stress it more in the larger police departments, and more 
importantly, to engage community leaders to tackle bottom-up issues and challenges. By 
soliciting the public’s assistance, collecting more useful information on various threats 
and needed police resources, will go a long way toward ensuring a harmonious 
communication system.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The current study topic is an unfortunately fluid law enforcement officer safety 
issue, thus the first recommendation for future research is to conduct another Hampton 
Roads research study in another year or two, especially after members of the law 
enforcement agencies interviewed had attended domestic extremist training. Another 
reason why this area-centric research should be performed is the fact that many agencies 
were contacted for an interview request and never responded. One, for some unknown 
reason, retracted its answers. Since the researcher felt privileged to research the Hampton 
Roads area based on the strong military presence, including the largest U.S. Navy base in 
the world, with a vast amount of law enforcement areas within a 50-mile radius, 
contacting the other agencies that didn’t participate in the original study would be good to 
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gain their perspectives. Another plus for this area is the overall population diversity. 
Researching a diverse sample gave the researcher several vital perspectives on different 
extremist group activities and possible criminality. A future research project would 
enhance these diverse opinions.   
 The second recommendation for future research would be to conduct this same 
type of research in other states and/or different parts of Virginia and analyze the data to 
see if there were similar results in response to domestic extremist threats, law 
enforcement tactics (i.e., community policing, community/law enforcement programs). 
Researching other parts of Virginia might pinpoint other extremists’ activities, such as 
militia extremists, who were hardly mentioned, if at all, during the Hampton Roads 
research project. Are there new groups to report?  Have White supremacy groups spread 
all across Virginia?  Are there more lone wolf ambushes against law enforcement?   
 The third recommendation would be to return to the Hampton Roads area and 
speak with the same participants after a few years and see if any of their opinions had 
changed based on experience, and, hopefully, more training. Since many of the 
participants had many years on the job, perhaps they may have retired since the last 
interview. Who took their place, and did that colleague feel the same way? It was 
gratifying to hear from the participants that this topic was considered worthwhile and 
worth the participants’ time. Hopefully, the next time such research is performed, there 
will not have been the loss of an officer’s life, and the law enforcement community will 
be better informed and trained on this vital issue.  
 The final recommendation would be to return to the Hampton Roads area to speak 
with community leaders on their relationship with their respective police agencies. All of 
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the interviews in the current study were conducted with law enforcement personnel 
giving responses. What about the community leaders’ opinions? How do they feel the 
relationship is with the local police department, and what are some ways in which the 
relationship could be better? Do they feel that the extremist issue is being addressed? 
How about other criminal threats to the overall safety and security of the community? 
Conclusion 
 The main impetus behind this research topic was to inform and make aware, if it 
was not already known, to the law enforcement and academic communities of the never-
ending social threat facing members of law enforcement and how the law enforcement 
and academic communities can mitigate these threats. It seemed like daily during the 
writing of the dissertation, America lost a law enforcement officer to a sinister ambush, 
unexpected gunfire from a car being pulled over, or to disturbed individuals who wanted 
to kill police officers for their own ideology and/or make a name for themselves. To 
achieve the main mission of the current study, it was necessary to provide secondary data 
to expose this national threat, in addition to supplying relevant case studies about the 
groups and individuals responsible for this violence.  
A systematic and robust literature review was performed, exposing the increase in 
violence against law enforcement while also collecting secondary data, charts, and tables 
concerning this serious officer safety issue. Vital case studies were mentioned to pinpoint 
who were these domestic extremist individuals and groups responsible for the law 
enforcement murders.  One constant theme during this research project was the fact that 
these targeted police killings continued to climb each year.  
However, the most dominant factor in this research, and the one for which the 
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researcher attempted to suggest ways to mitigate these threats, came mostly from 
literature review studies, theoretic concepts, and law enforcement officer interviews—the 
lone wolf.  As one participant said, “One of the things that keeps me up at night is the 
lone wolf threat.  We know nothing about them and what their next move is.” Ironically, 
that came from the first interview, and that bone-chilling thought resonated in the 
researcher ever since. In reality, law enforcement members do not know when the next 
shooting will take place and against whom. This is a great concern. However, a common 
theme throughout the interviews was that either a good relationship with the public was 
already in place through hard community outreach efforts, or a bottom-up community 
approach was already established in certain Hampton Roads communities to address the 
growing criminality in those areas and to mitigate those threats. Working with 
community leaders is a good place to start diffusing any unnecessary biases and to create 
understanding with community members. 
Another common theme highlighted in this research was the need for strong 
communication between law enforcement and with the communities they serve. As many 
participants said, “This is a great start, but it can get better.” These concepts were 
mentioned by Mann (2015) and confirmed what the participants reported and the themes 
and concepts from Schanzer et al.’s (2016) research, as well as research by the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (2014). All of the key research concepts 
discussed in Chapter 2 emphasized the necessity of a healthy relationship between the 
community at large and with authority figures. The important information collected from 
the Hampton Roads law enforcement and intelligence personnel interviews only 
confirmed these concepts.  
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The information collected from the law enforcement interviews was invaluable 
understanding key perspectives from state and national agencies. What was even more 
impressive was the experience level of the participants, their years of service, and their 
overall knowledge of the Hampton Roads area, especially where pockets of extremist 
activity had taken place. However, each jurisdiction was different. Members of each 
agency interviewed stated how the law enforcement community needed to work together 
more than usual, because many of these threats were transient and tough to keep track of 
at times, especially relating to perpetrators’ criminal backgrounds. Finally, it was very 
encouraging to hear about the strong, robust community policing, outreach, participation 
and awareness initiatives being employed in Hampton Roads law enforcement 
communities to curtail these violent attacks while improving community relationships. 
These programs need to continue in order to prevent any further targeted acts of violence 
and, most importantly, to potentially save officers’ lives.  
Epilogue 
 As the research was conducted over several months, in addition to law 
enforcement and intelligence members being interviewed about this threatening topic, 
and all the vast academic and law enforcement associations websites, portals, and 
journals that were studied to secure vital secondary data, it became increasingly clear that 
the threat against members of law enforcement was not going away. Instead, such 
violence has surged over 10 years, and 2018 was so far one of the most violent years on 
record for law enforcement murders. As of March 14, 2018, 30 law enforcement officers 
around the country had been killed in the line of duty, of which 17 were killed by gunfire 
(Officer Down Memorial Page, 2018a). Not surprisingly, firearms were the weapon 
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choice of the perpetrators executing these officers.  
Roughly 135 cops died in 2016, making it the deadliest year for police officers in 
at least 5 years, and while there were few deaths in 2017, the numbers weren’t 
much better: A total of 129 officers died last year. And 46 of those deaths were 
caused by gunfire in the whole scope of things. (Farber, 2018) 
While the loss of an officer’s life is a tragedy, most of the senseless deaths in 
2018 have been those officers responding to a domestic disturbance, only to be executed 
while on the scene. One Colorado deputy was killed by an antigovernment loner who 
hated law enforcement. The deputy went to the house, responding to a disturbance call. In 
reality, it really does not matter how the officers died, just that their deaths are 
unnecessary. All phases of the law enforcement and the academic community must work 
together to find ways to mitigate these threats.  
When New York City Police Commissioner James O’Neill tweeted his 
condolences to the Westerville, Ohio, police family who lost officers, Eric Joering and 
Anthony Morelli, to an ambush, the commissioner accurately described today’s volatile 
attitude toward law enforcement members: 
".@Westerville PD confirms 2 officers ambushed & killed today after responding 
to a 911 hang-up; fired upon when they arrived at the address. Everyone should 
be as upset about this as America's law enforcement officers are. No cop, 
anywhere, 'signed up' to be murdered," he wrote (Cerullo & Schladebeck, 2018).  
In the short time between January and March 2018, the following law 
enforcement officers gave the ultimate sacrifice; they were either targeted or ambushed 
by deranged individuals:  
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 January 8, 2018, Deputy Sheriff Daniel A. McCartney of the Pierce County 
Sheriff’s Office, Washington State, investigated a burglary and was shot and killed while 
chasing the suspect on foot. Deputy McCartney served 3 years with the Pierce County 
Sheriff’s Office.  
 January 17, 2018, Detective Michael Doty of the York County Sheriff’s Office, 
South Carolina, was killed while chasing a subject into the woods who had just attacked 
his wife. The subject ambushed Detective Doty in the woods, and he succumbed to his 
injuries a day later. Three deputies and a K-9 officer were also injured (Farber, 2018). 
Detective Doty served 11 years with the York County Sheriff’s Office.  
 January 18, 2018, Deputy U.S. Marshal Christopher David Hill was shot and 
killed while attempting to execute a warrant on a female making terrorist threats. Once 
inside the home, a male ambushed Hill and two other officers, who thankfully survived. 
Deputy U.S. Marshal Hill served 11 years with the U.S. Marshals Service.  
 January 24, 2018, Deputy Heath Gumm of the Adams County Sheriff’s Office in 
Colorado was shot and killed while responding to a disturbance call (Farber, 2018). The 
suspect was well known for hating law enforcement. Deputy Gumm was a 5-year veteran 
of the Adams County Sheriff’s Office.  
 January 28, 2018, Police Officer Glenn Doss, Jr., was shot in the head and chest 
while responding to a domestic call on January 24 (Farber, 2018). The suspect opened 
fire on the officers while they were still inside their patrol car.  Officer Doss was a 2-year 
veteran of the Detroit Police Department. 
 February 5, 2018, Deputy Sheriff Micah Flick of the El Paso County Sheriff’s 
Office in Colorado was shot and killed as he and other officers attempted to take a 
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suspect into custody. Officer Flick was a 11-year veteran of the El Paso County Sheriff’s 
Office.  
 February 7, 2018, Officer David Sherrard of the Richardson Police Department in 
Texas was killed while responding to a disturbance call. Officer Sherrard was a 13-year 
veteran of the Richardson Police Department  
 February 9, 2018, Officer Chase Maddox of the Locust Grove Police Department, 
Georgia, was killed while serving a traffic warrant. Officer Maddox was a 5-year veteran 
of the Locust Grove Police Department (Farber, 2018). 
 February 10, 2018, Officer Eric Joering of the Westerville Police Department in 
Ohio was ambushed while responding to a domestic situation. Officer Joering had been 
with the Westerville Police Department for 16 years (Cerullo & Schladebeck, 2018). 
 February 10, 2018, Officer Anthony Morelli of the Westerville Police Department 
in Ohio was ambushed while responding to a domestic situation. Officer Morelli was a 
29-year veteran of the department (Cerullo & Schladebeck, 2018). 
 February 21, 2018, Police Officer Justin Billa of the Mobile Police Department in 
Alabama was shot and killed by a barricaded subject. Police Officer Billa was a 2-year 
veteran of the department.  
 February 21, 2018, Corporal Mujahid A. Ramazziddin of the Prince George’s 
Police Department in Maryland was killed while assisting a neighbor involved in a 
domestic dispute. Corporal Ramazziddin, a 14-year veteran of the department, was also a 
medal of valor recipient. 
 March 2, 2018, Deputy Jacob Pickett of the Boone County Sheriff’s Office in 
Indiana was killed while pursuing a wanted fugitive. Deputy Pickett was a 3-year veteran 
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of the Sheriff’s Office and a 2-year veteran of the Tipton County Sheriff’s Department. 
(Meeks & Flora, 2018).  
 March 6, 2018. Police Officer Christopher Ryan Morton, Clinton Police 
Department in Missouri, was shot and killed when he and two other officers responded to 
an unknown situation as the result of a 911 call at approximately 9:20 p.m. Officer 
Morton was a 3-year veteran of the Clinton Police Department. (Officer Down Memorial 
Page, 2018b) 
 March 9, 2018. Police Officer Greggory Casillas of the Pomona Police 
Department, California, was shot and killed as he attempted to arrest a man following a 
vehicle pursuit. Officer Casillas had served with the Pomona Police Department for 6 
months and was still in the field-training phase of his service. (Officer Down Memorial 
Page, 2018c)   
 March 12, 2019. Reserve Officer Christopher Lawton of the Zachary Police 
Department, Louisiana, was killed after being intentionally struck by a vehicle as he 
attempted to serve a narcotics-related felony warrant (Officer Down Memorial Page, 
2018e). Officer Lawton served part-time, unpaid, and was also a Zachary Fire 
Department full-time firefighter.  
 March 13, 2018. Police Officer Scotty Hamilton of the Pikeville Police 
Department, Kentucky, was shot and killed while responding to a call and assisting in a 
murder investigation. Officer Hamilton was a 12-year veteran of the Pikeville Police 
Department (Officer Down Memorial Page, 2018d) 
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